People v. St. Cyr

• Decision Date: 06 September 1974
• Docket Number: No. 10,10
• Citation: 392 Mich. 605,221 N.W.2d 389
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Albert A. ST. CYR, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 389

221 N.W.2d 389

392 Mich. 605

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Albert A. ST. CYR, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Sept. 6, 1974.

F. Hubert Mather, Pros. Atty., Baraga County, for the People; Prosecuting Attorneys Appellate Service, Howard C. Marderosian, Acting Director by William P. Weiner, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, of counsel.

Andrew H. Wisti of Wisti & Jaaskelainen, Hancock, for defendant-appellant.

Before the Entire Bench.

FITZGERALD, Justice.

Defendant was tried by jury and convicted of first degree murder, a violation of M.C.L.A. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction in an unpublished per curiam opinion.

While defendant raises a number of issues on appeal, we choose to discuss only one, dealing with instruction of the jury by the trial court. We find that improper instruction of the jury requires reversal and remand for new trial.

On the evening of December 20, 1970, defendant Albert St. Cyr and his wife Barbara encountered the deceased, Fred Roth, and his wife Marlene in the Huron Bay tavern located in Baraga County, Michigan. Prior to their meeting, animosity existed between the parties due to the fact that the Roths had for a period of time concealed two runaway children of defendant and his wife. During the course of a heated discussion between Barbara St. Cyr and Marlene Roth, Marlene Roth disclosed that her husband had ahd sexual intercourse with Sandra St. Cyr, the 15-year-old daughter of defendant. Shortly thereafter, defendant and his wife departed the tavern. Defendant's wife became extremely agitated as a result of the disclosure.

Upon arriving at his home, defendant inquired of his daughter and learmed that the facts respecting Fred Roth's conduct had been accurately reported. At around 12:30 a.m., defendant called the Baraga County Sheriff to inform him of the rape of his daughter and demanded immediate action against Fred Roth. Not satisfied by the sheriff's response, he informed the sheriff that he was going to the Roth home. The sheriff testified that defendant indicated on the phone that he was going to shoot Fred Roth. Defendant thereupon grabbed a rifle and left by car for the Roth home. He testified that his initial rage cooled during the drive to the Roth home and that he was resolved to hold Fred Roth in custody until the sheriff arrived.

The testimony respecting what occurred in the Roth home upon defendant's arrival is that of defendant and Marlene Roth. Defendant testified that he knocked on the door and received no response. He then opened the door and entered, announcing that he wished to speak to Fred Roth. His actions did succeed in rousing Fred Roth and a confrontation ensued in the kitchen of the Roth home. After an initial grappling for the gun, Marlene Roth's entry into the kitchen caused the parties to separate. She turned on the kitchen light. Fred Roth then pulled out a chair at the kitchen table as if to sit down and asked Marlene Roth to get him some cigarettes. She departed the kitchen in search of the cigarettes only, shortly thereafter, to hear shouting and a gun go off.

By defendant's account, he was momentarily distracted in the kitchen when he saw his car lights on and realized he had also left the motor running. During this interval someone, presumably Fred Roth, grabbed the barrel of the gun and the gun discharged killing Fred Roth.

The theories of the defense at trial were insanity and that the shooting was the result of the accidental discharge of defendant's weapon. With respect to the latter theory, defendant requested that the following charge be given by the trial court:

'If you find from the evidence that the weapon of Albert A. St. Cyr discharged accidentally then I instruct that you cannot find the defendant guilty of murder and you must find him not guilty of murder.' Defendant's Instruction No. 2.

The trial court declined to give the instruction, commenting that it was 'argumentative'. ¹

After the trial judge had accurately explained to the jury defendant's theory of the case--that the killing was accidental and therefore excusable homicide--and when the judge was mearing the close of his instructions, he gave the following instructions:

'The defendant in this case, Ladies and Gentlemen, further claims that the gun discharged accidentally. You have heard the evidence in this case and know what the circumstances are, and you should judge from all of the evidence, as I mentioned, the shooting, the alleged scuffling, the defendant's conduct at the time of the shooting, whether or not it was accidental.

'Now there has been mention in this case that after the defendant entered the deceased's dwelling the deceased grabbed at the rifle held by the defendant. I charge you that if you find as a matter of fact that the deceased believed that he had a reasonable cause to believe his life was in danger, or that he was in danger of great bodily harm, he had every right to try to defend himself by grabbing the rifle or by resorting to such force. The actions of the deceased are to be judged from the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time, and the fact that his attempt to protect himself by grabbing the rifle held by the defendant caused the gun to fire kill him does not in any way excuse the defendant from this offense.'

No objection to this instruction was made by defense counsel at trial.

Able counsel for defendant contends, and we agree, that reversible error was committed in the giving of the above instruction. Indeed, the instruction given had the result of completely distorting the meaning of instructions earlier given by the trial judge. In the words of defendant's counsel:

'* * * the trial court (by this instruction) instructed the jury that they must find the defendant guilty of first degree murder even if the shooting occurred at (sic) the result of an accident and regardless of the defendant's state of mind when the incident occurred. This instruction is patently wrong.

'The defendant contended that he should be found innocent of the offenses with which he was charged if the jury should decide, as a matter of fact, that the deceased caused the weapon to be fired when he grabbed the weapon held by the defendant. This was the thrust of the trial strategy of defense counsel and this theory is implicit in the defendant's requested Instruction No. 2.

'On the other hand, the trial court instructed the jury that, if the behavior of the deceased was reasonable under the circumstances (as he perceived them), the fact that the deceased caused his own death by grasping the rifle in the hands of Albert St. Cyr would not excuse Albert St. Cyr of first degree murder or related lesser included offenses.'

The instruction given resulted in a misdirection of the jury on the requisite intent to sustain a conviction of first degree murder or its included offenses because the instruction erroneously focused jury attention upon the state of mind of the deceased rather than that of the defendant. This instruction also misinformed the jury that defendant could be convicted of first degree murder or its included offenses if the Deceased's actions, as opposed to the defendant's own actions, caused the deceased's death. As is noted by defendant's counsel, the instruction had the...