People v. Stacker

• Decision Date: 10 August 1931
• Docket Number: No. 17189.,17189.
• Citation: 322 Ill. 232,153 N.E. 354
• Parties: PEOPLE v. STACKER.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

322 Ill. 232

153 N.E. 354

PEOPLE

v.STACKER.

No. 17189.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 16, 1926.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 8,1926.

Error to Hancock County Court; Warren H. Orr, Judge.

William Stacker was convicted of operating a motor vehicle on public highway while intoxicated, and he brings error.

Affirmed.

Hartzell, Cavanagh & Martin, of Carthage, for plaintiff in error.

Oscar E. Carlstrom, Atty. Gen., Homer H. Williams, State's Atty., of Hamilton, and Merrill F. Wehmhoff, of Decatur, for the People.

DE YOUNG, J.

An information charging that William Stacker, on July 4, 1925, while intoxicated, operated a motor vehicle upon a public highway in Hancock county, was filed in the county court of that county. Stacker pleaded not guilty and waived a trial by jury. The court found him guilty, and after motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were overruled Stacker was sentenced to pay a fine of $100 and to be imprisoned in the county jail for 30 days. This writ of error followed. The prosecution is based upon section 41 of the act entitled ‘An act in relation to motor vehicles and to repeal a certain act therein named,’ approved June 30, 1919, in force January 1, 1920 (Laws 1919, p. 687), which reads:

‘Any person who shall drive or operate a motor vehicle or motor bicycle upon any public highway of this state while drunk or intoxicated, shall, upon conviction thereof, for each offense, be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail for a period not exceeding sixty days or by both such fine and imprisonment.’

No question of fact is involved on this review, but it is contended by Stacker, the plaintiff in error, that section 41 of the Motor Vehicle Act violates section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution, which provides that no act shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title, because, he argues: (1) There is nothing in the title to the Motor Vehicle Act which expresses the purpose of section 41; and (2) that section has no relation to motor vehicles, but is only concerned with the condition of the driver.

[1] The constitutional provision that no act shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in the title, prohibits the passage of an act containing provisions not fairly included in the title. Milne v. People, 224 Ill. 125, 79 N. E. 631;Rouse v. Thompson, 228 Ill. 522, 81 N. E. 1109;Sutter v. People's Gaslight & Coke Co., 284 Ill. 634, 120 N. E. 562;Public Service Co. v. Recktenwald, 290 Ill. 314, 125 N. E. 271, 8 A. L. R. 466. The subject of an act means the matter or thing forming the groundwork of the act, and may include many provisions that are germane to it and are such that, if traced back, will lead the mind to the subject as the generic head. People v. Solomon, 265 Ill. 28, 106 N. E. 458;Perkins v. Board of County Com'rs, 271 Ill. 449, 111 N. E. 580, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 27. The general purpose of the constitutional provision is accomplished when a law has but one general subject which is fairly indicated by its title.

[2][4] The title is not required to be an index to or as comprehensive in matters of detail as the body of the act, but if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the General Assembly or the people, it is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. Unless the act contains matters which have no proper connection wiht or relation to the title, or the title itself contains subjects without any proper relation to each other, the constitutional provision is not violated. The General Assembly must determine for itself how broad and comprehensive the object of the statute shall be and how much particularity shall be employed in the title defining it. An act having a single, general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject, by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. Public Service Co. v. Recktenwald, supra; People v. Nelson, 133 Ill. 565, 27 N. E. 217;People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865,122 Am. St. Rep. 82, 114 Ann. Cas. 994; Manaster v. Kioebge, 257 Ill. 431, 100 N. E. 989; Perkins v. Board of County Com'rs, supra; Sutter v. People's Gaslight &...