People v. Stadnick

• Decision Date: 24 September 1962
• Docket Number: Cr. 7287
• Citation: 207 Cal.App.2d 767,99 A.L.R.2d 766,25 Cal.Rptr. 30
• Parties: , 99 A.L.R.2d 766 The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Edward F. STADNICK and Zella Mae Snyder, Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 30

25 Cal.Rptr. 30

207 Cal.App.2d 767, 99 A.L.R.2d 766

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Edward F. STADNICK and Zella Mae Snyder, Defendants and Appellants.

Cr. 7287.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Sept. 24, 1962.

Hearing Denied Nov. 21, 1962.

Ernest L. Graves, Wilmington, for appellants.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., Jack E. Goertzen, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

HERNDON, Justice.

Appellants Edward F. Stadnick and Zella Mae Snyder appeal from judgments convicting them of first degree robbery in violation of section 211 of the Penal Code; they also appeal from the orders denying their motions for new trials.

Initially, appellants were charged in a four-count information with a co-defendant, Timothy M. Burke. Count One charged that appellant Stadnick and Burke had robbed one John Hamlinn of $165 on January 9, 1960, and that at the time of the commission of the offense they were armed with a .380 Belgium Automatic Pistol. Count Two charged that appellants Snyder and Burke robbed one Mary G. Sparks of $20 on January 10, 1960, while similarly armed. In the third and fourth counts, the co-defendant Burke was separately charged with two additional robberies on January 10, 1960. Appellant Stadnick also was charged with two prior felony convictions which he admitted. Following the selection of a jury, the co-defendant Burke, who was separately represented by counsel other than counsel representing appellants, changed his plea to guilty to all counts. The matter then proceeded to trial on the remaining counts involving appellants; it resulted in verdicts that appellants were guilty of first degree robbery 'as charged in the information'. Appellants were sentenced to state prison for the terms prescribed by law.

The evidence of the Hamlinn robbery consisted of the testimony of the victim that on the night in question Burke entered the liquor store where he was employed and ordered a bottle of vodka. The witness turned, took a bottle from the shelf, and when he turned again to face the counter, he noticed that Burke had a gun in his hand and that appellant Stadnick was standing beside him. Burke demanded that the witness hand over all the money. The witness removed the money from the cash register and when Stadnick, who was closest to him, held out his hand, the witness placed the money in it. Stadnick then went behind the counter and checked the cash register drawer for a false bottom. Burke, who had kept the gun aimed at the witness during these proceedings, asked whether there was any more money; the witness thereupon produced some change from under the counter and handed it to Burke. Burke then directed the witness to the rear of the store and Stadnick remarked, 'Don't worry. We won't hurt you. Just do as you are told and everything will be all right.' Burke held the witness at gun point for a few minutes at the rear of the store while Stadnick left. Burke left the store with a warning to the witness not to follow him.

Appellant Stadnick did not testify, but Burke was called as a witness on his behalf. He testified in substance: that he had known Stadnick for some two years; that they lived together; that they drove to the store together and left together; but that Stadnick had been unaware of Burke's sudden decision to rob the store and had not participated therein. Burke further testified that although Stadnick was 'very angry' about the robbery, he had accepted $50 of the loot in payment of certain 'arrearages in rent'. Burke explained his being in arrears in his rent, despite the very substantial proceeds of some eighteen previous robberies committed by him, by stating that he spent money 'pretty quick'. Burke also indicated that Stadnick knew of his possession of the gun.

The evidence as to the Sparks robbery was the testimony of the victim that she was alone in the small grocery store where she worked when she noticed appellant Snyder at the bread counter. Some conversation was had in which Snyder asked, 'Is there anything fresh in here besides you?' She then noticed Burke at the counter holding a gun on her. She gave him all the money she had. Snyder moved toward her during this transaction. A customer then entered, and at Burke's direction, she waited on him and he left. Snyder drew even nearer the witness while the customer was in the store. Burke then told her to go into the back room. She did so and 'Mrs. Snyder followed me back there and she and he closed the door.' When the witness emerged from the rear room Mrs. Snyder and Burke had gone.

Burke also testified on behalf of appellant Snyder, and again stated that, although he had known her for some time, and in fact they and others had been drinking at his apartment the previous night, (after the Hamlinn robbery above described) she was unaware of his sudden decision to rob the grocery store and had not participated therein. It is not entirely clear from the record whether Snyder shared the apartment with Burke and Stadnick, but it would have been a reasonable inference from the evidence that she did. When she took the stand in her own behalf, she testified that 'they wanted me to fix something to eat, and having been drinking I decided upon sandwiches, and there wasn't any bread, so I went to the store to get some bread.' (Emphasis added.) Later, however, she stated that no one had told her to go, that she 'just decided' she was going to make sandwiches for herself, 'the baby and Jake'. However, although she returned to the apartment after the robbery, she did not make any sandwiches or tell Jake of the robbery, but simply told him to watch the baby as she 'wouldn't be around to care for her'. She then left, went to a bar and resumed her drinking. She was later arrested and returned to the store where she was definitely identified by the victim.

Appellants' first assignment of error is that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdicts. Manifestly, this contention is completely without merit. Section 31 of the Penal Code provides that 'All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, * * * whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, * * * are principals in any crime so committed.' (Emphasis added.)

While the mere presence of an accused at the scene of a crime is not alone sufficient to make him a participant, nor is he guilty merely because he does not act to prevent it, his presence is a circumstance tending to support a finding that he is a principal and may be considered by the jury with evidence of his companionship with the principal and of his conduct before and after the offense. (People v. Mauldin, 181 Cal.App.2d 184, 189, 5 Cal.Rptr. 243; People v. Carlson, 177 Cal.App.2d 201, 205, 2 Cal.Rptr. 117; People v. Moore, 120 Cal.App.2d 303, 306, 260 P.2d 1011.) An accused who, in the commission of first degree robbery, aids and abets a companion who is armed with a deadly weapon, is not less guilty of such robbery because he himself is unarmed. (People v. Perkins, 37 Cal.2d 62, 64, 230 P.2d 353.) It need not be shown that the direct perpetrator of a crime expressly communicated his purpose to the accused in order to make the latter liable as an aider and abettor. (People v. Carlson, supra, at page 205, 2 Cal.Rptr. at page 120); and one may aid or abet in the commission of a crime without having previously entered into a conspiracy to commitit. (People v. Villa, 156 Cal.App.2d 128, 134, 318 P.2d 828.)

In addition to the evidence heretofore set forth regarding appellants'...