People v. Stoecker

• Decision Date: 24 September 2020
• Docket Number: Docket No. 124807
• Citation: 181 N.E.3d 201,450 Ill.Dec. 201,2020 IL 124807
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Ronald L. STOECKER, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2020 IL 124807

181 N.E.3d 201

450 Ill.Dec. 201

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,

v.Ronald L. STOECKER, Appellant.

Docket No. 124807

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Opinion filed September 24, 2020.

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Peter A. Carusona and Thomas A. Karalis, Deputy Defenders, and Andrew J. Boyd, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellant.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Evan B. Elsner, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Over 16 years after Ronald L. Stoecker's convictions and sentences for first degree murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault were affirmed on direct appeal and after numerous other petitions for collateral relief were dismissed or denied, he filed the instant petition for relief from judgment under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2016) ). The State moved to dismiss the petition on procedural grounds. Appointed counsel did not respond to the motion and was not present for the ruling on the motion; nonetheless, the circuit court of Stark County dismissed the petition as a matter of law. The appellate court held that any procedural due process violation relating to the dismissal of the petition was harmless error and that appointed counsel's representation was not inadequate where the defects in the petition could not be cured. 2019 IL App (3d) 160781, ¶¶ 10-12, 14-16, 430 Ill.Dec. 683, 126 N.E.3d 771. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In 1998, a jury convicted petitioner of first degree murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault of a 15-year-old girl. The evidence adduced at trial established that petitioner drove the girl to a remote, rural area of Illinois, sexually assaulted her, slit her throat, and left her for dead in a field. Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of natural life and 30 years in prison.

¶ 4 His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Stoecker , 308 Ill. App. 3d 1107, 261 Ill.Dec. 905, 764 N.E.2d 196 (1999) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 ). Thereafter, petitioner filed numerous unsuccessful petitions for collateral relief.¹ Relevant to this appeal, in 2005 petitioner filed a petition for relief from judgment, contending inter alia that he was entitled to resentencing. He argued that the circuit court's procedures in imposing a life sentence for murder violated Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), where the United States Supreme Court held that, other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty beyond the statutory maximum sentence must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 5 The circuit court construed the filing as a petition for postconviction relief and appointed counsel to represent petitioner. In a report filed with the court, counsel thoroughly addressed petitioner's Apprendi claim and the legal underpinnings of his argument. Recognizing that petitioner's claim had been squarely addressed by this court in People v. De La Paz , 204 Ill. 2d 426, 274 Ill.Dec. 397, 791 N.E.2d 489 (2003), counsel concluded that "the Illinois Supreme Court's decision controls and we need not address this issue further." The circuit court dismissed the petition. Although petitioner filed four subsequent amended petitions for relief related to ineffective assistance of counsel claims, he did not appeal from the court's ruling on the Apprendi issue.

¶ 6 Seven years later, in 2012, petitioner filed another petition for relief from judgment, again raising the Apprendi issue. The circuit court dismissed the petition as untimely. The appellate court affirmed, holding that, under De La Paz , the rule established in Apprendi did not apply retroactively to cases whose direct appeals were exhausted prior to the Supreme Court's decision. Stoecker , 2014 IL App (3d) 130389-U, ¶ 16.

¶ 7 In August 2016, petitioner filed yet another petition for relief from judgment under section 2-1401 of the Code, seeking to collaterally attack his sentence. Therein, petitioner reasserted that his life sentence was improper under Apprendi . Citing the recent Supreme Court decisions in Johnson v. United States , 576 U.S. 1035, 135 S.Ct. 2857, 192 L.Ed.2d 894 (2015), and Welch v. United States , 578 U.S. 120, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 194 L.Ed.2d 387 (2016), he contended that Apprendi now applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. Additionally, petitioner argued that the circuit court failed to sufficiently articulate the basis for its finding to support his enhanced sentence. He further contended that his noncompliance with section 2-1401's two-year time limitation was excused; petitioner maintained that his sentence was void and that a void sentence could be attacked at any time. He also requested the appointment of counsel.

¶ 8 On September 26, 2016, the circuit court appointed counsel to represent petitioner and ordered the State to respond to the petition within 30 days. The certificate of mailing filed by the circuit clerk reflects that appointed counsel was served with the appointment order by regular mail on that date.

¶ 9 On November 14, 2016, the State moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the claim was both untimely, and barred by res judicata because the issues had been previously litigated and other matters asserted were of record at the time of trial. The certificate of service reflects that the State served the motion on appointed counsel by e-mail and regular mail the same day.

¶ 10 Four days later, on November 18, 2016, the circuit court dismissed the petition, announcing its ruling on the record. The report of proceedings reflects that only the State was present for the ruling, though it made no argument before the court. The record does not show that appointed counsel was notified of the proceeding. After stating that petitioner's presence was not required, the court ruled that it had reviewed the file and the pleadings and determined that the State's motion was correct as a matter of law. The certificate of mailing reflects that appointed counsel was served with the court's order.

¶ 11 Petitioner then filed a pro se motion to reconsider, arguing that the court had not given him an opportunity to respond to the State's motion or amend his petition. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that "nothing contained therein * * * change[d] the [c]ourt's decision."

¶ 12 On appeal, petitioner argued that his due process rights were violated because the circuit court failed to give him a meaningful opportunity to respond to the State's motion to dismiss and because it held an ex parte hearing on the motion. He further argued that his counsel's performance was deficient.

¶ 13 The appellate court affirmed. 2019 IL App (3d) 160781, ¶¶ 10-20, 430 Ill.Dec. 683, 126 N.E.3d 771. The court found that, even if petitioner's due process rights were violated, any violation was harmless because the deficiencies in the petition could not be cured on remand. Id. ¶ 10. The petition was untimely, barred by res judicata , and meritless. Id. ¶¶ 12, 16. With respect to appointed counsel's representation, the appellate court found that under any standard of representation, counsel's representation was not inadequate where the defects in the petition were not curable. Id. ¶¶ 14-16. Justice Lytton dissented, finding that appointed counsel's failure to appear, file any pleadings, or provide any representation was inadequate under any relevant standard. Id. ¶ 25 (Lytton, J., dissenting). We subsequently granted petitioner leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. July 1, 2018).

¶ 14 ANALYSIS

¶ 15 Due Process Claim

¶ 16 We first address petitioner's contention regarding the manner in which the circuit court heard and ruled upon his petition. Petitioner reasserts that his due process rights were violated because he was not given a meaningful opportunity to respond to the State's motion to dismiss and because the court dismissed his petition during an ex parte hearing. He maintains that these errors were necessarily prejudicial because they affected the "integrity of the proceedings."

¶ 17 A procedural due process claim presents a question of law, which we review de novo . People v. Cardona , 2013 IL 114076, ¶ 15, 369 Ill.Dec. 117, 986 N.E.2d 66. An individual's right to procedural due process is guaranteed by the United States and Illinois Constitutions. See U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1 ; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2. This right entitles an individual to "the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." In re D.W. , 214 Ill. 2d 289, 316, 292 Ill.Dec. 937, 827 N.E.2d 466 (2005). "Due process is a flexible concept," and thus, not all circumstances call for the same type of procedure. People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski , 233 Ill. 2d 185, 201, 330 Ill.Dec. 761, 909 N.E.2d 783 (2009).

¶ 18 In the context of a petition for relief from judgment, section 2-1401 of the Code provides a statutory mechanism for vacating final judgments older than 30 days. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2016). It is a civil remedy that extends to both criminal and civil cases. People v. Vincent , 226 Ill. 2d 1, 8, 312 Ill.Dec. 617, 871 N.E.2d 17 (2007). We have consistently held that proceedings under section 2-1401 are governed by the usual rules of civil practice. Id. As such, petitions filed thereunder are treated as complaints "inviting responsive pleadings." Id. Accordingly, the respondent may answer the petition, move to dismiss it, or choose not to file a responsive pleading. Id.

¶ 19 In Vincent , this court examined the propriety of a sua sponte dismissal by the court and its impact on...