People v. Stewart

• Decision Date: 31 October 1969
• Docket Number: Cr. 15995
• Citation: 1 Cal.App.3d 339,81 Cal.Rptr. 562
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ralph Eugene STEWART, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 562

81 Cal.Rptr. 562

1 Cal.App.3d 339

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ralph Eugene STEWART, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 15995.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Oct. 31, 1969.

Hearing Denied Dec. 23, 1969.

[1 Cal.App.3d 340] Bruce P. Wolfe, Los Angeles, for defendant and appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Michael

L. Abrams, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

WRIGHT, Associate Justice.

Appellant, Ralph Eugene Stewart, and Edward Arthur Timmons were charged by information with two counts of kidnapping for the purpose of robbery (violations of Penal Code, section 209) and with two counts of robbery (violations of Penal Code, section 211). Each count alleged that both appellant and Timmons were armed with a deadly weapon, to wit, a knife, at the time of the commission of each offense. Pleas of not guilty were entered by both of the accused as to all counts.

On the day set for trial appellant withdrew his plea of not guilty to one charge of robbery and entered a plea of guilty. Thereafter appellant personally and all counsel waived right to jury trial on the armed allegation and the fixing of the degree of the robbery. A probation officer's report was ordered and it was agreed that the cause be continued to a later date for probation hearing and sentencing, for determination of the armed allegation, for fixing of degree of the robbery and for disposition of the remaining three counts. On the date of the later hearing the trial judge found the armed allegation to be not true, fixed the degree of the offense as in the second degree, denied probation and sentenced the appellant to the state prison for the term prescribed by law. On motion of the People the three remaining counts were dismissed by the court in the interest of justice. Appellant appeals on the limited question of error claimed to have been committed by the trial court by imposing judgment and sentence on a plea of guilty after a grant of immunity pursuant to the provisions of Penal Code, section 1324 ¹ made subsequent to such plea.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

As the issue before this court is not only a narrow but a unique one, it is unnecessary to set forth the facts surrounding the crimes of which appellant and the codefendant were convicted. Such a statement is not only unnecessary but impossible as the record on appeal does not include that portion of the proceedings. What does appear from the record is that after appellant entered a plea of guilty to one count of robbery, further proceedings were continued to a future date. Included in the matters to be disposed of later were the two counts of kidnapping and the remaining count of robbery filed against appellant. After receipt of the guilty plea from appellant the trial judge proceeded with the trial of the codefendant, Timmons. Appellant was called by the People as a witness to testify against his confederate and after refusing to testify on the grounds of possible self-incrimination, appellant waived issuance of order to show cause and hearing under section 1324 of the Penal Code and consented to the issuance of an order compelling him to answer questions and produce evidence in the case involving At the time of the hearing on the application for probation and for sentencing no reference was made by the trial judge, counsel for the People or counsel for appellant to the effect that the grant of immunity precluded sentence being imposed on the offense to which appellant had entered a plea of guilty.

Timmons. The trial judge thereupon signed the required order which contained the following language. 'After complying with the order, the above named witness (the appellant) shall not be prosecuted or subjected to penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any question, fact or thing, which, in accordance with this order, the witness was required to answer or produce.' Appellant then gave testimony at Timmons' trial and the latter was convicted of all four counts contained in the information.

Counsel for appellant not only waived formal arraignment for judgment and sentence but indicated that there was no legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. Counsel then made a vigorous argument to the court asking for a grant of probation and mentioned as one reason for favorable court consideration the appellant's cooperation as a witness. ² From the colloquy between the court and both counsel it is apparent that no one was laboring under the impression that any promises had been made to appellant in exchange for his cooperation as a witness.

CONCLUSION

Neither appellant nor respondent has furnished this court with any authority in support of their respective position. By argument appellant contends that it was clear that the Legislature intended Penal Code, section 1324 to be a broad and sweeping grant of immunity against imposition of penalty for any criminal conduct and not merely a bar to using his statements against him in any future proceeding. Under the facts of the cause before this court we do not interpret the section in such a manner.

It is a complete answer to appellant's argument to state that sentence was not imposed by reason of any question he might have answered or for any evidence he might have produced at the trial of Timmons. Sentence was imposed solely by reason of his prior voluntary plea of guilty to the charge of robbery. Such a plea, of course, removed appellant from the protection against...