People v. Stittsworth

• Decision Date: 12 March 1990
• Docket Number: No. A045410,A045410
• Citation: 218 Cal.App.3d 837,267 Cal.Rptr. 280
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Adele N. STITTSWORTH, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 280

267 Cal.Rptr. 280

218 Cal.App.3d 837

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Adele N. STITTSWORTH, Defendant and Appellant.

No. A045410.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

March 12, 1990.

Review Denied June 21, 1990.

William D. Farber, San Rafael, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Richard B. Iglehart, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., John H. Sugiyama, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Herbert F. Wilkinson, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., David D. Salmon, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.

PERLEY, Associate Justice.

In this case we hold that a misdemeanor conviction may not be appealed on statutory speedy trial grounds where the defendant is originally held to answer on felony charges, and then pleads no contest to a misdemeanor in return for dismissal of the felonies pursuant to a plea bargain.

I. FACTS

On March 24, 1986, appellant was held to answer in the superior court for the felonies of arson, insurance fraud and criminal conspiracy. Due to an apparent clerical error, the information was not filed until April 10, 1986, two days beyond the 15-day deadline specified in Penal Code section 1382, subdivision (a). ¹ The trial court denied appellant's motion to dismiss based on the untimely information, she unsuccessfully sought review of the ruling by way of petition for writ of mandate or prohibition to the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court declined to grant review.

On May 17, 1988, after extended pretrial proceedings, appellant entered a negotiated plea of nolo contendere to an added charge of misdemeanor accessory after the fact (Pen.Code, § 32) in return for dismissal of the felony counts. The plea bargain did not include preservation of any right to appeal on speedy trial grounds. Appellant was found guilty of the misdemeanor, imposition of sentence was suspended and probation was granted, conditioned inter alia on service of 90 days in county jail. She now seeks to overturn the judgment on the basis of the untimely information.

II. DISCUSSION

In People v. Draughon (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 471, 473-474, 164 Cal.Rptr. 440, this Court held that a defendant may not raise statutory speedy trial error on appeal after pleading guilty to a felony. Other Courts of Appeal have also concluded that speedy trial rights are waived by guilty pleas in felony cases. (See People v. Lee (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 715, 717-718, 161 Cal.Rptr. 162; and People v. Hayton (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 413, 418-419, 156 Cal.Rptr. 426 [citing People v. Hocking (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 778, 780, 296 P.2d 59].)

Draughon, Lee and Hayton all reasoned that speedy trial error does not " 'go ... to the legality of the proceedings' " under section 1237.5, which limits the grounds for appeal from judgments of conviction in superior courts following pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. (Draughon, supra, 105 Cal.App.3d at p. 473, 164 Cal.Rptr. 440; Lee, supra, 100 Cal.App.3d at p. 717, 161 Cal.Rptr. 162; Hayton, supra, 95 Cal.App.3d at p. 418, 156 Cal.Rptr. 426.) Hayton noted, in the context of a felony conviction, that "[i]f an action is dismissed for failure to bring a defendant to trial within the time specified in section 1382, another action may be commenced against the defendant. (Pen.Code, §§ 1387, 1388.)" (Ibid.) The Hayton court also observed that: "The essence of a defendant's speedy trial or due process claim in the usual case is that the passage of time has frustrated his ability to establish his innocence. The resolution of a speedy trial or due process issue necessitates a careful assessment of the particular facts of a case in order that the question of prejudice may be determined. [p] Where the defendant pleads guilty, there are no facts to be assessed. And since a plea of guilty admits every element of the offense charged, there is no innocence to be established." (Id., at p. 419, 156 Cal.Rptr. 426; footnote omitted.)

Avila v. Municipal Court (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 807, 812, 196 Cal.Rptr. 286, distinguished Draughon, Lee and Hayton, and concluded that statutory speedy trial error is cognizable on appeal from a misdemeanor conviction on a guilty plea. Avila noted that such error is deemed "automatically prejudicial" in misdemeanor cases (In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606, 632, 58 Cal.Rptr. 579, 427 P.2d 179) because, unlike felonies, misdemeanor charges cannot be refiled if they have been dismissed on speedy trial grounds (see § 1387). Since prejudice would not be an issue, the Avila court reasoned that inability to show prejudice should not prevent review of speedy trial error on appeal of a misdemeanor, even if the conviction is based on a guilty plea. The court also reasoned that, even if section 1237.5's limitations on felony appeals were applied to misdemeanor proceedings, speedy trial errors would "go to the legality" of such proceedings because they are automatically prejudicial.

Under Draughon, Lee and Hayton, if appellant had pled guilty to any of the original felony charges she would have been barred by her plea from raising any error under section 1382. But since her plea bargain reduced the charges to a misdemeanor, she seeks to assert such error under the authority of Avila.

Whatever its merits in the typical misdemeanor case, we find Avila's reasoning inapposite to appellant's situation. Avila was premised on the inability to re-file misdemeanor charges after a speedy trial violation. The situation in this case is more like a felony, however, because reversal of the judgment on speedy trial grounds would only put the parties back to square one. The prosecution could re-file the original felony charges because it would be deprived of the benefit of its plea...