People v. Wills
| Decision Date | 19 May 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 47039,47039 |
| Citation | 330 N.E.2d 505,61 Ill.2d 105 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. John WILLS, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Richard J. Wilson and Thomas Nelson, Springfield, for appellant.
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., of Springfield, and Richard J. Doyle, State's Atty., Danville , for the People.
James J. Doherty, Public Defender, Chicago (Kathryn J. Kuhlen, John Thomas Moran, John X. Breslin, and David W. Hirschboeck, Asst. Public Defenders, of counsel), for amicus curiae Office of the Public Defender of Cook County.
Defendant, John Wills, appealed from the judgments of the circuit court of Vermilion County entered upon his pleas of guilty to the offenses of burglary, escape and armed robbery. The circuit court imposed concurrent sentences of 3 to 9 years for the burglary, 3 years and 4 months to 10 years for the escape, and 5 to 30 years for the armed robbery. The appellate court affirmed (23 Ill.App.3d 25, 319 N.E.2d 269) and issued a certificate of importance.
Defendant contends here, as he did in the appellate court, that his pleas of guilty to the offenses of escape and armed robbery were invalid because the record shows that he 'was confused about the possibility of receiving an enhanced sentence for burglary if he plea not guilty of armed robbery and escape.' In considering this contention, the appellate court said, (23 Ill.App.3d 25, 31, 319 N.E.2d 269, 273.) We have examined the transcript of the proceedings had when defendant's guilty pleas were taken, much of which is set out in the appellate court opinion, and we agree with the appellate court.
An understanding of defendant's next contention requires an examination of both the relevant statute and the appellate court opinion.
At the time when defendant was sentenced, section 5--8--1 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 1005--8--1) provided in pertinent part:
'(a) A sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall be an indeterminate sentence set by the court under this Section.
(e) Every indeterminate sentence shall include as though written therein a parole term in addition to the term of imprisonment. Subject to earlier termination under Section 3--3--8, the parole term shall be as follows:
(1) for * * * a Class 1 felony, 5 years;
(2) for a Class 2 felony, * * * 3 years.'
Defendant contends here, as he did in the appellate court, that his convictions for burglary and escape must be reversed for the reason that he was not admonished, prior to pleading guilty, that the sentences imposed included the mandatory period of parole. He makes no similar contention concerning the plea of guilty to the armed robbery charge. The record shows that the circuit court advised defendant that the permissible penalty for armed robbery was imprisonment for 'four to any number of years plus five years parole' and that
The appellate court, in considering defendant's contention that the pleas of guilty must be vacated, reviewed the statutory scheme and held that section 5--8--1(e) and a portion of section 3--3--9(a)(3)(i) of the Unified Code of Corrections were unconstitutional. The basis for holding the statutes invalid was that under their provisions, in the event of revocation of parole, a defendant could be incarcerated for periods which in the aggregate exceeded the maximum of the indeterminate sentence imposed by the circuit court. The appellate court concluded that since the statutes imposing the period of parole were unconstitutional, the failure to admonish defendant concerning them was not error. Because of the potential impact of the statutes' being held invalid the appellate court, of its own motion, issued a certificate of importance.
Defendant contends here that the statutory provision for a mandatory period of parole is constitutional, and that the admonition was, therefore, insufficient. Amicus curiae, the Public Defender of Cook County, contends that the mandatory parole term provisions are unconstitutional for the reasons that they do not provide for minimum due process requirements and that they 'violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.'
We agree with the appellate court that, under the provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections (see pars. 1003--3--9(a)(3)(i) and 1003--3--10(a)), in the event of revocation of parole, a defendant could be incarcerated for periods which in the aggregate exceeded the maximum of the indeterminate sentence imposed by the sentencing court. This record, however, does not present for decision the question whether the statutes are unconstitutional. At this time defendant is not eligible for parole, and there is no basis for application of the statutory provisions which the appellate court held invalid. As we said in Stein v. Howlett, 52 Ill.2d 570, 580, 289 N.E.2d 409, 414, 'The fact that a statute might be susceptible of misapplication does not necessarily make it unconstitutional.'
We have reconsidered the position taken in People v. Krantz, 58 Ill.2d 187, 195, 317 N.E.2d 559, and hold that compliance with Rule 402(a)(2), Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 110A, § 402(a)(2), requires that a defendant be admonished that the mandatory period of parole pertaining to the offense is a part of the sentence that will be imposed and that he can be held subject to the jurisdiction of the Parole and Pardon Board...
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