People v. Stock
| Decision Date | 03 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 14SC870 |
| Citation | 397 P.3d 386 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner v. Susan Leigh STOCK, Respondent |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
397 P.3d 386
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner
v.
Susan Leigh STOCK, Respondent
Supreme Court Case No. 14SC870
Supreme Court of Colorado.
July 3, 2017
Attorneys for Petitioner: Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Carmen Moraleda,
Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado.
Attorneys for Respondent: Douglas K. Wilson, Public Defender, Kielly Dunn, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado.
En Banc
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶ 1 In 2011, a jury convicted Susan Stock of third degree burglary and theft for stealing money from vending machines at the hotel where she worked. The court of appeals reversed Stock's convictions, concluding that the trial court erroneously denied Stock's motion to suppress statements she made to a police officer who had entered the hotel room where she lived. Stock's father, who was Stock's invited guest in the room, had opened the door on Stock's behalf in response to the officer's knock, and moved aside to allow the officer to step a few feet inside the hotel-room door. The officer then requested and obtained Stock's express permission to come further into the room to speak with her. The court of appeals reasoned that the police officer's entry into the hotel room was unlawful because Stock's father lacked authority to consent to the officer's entry into the hotel room. In reviewing the court of appeals' decision, we are therefore asked to decide whether the officer's entry into Stock's hotel room violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. Importantly, this case does not require us to decide whether Stock's father had authority to consent to a full-blown search of the room; rather, the narrow question before us is whether Stock's father could consent to the officer's limited entry a few feet inside the door.
¶ 2 On the facts of this case, we conclude that Stock conferred authority on her father to consent to the officer's limited entry. The trial court therefore properly denied Stock's motion to suppress, and her statements to the officer were admissible at trial. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶ 3 The following facts are drawn from witness testimony and the trial court's findings of fact at Stock's suppression hearing on January 14, 2011.
¶ 4 Susan Stock worked as a front-desk clerk at a Best Western hotel in Winter Park, Colorado. Stock lived in a room at the hotel. In May 2010, the hotel manager discovered that she was missing a key to one of the hotel vending machines and that money had been emptied from the machine. Suspicious that an employee had taken the money, the manager reported the theft to a detective with the Fraser–Winter Park Police Department. The detective visited the hotel and made appointments to interview four hotel employees, one of whom was Stock. On May 18, the detective interviewed Stock in the hotel's front lobby. During that interview, Stock denied taking the key and money.
¶ 5 Two days later, on May 20, Stock reversed course and confessed to the hotel's owner that she had stolen money from the hotel's vending machines. The hotel manager called the police department, reported that one of the employees had confessed, and asked for an officer to respond. A uniformed police officer went to the hotel and spoke to the owner. The hotel owner related to the officer that Stock had confessed and was presently in her hotel room. The hotel owner provided the officer with directions and the room number.
¶ 6 The officer went to Stock's hotel room and knocked on the door. Stock's father, whom the officer knew was not a resident of the hotel room, answered the door. The father opened the door and stepped back into the hotel room, allowing the officer to step inwards. The officer understood the father's action to be an invitation to enter the room. Stock's hotel room was a typical single-room unit with a small entryway, a bathroom on the right side, a bed, and some furniture. The officer took a couple of steps past the hotel-room door and introduced himself. Stock's father asked the officer whether he should remain in the room. The officer asked the father to leave, and the father stepped outside into the hallway. As the father was leaving, the officer saw Stock, who had been
on the bed crying when her father opened the door.
¶ 7 The officer asked Stock if he could speak with her, and Stock responded, "Yes." Stock then cleared off a seat in her room for the officer and offered it to him. The officer took the seat and had a thirty-minute conversation with Stock, during which she admitted to taking money from the hotel's vending machines. Stock also produced the vending-machine key and gave it to the officer.
¶ 8 The People charged Stock with third degree burglary in violation of section 18-4-204(1), C.R.S. (2016), and theft of cash with a value of $1,000 or more, but less than $20,000, in violation of section 18-4-401(2)(c), C.R.S. (2009). Stock moved to suppress her statements to the officer and the evidence obtained as a result of the officer's entry, arguing that the officer's entry into the room was illegal and that the officer's questioning constituted a custodial interrogation necessitating Miranda warnings. The court held a hearing on the motion, and the parties presented testimony from Stock, her father, the officer, and the detective who had initially interviewed Stock on May 18. Stock testified at the hearing that she did "not really" want the officer to enter her room. However, the trial court found that aspects of Stock's testimony were contradictory, and that Stock's credibility was impaired by her prior felony conviction and her self-interest in having the suppression motion granted.
¶ 9 The court issued a bench ruling denying the motion to suppress, but later expressed concern as to whether it had correctly concluded that the officer's entry into the hotel room was lawful. The court therefore invited the parties to submit written briefing on the issue. The court then issued a written order reaffirming its earlier ruling denying the motion to suppress. The court's written order relied principally on People v. White , 64 P.3d 864, 872 (Colo. App. 2002), in which the court of appeals concluded that a family friend visiting the defendant's father as an overnight houseguest had authority to consent to a police entry into an area of the father's house where a visitor normally would be received. In this case, the trial court reasoned that the officer's entry into Stock's hotel room was analogous to the lawful police entry in White because Stock's father was a close relative, not a casual visitor, and because he had merely allowed the officer to step into the entry area to the hotel room where guests normally would be received. The trial court therefore concluded that Stock's father had authority to let the officer into the entry area of the hotel room. The trial court also reasoned that Stock's father "opened the door for his daughter because she was on the bed crying" when the officer knocked. Finally, the court found from the evidence at the motions hearing that Stock and her father were waiting for law enforcement; the court noted that neither of them acted surprised or asked the officer why he had come to Stock's room. Accordingly, the trial court again concluded that the officer's entry into the hotel room was lawful and denied the motion to suppress.
¶ 10 Stock's three-day jury trial took place in March 2011. The officer testified about Stock's confession in her hotel room on May 20. Stock testified in her own defense. She admitted taking money from the vending machines but claimed that she intended to return the money once she received a commission that she expected for ski-rental customer referrals. The jury convicted Stock of both counts.
¶ 11 On appeal, Stock again argued that her statements should have been suppressed because the officer's entry into her hotel room was unlawful. In an unpublished decision, a panel of the court of appeals agreed. People v. Stock , No. 11CA1271, slip op. at 7–9, 2014 WL 4467735 (Colo. App. Sept. 11, 2014) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f) ). The court of appeals concluded that the trial court had erred in relying on White because, in its view, White "does not stand for the legal proposition that any visitor who is more than a casual visitor has the authority to allow law enforcement officers into another person's home without that person's consent." Id. at 7. Instead, the court of appeals concluded that the father lacked authority to consent to the officer's entry because the father did not live in the hotel room. Id. at 7–8. And because the officer knew the father did not reside there, the
court of appeals further concluded that the officer could not have formed a reasonable (albeit mistaken) belief that the father possessed common authority over the room. Id. at 8. The court of appeals therefore reversed Stock's judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 14.
¶ 12 We granted the People's petition for writ of certiorari to...
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