People v. Spruill
| Decision Date | 12 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | 2017–04490,Ind. No. 13008/95 |
| Citation | 164 A.D.3d 1270,82 N.Y.S.3d 520 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, etc., appellant, v. Tasker SPRUILL, respondent. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Victor Barall, and Morgan J. Dennehy of counsel, Brooklyn), for appellant.
Rita Dave, Brooklyn, NY, for respondent.
JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, J.P., SHERI S. ROMAN, FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the People from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Michael Gerstein, J.), entered March 27, 2017, which, after a hearing, granted those branches of the defendant's motion which were pursuant to CPL 440.10(1)(b), (f), and (h) to vacate a judgment of the same court (Ariel E. Belen, J.) rendered September 16, 1998, convicting him of murder in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, and those branches of the defendant's motion which were pursuant to CPL 440.10(1)(b), (f), and (h) to vacate the judgment rendered September 16, 1998, are denied, the judgment is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, which, upon at least two days' notice to the defendant and his attorney, shall promptly direct the defendant to surrender himself to the court in order that execution of the judgment may resume.
The defendant was charged with murder in the second degree, among other crimes, in connection with the shooting death of Tracey Thomas on October 22, 1993. Thomas was shot and killed as he sat in his car outside a game room operated by the defendant, who was known as "Pike."
The evidence at trial, which was conducted in 1998, included the testimony of two eyewitnesses who identified the defendant as the shooter. One eyewitness to the shooting, Marilyn Connor, testified that she heard a gunshot and saw a spark coming from the defendant, who was standing in front of Thomas. Connor stated that she had seen the defendant "[o]nce or twice" before. The other eyewitness, Shawn Newton, testified that the defendant exited the game room, approached Thomas's car, and shot Thomas in the chest. Newton stated that he had known the defendant "all [his] life." Newton was incarcerated at the time of trial on charges unrelated to those against the defendant. He also testified regarding an implied threat that was made to him by a fellow inmate concerning Newton's testimony in this case. Several police officers testified concerning the efforts that were made to locate the defendant following the shooting, and that the police were unable to find him until August 1997, when he was apprehended in Baltimore. After he was apprehended, the defendant told a detective assigned to the fugitive task force that his name was Kevin Michael Mulberry. The People and the defendant also entered into a stipulation at trial that the defendant "at one time had a small tattoo on ... his left arm," which said "Pike." At the time of trial, however, the tattoo, which was shown to the jury, depicted a panther.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted the defendant of murder in the second degree. The judgment of conviction was affirmed on direct appeal by decision and order of this Court dated November 4, 2002 (see People v. Spruill , 299 A.D.2d 374, 750 N.Y.S.2d 312 ).
In March 2016, the defendant moved to vacate the judgment, inter alia, pursuant to CPL 440.10(1)(b) on the ground that the judgment was procured by duress, misrepresentation, or fraud on the part of the prosecutor, and pursuant to CPL 440.10(1)(f) and (h) on the ground that the prosecution violated its duty to disclose certain material favorable to the defense. Specifically, the defendant argued that the prosecution had violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) by failing to disclose certain pretrial orders pursuant to which Newton was produced from prison to meet with the prosecutor to discuss his testimony. The defendant argued that these "Damiani orders" (see generally People v. Jackson, 65 N.Y.2d 265, 267 n. 1, 491 N.Y.S.2d 138, 480 N.E.2d 727 ), were explicitly contingent on Newton providing his written consent to being taken into temporary custody by detective investigators representing the District Attorney's Office; however, Newton's signature was absent from the consent sections of those orders. Additionally, the defendant argued, among other things, that the prosecutor had "abused a secret material witness" order to obtain Connor's testimony, and that Newton's testimony at trial was coerced.
The Supreme Court directed that a hearing be held on the defendant's motion with respect to the issues of whether Newton had consented to meet with the prosecutor approximately 20 times prior to trial, as Newton had testified at trial, or whether his testimony was coerced, and whether the prosecutor engaged in a deliberate pattern of deception upon the court. At the hearing, testimony was elicited from, among other witnesses, the Assistant District Attorney who prosecuted the case against the defendant (hereinafter the prosecutor). The record indicates that due to an apparent medical condition, Newton was not called as a witness at the hearing, which commenced in August 2016.
Following the hearing, the Supreme Court determined, among other things, that the People had committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose the Damiani orders that the prosecutor had used to secure Newton's presence, one of which contained the notation "refused," as well as evidence that Newton had refused to be produced to meet with the prosecutor. Additionally, the court found that the People had violated Brady by failing to disclose a record from the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (hereinafter DOCCS) evidencing that Newton had attempted suicide in his cell at or around the time period that he was supposed to be produced to meet with the prosecutor. The court determined that Newton's lack of written consent to the meetings with the prosecutor constituted material which could have been used to further impeach Newton, and that Newton's suicide attempt, explicit refusal to be produced, and lack of written consent to production could have supported the defense argument that Newton's testimony was coerced and not credible. The court also determined that the prosecutor had improperly failed to disclose that he had obtained a material witness order to secure Connor's testimony. While the court concluded that application of the "reasonable possibility" standard was appropriate in evaluating the subject Brady violations, the court found that it was both "reasonably probable" and "reasonably possible" that the undisclosed items would have changed the outcome of the proceedings.
The Supreme Court further determined that the prosecutor had engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by failing to correct Newton's testimony concerning the number of times that he had met with the prosecutor prior to trial, and by referring to that testimony during his summation. The court also determined that the defendant was entitled to relief pursuant to CPL 440.10(1)(b) inasmuch as "there was evidence that Newton was subject to duress by being repeatedly produced to meet with [the prosecutor] after his suicide attempt and refusals [to be produced]." Accordingly, the court granted those branches of the defendant's motion which were pursuant to CPL 440.10(1)(b), (f), and (h) to vacate the judgment, and directed a new trial. The People appeal.
A defendant has a right, guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions, to discover favorable evidence, known as Brady material, in the People's possession which is material to either guilt or punishment (see Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194 ; People v. Bryce , 88 N.Y.2d 124, 128, 643 N.Y.S.2d 516, 666 N.E.2d 221 ; People v. Wagstaffe , 120 A.D.3d 1361, 1363, 992 N.Y.S.2d 340 ). "The prosecutor's duty to exchange Brady material extends to the disclosure of evidence that can be used to impeach the credibility of a witness for the People whose testimony may be determinative of the defendant's guilt" ( People v. Wagstaffe , 120 A.D.3d at 1363, 992 N.Y.S.2d 340 ; see Giglio v. United States , 405 U.S. 150, 154–155, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) ; People v. Baxley, 84 N.Y.2d 208, 213, 616 N.Y.S.2d 7, 639 N.E.2d 746 ).
"To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that (1) the evidence is favorable to the defendant because it is either exculpatory or impeaching in nature; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution; and (3) prejudice arose because the suppressed evidence was material" ( People v. Fuentes , 12 N.Y.3d 259, 263, 879 N.Y.S.2d 373, 907 N.E.2d 286 ; see People v. Salton , 74 A.D.3d 997, 999, 905 N.Y.S.2d 199 ). "In New York, where a defendant makes a specific request for a document, the materiality element is established provided there exists a ‘reasonable possibility’ that it would have changed the result of the proceedings" ( People v. Fuentes , 12 N.Y.3d at 263, 879 N.Y.S.2d 373, 907 N.E.2d 286, quoting People v. Vilardi , 76 N.Y.2d 67, 77, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518, 555 N.E.2d 915 ). "Absent a specific request by defendant for the document, materiality can only be demonstrated by a showing that there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that it would have changed the outcome of the proceedings" ( People v. Fuentes , 12 N.Y.3d at 263, 879 N.Y.S.2d 373, 907 N.E.2d 286, quoting People v. Bryce , 88 N.Y.2d at 128, 643 N.Y.S.2d 516, 666 N.E.2d 221 ; see People v. Vilardi , 76 N.Y.2d at 73, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518, 555 N.E.2d 915 ; People v. Salton , 74 A.D.3d at 998–999, 905 N.Y.S.2d 199 ; People v. Bryant , 247 A.D.2d 400, 401, 668 N.Y.S.2d 646 ). "The mere possibility that undisclosed evidence, which was not requested, might have helped the defense or affected the outcome of the trial does not...
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