People v. Stapleton

Decision Date16 March 2017
Docket NumberE064824
Citation215 Cal.Rptr.3d 534,9 Cal.App.5th 989
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Parties The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Luther Darnell STAPLETON, Jr., Defendant and Appellant.

Laurel E. Simmons, San Francisco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Kathryn Kirschbaum, and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

RAMIREZ P.J.

In a plea to the court, defendant and appellant Luther Darnell Stapleton, Jr., pleaded guilty to petty theft with a prior (Pen. Code, § 666 ).1 In return, defendant was placed on probation for a period of 36 months on various terms and conditions. On appeal, defendant challenges two of his probation conditions on constitutional grounds. For the reasons explained below, we find no error and affirm defendant's probationary terms.

IFACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 17, 2014, defendant stole less than $950 worth of property from a Target store. Defendant had prior theft-related convictions, as well as failing to register pursuant to section 290.

On December 17, 2014, a felony complaint was filed charging defendant with one count of petty theft with a prior (§ 666 ). The complaint further alleged that defendant was previously required to register as a sex offender under section 290.

On September 16, 2015, defendant pleaded guilty to the petty theft with a prior charge and admitted that he was required to register as a sex offender. Immediately thereafter, defendant was placed on probation on various terms and conditions. Among other terms and conditions, defendant was required to inform his probation officer of his place of residence, reside in a residence approved by his probation officer, give written notice to his probation officer 24 hours before changing his residence, and not to move without approval from his probation officer. Defendant was also prohibited from having direct or indirect contact with Target stores and Target parking lots. Defendant accepted his terms and conditions without objection.

IIDISCUSSION

Defendant contends the two above-referenced probation conditions are overbroad, violate his constitutional rights, and must be stricken.

Trial courts have broad discretion to "impose ... reasonable [probation] conditions, as [they] may determine are fitting and proper ... for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer ...." (§ 1203.1, subd. (j).) This discretion, however, "is not unbounded." (People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 624, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 66.) To be valid, a probation condition "must (1) ... relate[ ] to the crime of which the defendant was convicted, or (2) relate to conduct that is criminal, or (3) require or forbid conduct that is reasonably related to future criminality." (People v. Bauer (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 937, 942, 260 Cal.Rptr. 62 (Bauer ).) However, constitutional challenges are reviewed under a different standard. Whether a term of probation is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad presents a question of law, which we review de novo. (In re J.H. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 174, 183, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ; In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143, 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 84.)

"If a probation condition serves to rehabilitate and protect public safety, the condition may ‘impinge upon a constitutional right otherwise enjoyed by the probationer, who is "not entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection as other citizens." " (People v. O'Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1355, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 878, quoting People v. Lopez , supra , 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 624, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 66.) But an otherwise valid condition that impinges upon constitutional rights "must be carefully tailored, "reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation ...." " (Bauer , supra , 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 942, 260 Cal.Rptr. 62, quoting In re White (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 141, 146, 158 Cal.Rptr. 562 (White ); accord, People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199, 198 P.3d 1 (Olguin ); In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716, 153 P.3d 282 (Sheena K. ).)

A probation condition cannot be overbroad. (Olguin , supra , 45 Cal.4th at p. 384, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199, 198 P.3d 1 ; Sheena K. , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 890, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716, 153 P.3d 282.) "A restriction is unconstitutionally overbroad ... if it (1) ‘impinge[s] on constitutional rights,’ and (2) is not ‘tailored carefully and reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation.’ [Citations.] The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant's constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement." (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153, 115 Cal.Rptr.3d 869.)

However, even a facial challenge to constitutionality requires more than a one-size-fits-all approach. Our inquiry does not take into account the individual facts pertaining to this particular probationer—as would an "as applied" challenge—but it must take into account the nature of the case and the goals and needs of probation in general. For example, what is constitutional in a case involving drug usage is not necessarily the same as what is constitutional in a theft-related case. This broad consideration of the nature of the case must inform all decisions about whether the condition has been "narrowly tailored," even where, as here, we do not reach the personal circumstances of the probationer.

Moreover, a probation condition cannot be vague; it " "must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated .... " " (People v. Barajas (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 748, 753, 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 412, quoting Sheena K. , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 890, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716, 153 P.3d 282.) On the other hand, probation is a privilege and not a right, and adult probationers, in preference to incarceration, may validly consent to limitations upon their constitutional rights. (Olguin , supra , 45 Cal.4th at p. 384, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199, 198 P.3d 1.) For example, probationers may agree to warrantless search conditions or restrictions on their constitutional right of association. (Id . at pp. 384 & 385, fn. 4, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199, 198 P.3d 1, citing People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 506, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 101 P.3d 478 ; People v. Medina (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1580, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 413 ["a suspicionless search pursuant to a probation search condition is not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment"]; People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57, 68-69, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 77 [upholding a probation condition requiring submission to alcohol and drug testing at the discretion of the probation officer]; People v. Lopez , supra , 66 Cal.App.4th at pp. 624, 628-629, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 66 [upholding condition prohibiting association with known gang members]; People v. Peck (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 351, 363, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 [condition prohibiting association with known possessors, users, or traffickers of controlled substances]; and other cases.)

Defendant did not object to either of the probation conditions at issue in the trial court. But where a claim that a probation condition is facially overbroad and violates fundamental constitutional rights is based on undisputed facts, it may be treated as a pure question of law, which is not forfeited by failure to raise it in the trial court. (Sheena K ., supra , 40 Cal.4th at pp. 888-889, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716, 153 P.3d 282 ; People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 235, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 520, 851 P.2d 802.) The forfeiture doctrine does apply if the objection involves a discretionary sentencing choice or unreasonable probation conditions "premised upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case." (Sheena K. , supra , at pp. 885, 888, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716, 153 P.3d 282.)

A. Residency Terms

Defendant contends the residency conditions violate his constitutional right to travel and freedom of association and should be stricken.2 Defendant relies primarily on Bauer , supra , 211 Cal.App.3d 937, 260 Cal.Rptr. 62.

The right to travel and freedom of association are undoubtedly "constitutional entitlements." (Bauer , supra , 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 944, 260 Cal.Rptr. 62.) But, as discussed, a probation condition may restrict these rights so long as it reasonably relates to reformation and rehabilitation. (White , supra , 97 Cal.App.3d at p. 146, 158 Cal.Rptr. 562.) In Bauer , the reviewing court struck a residence condition apparently designed to prevent the defendant from living with his overprotective parents. (Bauer , supra , at p. 944, 260 Cal.Rptr. 62.) Nothing in the record suggested the defendant's home life contributed to the crimes of which he was convicted (false imprisonment and simple assault), or that living at home reasonably related to future criminality. (Ibid . ) The court concluded the probation condition impinged on the defendant's right to travel and freedom of association, and was extremely broad since it gave the probation officer the power to forbid the defendant "from living with or near his parents—that is, the power to banish him." (Ibid . )

The present case is distinguishable. Unlike the condition in Bauer , the residence condition imposed here is not a wolf in sheep's clothing; it is not designed to banish defendant or to prevent him from living where he pleases. Moreover, unlike the defendant in Bauer , where defendant lives may directly affect his rehabilitation, considering his history with issues related to his mental health and...

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