People v. Stewart
| Docket Number | 162497 |
| Decision Date | 31 July 2023 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSHUA LAMAR-JAMES STEWART, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Argued on application for leave to appeal January 11, 2023.
Justices: Brian K. Zahra, David F. Viviano, Richard H Bernstein, Megan K. Cavanagh, Elizabeth M. Welch, Kyra H Bolden
Joshua L-J Stewart was convicted following a jury trial in the Wayne Circuit Court of three counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.84; receiving and concealing stolen property valued between $1,000 and $20,000, MCL 750.535(3)(a); and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. Defendant allegedly aided and abetted two other individuals in two armed robberies by serving as the getaway driver. Two of the victims were shot by the perpetrators during the robberies and one of the victims died as a result of his injuries. Defendant was arrested and questioned after he drove one of the perpetrators to the hospital in the vehicle used in the robberies. During his interview with police officers defendant eventually admitted to driving the getaway vehicle. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress statements he made during his police interview, arguing that the statements were involuntary because of coercive interview techniques and promises of leniency by the interrogating officers. The trial court, Michael Callahan, J., denied the motion. Defendant appealed, and in an unpublished, per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals, GLEICHER, P.J., and K. F. KELLY, J. (SHAPIRO, J., concurring), also rejected defendant's argument that the statements were involuntary and affirmed his convictions. Defendant sought leave to appeal, and the Supreme Court ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant defendant's application for leave to appeal or take other action. 508 Mich. 941 (2021).
In an opinion by Chief Justice CLEMENT, joined by Justices BERNSTEIN, CAVANAGH, WELCH, and BOLDEN, the Supreme Court held:
The totality of the circumstances of defendant's interrogation, including his age, the timing of the interview, the officers' references to leniency, the officers' use of falsehoods, and the officers' overall tone and use of language, created an environment in which defendant's free will was overborne and the statements he gave were involuntary. The use of these statements at trial violated defendant's constitutional rights, and he was entitled to a new trial.
1. The use of an involuntary statement elicited by coercive state action in a criminal trial violates an individual's constitutional right to due process and against self-incrimination. To determine whether a statement was involuntary because of state coercion, a reviewing court must consider whether the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the confession indicates that it was freely and voluntarily made. While all relevant circumstances must be considered, in People v Cipriano, 431 Mich. 315 (1988), the Supreme Court specifically directed consideration of the following factors: the age of the accused; their lack of education or their level of intelligence; the extent of their previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before they gave the statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of their constitutional rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing them before a magistrate before they gave the confession; whether the accused was injured, intoxicated or drugged, or in ill health when they gave the statement; whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention; whether the accused was physically abused; and whether the accused was threatened with abuse. Additionally, promises of leniency can render a confession involuntary, such as express or implied assurances that cooperation will aid the interviewee's defense or result in a lesser sentence.
2. In the present case, defendant was 18 years old at the time of the interview and, thus, an adult under the law. However, 18-year-olds are still maturing, physiologically and neurologically, and therefore their decision-making abilities are not fully developed. Although a defendant's age alone does not render their statements involuntary, age is a relevant circumstance to be considered as one factor in the voluntariness analysis. In this case, defendant's age made him more susceptible to suggestions from law enforcement and less likely to engage in reasoned decision-making. Next, the length of the interview, at approximately three hours, was not excessively long; however, it took place in the early morning, and there was no indication that defendant slept or had the opportunity to sleep in the interval between when he arrived at the hospital the night before and the beginning of the interview. Sleep deprivation, along with the deprivation of other basic necessities such as food and water, has long been considered a factor weighing against the voluntariness of a statement. Regarding defendant's health, there was an indication in the record that defendant had recently undergone treatment for cancer and may have been suffering from ill effects of the treatment that could have affected his ability to endure interrogation. Other Cipriano factors weighed in favor of voluntariness or were largely neutral: defendant was advised of his rights at the beginning of the interview, and defendant did not allege that he was injured, intoxicated, or drugged when he was interviewed. Further, the record was silent as to whether defendant had any cognitive challenges. And finally, defendant had a previous juvenile adjudication, meaning that he had some limited previous experience with the police. Outside of the Cipriano factors, the Court also had to address any other factual circumstances, psychological effects, and coercive tactics employed by the officers that may have contributed to an overbearing of defendant's free will. In this case, one such tactic employed by law enforcement was the officers' repeated and specific references to leniency. While the officers did not make explicit promises of leniency, they heavily implied that defendant would receive a sentence of 20 years to life if he did not cooperate but that he could receive a sentence as low as two years if he did. The record reflected that defendant took these statements as an assurance of a lesser sentence if he cooperated. The officers also lied to defendant regarding the extent of the evidence against him, falsely claiming that an eyewitness and home surveillance video placed him at the scene of the incidents. Exaggerating the strength of the case against defendant weighed against a finding that defendant's inculpatory statements were made of a free and voluntary mind. Finally, the overall tone of the interview was combative, and the officers made frequent use of profanity and racial slurs, which isolated and belittled defendant and likely rendered him more susceptible to the other coercive tactics that were employed. While any one of the circumstances articulated may not have been sufficient to render defendant's statements involuntary, when considered collectively, the cumulative effect of the circumstances on defendant's free will was such that defendant's statements were not freely and voluntarily made. Because the use of these involuntary statements violated defendant's right to due process, his convictions could stand only if the prosecutor could prove that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor could not do so: although defendant arrived at the hospital in the vehicle used in the robberies, the only additional evidence that tied him to those robberies was defendant's own incriminating, involuntary statements. Defendant's arrival at the hospital in the vehicle used in the robberies may have been probative of guilt, but it was not sufficient to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found defendant guilty absent the error in admitting his involuntary statement.
Court of Appeals judgment reversed, and case remanded for a new trial.
Justice VIVIANO, joined by Justice ZAHRA, dissenting, agreed with many of the majority opinion's separate analyses of the Cipriano factors, finding them individually inadequate to make the confession involuntary, but he did not agree that the factors combined to render the confession involuntary. Because there was no physical abuse, threats, or promises of leniency during the interrogation, and none of the more subjective factors supported a finding of involuntariness, Justice VIVIANO would have held that the confession was voluntary. He noted that although the United States Supreme Court has stated that coercion can be mental as well as physical, none of its decisions has concluded that police tactics that did not involve physical or mental exhaustion were sufficient to show involuntariness. Moreover, courts have recognized that police may play on a suspect's ignorance, fear, or anxieties so long as doing so does not render a rational decision impossible. Therefore, even if a defendant's characteristics can be considered, the focus of the voluntariness analysis should be on police conduct and whether any threats, intimidation, or physical force were employed. In this case, the officers administered Miranda warnings,[1] and it has often been assumed that giving Miranda warnings will generally render any subsequent confession voluntary. Although defendant quibbled with the administration of the warnings, he did not identify any flaws with the information conveyed by the warnings or with his understanding of them. The majority...
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