People v. Stanley
| Decision Date | 30 October 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-04-1790.,1-04-1790. |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Christopher STANLEY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Office of the State Appellate Defender, Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, Caroline E. Bourland-Assistant Appellate Defender, Chicago, for Appellant.
Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, County of Cook, Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Mary Boland, Samuel Shim, and Peter Maltese, of counsel), for Appellee.
Following a bench trial, the defendant, Christopher Stanley, was convicted of three counts of attempt aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count of aggravated unlawful restraint. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of six years on the merged counts of attempt aggravated criminal sexual assault and five years on aggravated unlawful restraint. Because he was convicted of attempt aggravated criminal sexual assault, the defendant was required to register as a "sexual predator" for the rest of his life. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his aggravated unlawful restraint conviction. He also challenges the constitutionality of the Sex Offender Registration Act (Registration Act) (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2004)) and the Sex Offender and Child Murderer Community Notification Law (Notification Law) (730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 2004)). Finally, he argues he is entitled to a $100 credit against his assessed fines.1
At trial, the State presented evidence to establish that E.H., the victim in this case, was jogging in Evanston at 5:00 p.m. on November 23, 2003, when she encountered the defendant running alongside her. It was raining outside and although the defendant was also jogging, he was not wearing running clothes. The victim engaged the defendant in conversation in order to make herself more comfortable with the situation. After conversing for a few minutes, the victim ran ahead of the defendant. The defendant then grabbed the victim from behind, dragged her to an alley or parking lot next to an auto body shop and, after she screamed, threatened to slit her throat. The victim, however, never saw a knife. He also told her she was "going to die." The defendant pulled down her shorts and underwear so that her backside was exposed and unzipped his pants. The victim begged him to stop and struggled with him. The defendant punched the victim twice in the face and once in the stomach and eventually ran away. The victim received several nicks, cuts, and bruises to her face and body.
Eyewitness Matthew Beck was in his apartment overlooking the auto body shop and called the police after he heard someone screaming and saw a man lying on top of a person. Beck went outside after he saw the victim in the street trying to flag down a car. He called the police again. The police arrived shortly thereafter and took a description of the defendant from the victim. At the scene, the police recovered a cellular phone from a muddy puddle.
A few hours later, Beck heard a vehicle outside his apartment. He looked out his window and saw a red and cream-colored pickup truck. He also saw the man he had previously seen attacking the victim. The man appeared to be looking for something. Beck called the police and gave them this information.
Police officers were able to trace the recovered cellular phone to Stellar Productions, an event equipment rental company where the defendant worked. On November 25, 2003, the police spoke to the defendant's supervisor, Michael Glabowicz, who informed them that the defendant had told him he lost his cellular phone on November 23 while at a jobsite in Winnetka. Glabowicz gave the officers a description of the defendant and of his vehicle. At trial, Glabowicz described the defendant's vehicle as a light-colored pickup truck with maroon or red side panels. He also acknowledged that the defendant had been working 50 to 60 hours a week in November 2003 and that some of the defendant's paychecks had bounced.
After speaking to Glabowicz, the officers retrieved a photograph of the defendant. After the victim tentatively identified the defendant as the offender from an array, the officers went to the defendant's home in Zion. The defendant agreed to accompany the officers to the Evanston police station, where he was read his Miranda rights. The defendant initially told the officers that he lost his cellular phone at a Winnetka jobsite. However, when confronted with information that his phone had been recovered at the scene of an attack in Evanston and that a man fitting his description had been seen by an eyewitness driving a vehicle similar to his, the defendant put his head down and started to cry.
The defendant told the officers he had been experiencing troubles with his ex-wife; he believed she had begun working for an escort service. His ex-wife also had been harassing him over the phone, telling him she was moving with his two-year-old son to Florida. He left the Winnetka jobsite on November 23, 2003, and went for a drive, ending up in Evanston. He decided to go for a jog and was approached by the victim. The victim reminded him of his ex-wife, bothered him, and would not leave him alone. He "just snapped" and grabbed her from behind, walked her toward a parking lot, and fell on top of her. He denied striking the victim, pulling down her shorts, or unzipping his pants. When he went back to the jobsite, he realized his cellular phone was missing. He returned to the scene of the attack to look for it, but could not find it.
The defendant was placed in a lineup in the early hours of November 26, 2003, where the victim identified him without hesitation. He then made a statement similar to the one above in the presence of Evanston police officer Joe Dugan and Assistant State's Attorney Beth Neslin. The defendant added that while he had been on top of the victim, he had a pocket knife with a small blade pressed against her cheek. He said he covered most of the blade with his thumb. The defendant either threw the knife away or lost it.
The defendant's trial testimony was similar to the statements he had previously made. He testified that on November 23, 2003, he had been working "crazy" hours and several of his paychecks had bounced. He was also in an "ugly" situation with his ex-wife. He decided to go for a jog to blow off steam when he encountered the victim. Although he initially wanted to talk to her, he became upset because "she was all in [his] business." He also felt rejected when she ran ahead of him. When he grabbed her, he "just lost [his] temper" because he felt she had been rude to him and reminded him of his ex-wife. He threw her to the ground to scare her and struck her once in the mouth to quiet her. The defendant denied wanting to have sex with the victim. He also denied pulling down her shorts or unzipping his pants. He could not recall telling her that he was going to slit her throat. He eventually stopped because he looked into the victim's face and realized he was lashing out at the wrong person. He expressed his remorse for his actions and testified that he did not mean to hurt anyone.
The defendant also testified he told the victim he had a knife and would cut her if she moved. He admitted at trial that he did have a pen knife or pocket knife, which he described as "[j]ust a little — like Swiss army pocket knife" or "one of those Boy [Scout] knives * * * [with] scissors in it * * * [and] all that stuff in it." He acknowledged it was a pocket knife that came down into a casing. He testified that he held the knife to her cheek or jaw, but kept his thumb over most of the blade.
The trial court found the defendant guilty of three counts of attempt aggravated criminal sexual assault as well as one count of aggravated unlawful restraint based on his use of the pocket knife. He received a sentence of six years on the merged counts of attempt aggravated criminal sexual assault and a concurrent sentence of five years on the aggravated unlawful restraint count. The trial court assessed numerous fees and fines, ordered him to submit a DNA sample, and explained that he would be required to register in the sex offender registry for the rest of his life.
The defendant's first contention on appeal is that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the pocket knife he used constituted a "deadly weapon." Accordingly, he argues that his conviction for aggravated unlawful restraint should be reduced to unlawful restraint.
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the issue is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill.2d 237, 261, 87 Ill.Dec. 910, 478 N.E.2d 267 (1985); People v. Blanks, 361 Ill. App.3d 400, 412, 300 Ill.Dec. 580, 845 N.E.2d 1 (2005). A criminal conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. Collins, 106 Ill.2d at 261, 87 Ill.Dec. 910, 478 N.E.2d 267; Blanks, 361 Ill.App.3d at 412, 300 Ill.Dec. 580, 845 N.E.2d 1.
The defendant in this case was charged with and convicted of aggravated unlawful restraint. The defendant contends that the evidence falls short of the required proof that he used a deadly weapon. The indictment specifically alleged that the defendant "committed the offense of aggravated unlawful restraint in that he, knowingly without legal authority detained [the victim] while armed with a deadly weapon, to wit: a knife." See 720 ILCS 5/10-3.1(a) (West 2004).
A deadly weapon is one that is "dangerous to life" or "one likely...
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