People v. Stambor

• Decision Date: 19 May 1975
• Docket Number: No. 74--381,74--381
• Citation: 33 Ill.App.3d 324,337 N.E.2d 63
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henry STAMBOR, and Raymond Stambor, Defendants-Appellants. . Nov. 68 1975. James Geis, State Appellate Defender Office, Ottawa, for defendants-appellants. James Hinterlong, Illinois Stte's Attorney Assoc., Mount Vernon, Edward P. Drolet, State's Atty., Kankakee, for plaintiff-appellee. ALLOY, Justice. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Kankakee County finding defendants Henry Stambor and Raymond Stambor guilty of the offense of gurglary, following pleas of guilty. Both defendants were sentenced to not less than 2 nor more than 6 years of imprisonment. On appeal in this Court, defendants contend, first, that the convictions should be reversed because they were not admonished concerning the mandatory parole term provisions prior to their guilty pleas, under the terms of Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, ch. 38, § 1005--8--1(e). In the case of People v. Wills (1975), 61 Ill.2d 105, 109, 330 N.E.2d 505, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that Supreme Court Rule 402(a)(2) would require admonition to a defendant who was pleading guilty, as to the mandatory parole term. In a supplement to that opinion, the Supreme Court specified that such
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 63

337 N.E.2d 63

33 Ill.App.3d 324

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henry STAMBOR, and Raymond Stambor, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 74--381.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Nov. 68 1975.

James Geis, State Appellate Defender Office, Ottawa, for defendants-appellants.

James Hinterlong, Illinois Stte's Attorney Assoc., Mount Vernon, Edward P. Drolet, State's Atty., Kankakee, for plaintiff-appellee.

ALLOY, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Kankakee County finding defendants Henry Stambor and Raymond Stambor guilty of the offense of gurglary, following pleas of guilty. Both defendants were sentenced to not less than 2 nor more than 6 years of imprisonment.

On appeal in this Court, defendants contend, first, that the convictions should be reversed because they were not admonished concerning the mandatory parole term provisions prior to their guilty pleas, under the terms of Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, ch. 38, § 1005--8--1(e). In the case of People v. Wills (1975), 61 Ill.2d 105, 109, 330 N.E.2d 505, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that Supreme Court Rule 402(a)(2) would require admonition to a defendant who was pleading guilty, as to the mandatory parole term. In a supplement to that opinion, the Supreme Court specified that such decision shall apply only to guilty pleas accepted after May 19, 1975. Since the pleas in the instant case were accepted on August 14, 1974, on the basis of the Supreme Court decision in the Wills case, it was not then required that defendants be admonished as to the mandatory parole term. The defendants were admonished carefully in accordance with Rule 402, and the trial court substantially complied with the Rule.

Defendant Henry Stambor also challenges his sentence as being excessive and argues that the record in the case discloses that Henry Stambor has a considerably greater rehabilitative potential than his brother, Raymond Stambor, and that, therefore, the court abused its discretion in imposing identical sentences on the two defendants. While we agree that the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, ch. 38, § 1001 et seq.) is designed to 'permit the recognition of differences in rehabilitation possibilities among individual offenders' (§ 1001--1--2(a)), it is also true that the trial court has wide discretion in imposing sentence on convicted defendants within the limits provided by the legislature in the Unified Code. While our courts have stressed that fundamental fairness and respect for law requires that defendants similarly situated should not normally receive grossly disparate sentences (People v. Henne (2nd Dist., 1973), 10 Ill.App.3d 179, 180, 293 N.E.2d 172; People v. Hall (1st Dist., 1973), 17 Ill.App.3d 1, 5--6, 307 N.E.2d 664), equality in sentencing, however, is not required for all participants in the same criminal act. (People v. Schmidt (3rd Dist., 175), 25 Ill.App.3d 1035, 1037, 324 N.E.2d 246).

We have observed, therefore, that where there is no basis in the record of co-defendants or in the nature of their respective roles in the crime, a sentence which arbitrarily imposes a more severe punishment on one of the defendants cannot be supported. (People v. Stge (3rd Dist., 1966), 69 Ill.App.2d 188, 192, 215 N.E.2d 854). It is appropriate, however, to impose different sentences on co-defendants based upon important distinctions which have a basis in the record. (People v. Prater (4th Dist., 1973), 12 Ill.App.3d 452, 453, 299 N.E.2d 26). We recognize also that there can be an abuse of discretion when two co-defendants are given the same sentence, although having widely different criminal records and different roles in the particular crime, and where there is a difference in other pertinent factors which are commonly used to evaluate the proper punishment required. (People v. House (4th Dist., 1975), 26 Ill.App.3d 330, 333, 325 N.E.2d 69). Essentially, therefore, the factors which normally should be uppermost in the mind...