People v. Stone Transport, Inc., Docket No. 213894.
| Decision Date | 26 July 2000 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 213894. |
| Citation | 613 N.W.2d 737,241 Mich. App. 49 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STONE TRANSPORT, INC., Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Michael D. Thomas, Prosecuting Attorney, and Randy L. Price, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Braun Kendrick Finkbeiner, P.L.C. (by Scott C. Strattard and Frederick C. Overdier), Saginaw, for the defendant.
Before: ZAHRA, P.J., and WHITE and HOEKSTRA, JJ.
Defendant appeals by leave granted from an order affirming the district court's decision finding defendant responsible for two civil infractions for operating over-length vehicles on Michigan highways in violation of M.C.L. § 257.719; MSA 9.2419. We reverse.
Defendant contends that the circuit court erred in interpreting the definition of length under M.C.L. § 257.719(8)(c); MSA 9.2419(8)(c) by holding that a coupling device may be included in the measurement of a trailer's length. We agree. Statutory interpretation and application is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. People v. Webb, 458 Mich. 265, 274-275, 580 N.W.2d 884 (1998).
When interpreting a statute, this Court's primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Id. at 273-274, 580 N.W.2d 884. To discern the intent of the Legislature, this Court must first look to the specific language of the statute. People v. Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich. 278, 284, 597 N.W.2d 1 (1999). If the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language is clear, judicial construction is inappropriate. Id. However, if reasonable minds could differ regarding the statute's meaning, judicial construction is appropriate. Id.; People v. Armstrong, 212 Mich.App. 121, 123, 536 N.W.2d 789 (1995). This Court must look to the purpose of the statute, the harm it is designed to remedy, and apply a reasonable construction that accomplishes the statute's purpose. People v. Adair, 452 Mich. 473, 479-480, 550 N.W.2d 505 (1996); People v. Williams, 236 Mich.App. 610, 613, 601 N.W.2d 138 (1999). "[L]iteral construction of a statute that would produce absurd and unjust results clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the statute should be avoided." Livonia v. Goretski Constr. Co., 229 Mich.App. 279, 289-290, 581 N.W.2d 761 (1998).
Subsection 719(2) of the Vehicle Code, M.C.L. § 257.719(2); MSA 9.2419(2), provides the "normal length maximum" of vehicles and combinations of vehicles that may be operated on Michigan highways. Notwithstanding the maximum lengths provided in subsection 719(2), specific exceptions to the length of combinations are provided in subsection 719(3):
Notwithstanding subsection (2), the following vehicles and combinations of vehicles shall not be operated on a designated highway of this state in excess of these lengths:
* * *
(c) Truck tractor and 2 semitrailers, or truck tractor, semitrailer, and trailer combinations: no overall length limit, if the length of each semitrailer or trailer does not exceed 28-1/2 feet each, or the overall length of the semitrailer and trailer, or 2 semitrailers as measured from the front of the first towed unit to the rear of the second towed unit while the units are coupled together does not exceed 58 feet. [MCL 257.719(3); MSA 9.2419(3).]
The pivotal issue in the present case revolves around the meaning of "length" in the quoted language. Subsection 719(8)(c) defines the term "length" as used in § 719:
"Length" means the total length of a vehicle, or combination of vehicles, including any load the vehicle is carrying. Length shall not include safety or energy conservation devices.... Semitrailers and trailers shall be measured from the front vertical plane of the foremost transverse load supporting structure to the rearmost transverse load supporting structure. [MCL 257.719(8)(c); MSA 9.2419(8)(c) (emphasis supplied).]
This provision, as applied in the present case, requires a determination whether the dolly, i.e., the coupling device, that is used to connect the lead trailer to the pup trailer1 is included within the statutory language. See M.C.L. § 257.719(8)(c); MSA 9.2419(8)(c).
In applying the statutory definition of length, defendant claims that the foremost load supporting structure is the front end of the semitrailer or trailer, that the dolly is not an integral part of the trailer, and that the dolly was never intended to be measured. In essence, defendant claims that the two trailers in a combination should be measured the same, because they are the same length and their positions are interchangeable. Defendant explains that each semitrailer should be measured from the front vertical portion of the trailer to the rear of the trailer. Moreover, defendant presented testimony that for the past ten years it has been utilizing the same vehicle combination and, although having been subject to measurements, it has not been issued an over-length citation until the current citations that were issued by the same enforcement officer. In opposing defendant's interpretation of the statutory language, the prosecution maintains that because the dolly was a loadbearing structure, it was properly included in the measurement. The prosecution explains that the lead trailer does not need the load bearing dolly when a pup trailer is not used, but only when the pup trailer is hitched to a semitrailer because without the dolly nothing would support the load at the front of the pup trailer.
In our opinion, each of these interpretations is defensible in the context of the statutory language, and thus there is no one clear interpretation. Because the statutory language with regard to how the length of combinations of vehicles is to be measured is subject to varying interpretations, resolution of the issue on appeal requires...
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