People v. Stovall

• Decision Date: 05 November 2020
• Docket Number: No. 342440,342440
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Montez STOVALL, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

334 Mich.App. 553

965 N.W.2d 264

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Montez STOVALL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 342440

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 9, 2020, at Detroit.

Decided November 5, 2020, 9:05 a.m.

Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, Jason W. Williams, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Jon P. Wojtala, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

State Appellate Defender, Detroit (by Sofia V. Nelson ) for defendant.

Before: Gleicher, P.J., and Sawyer and Meter, JJ.

Sawyer, J.

This case is before us on remand from our Supreme Court for consideration as on delayed leave granted.¹ Defendant appeals the trial court's order denying his successive motion for relief from judgment. We affirm.

In 1991, while still a juvenile, defendant shot and killed two men. As part of a plea agreement with the prosecution, defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and two counts of possessing a firearm when committing or attempting to commit a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b(1). In exchange for defendant's guilty pleas, the prosecution reduced the charges in one of the cases from first-degree murder, MCL 750.316, to second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, with defendant sentenced to two concurrent sentences of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after 10 years and the mandatory two-year sentence for the felony-firearm convictions. In pleading guilty to second-degree murder, defendant avoided the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole were he found guilty of first-degree murder.

Over the next quarter-century, defendant filed several motions for relief from judgment in the trial court, all of which were denied. In 2016, after several United States Supreme Court decisions regarding the sentencing of juvenile offenders, defendant filed another successive motion for relief from judgment in the trial court, asserting that there had been a retroactive change in the law warranting the withdrawal of his guilty plea and the vacation of his sentences. After considering defendant's motion, the trial court determined that defendant was not entitled to relief from judgment because of the validity of his sentences. This appeal ensued.

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

This Court reviews "a trial court's decision on a motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion and its findings of facts supporting its decision for clear error. A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes or makes an error of law." People v. Swain , 288 Mich. App. 609, 628-629, 794 N.W.2d 92 (2010) (citations omitted). "Interpretation of a court rule is treated like interpretation of a statute, it is a question of law that is reviewed de novo." People v. Phillips , 468 Mich. 583, 587, 663 N.W.2d 463 (2003). Similarly, questions of constitutional law are reviewed de novo. People v. Trakhtenberg , 493 Mich. 38, 47, 826 N.W.2d 136 (2012).

Unpreserved constitutional claims are reviewed against the plain-error standard. People v. Vandenberg , 307 Mich. App. 57, 61, 859 N.W.2d 229 (2014), citing People v. Carines , 460 Mich. 750, 764, 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999).

To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights. The third requirement generally requires a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings. It is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. Finally, once a defendant satisfies these three requirements, an appellate court must exercise its discretion in deciding whether to reverse. Reversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant's innocence. [ Carines , 460 Mich. at 763-764, 597 N.W.2d 130 (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted).]

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Defendant premises much of his argument on two recent cases decided by the United States Supreme Court that exerted a significant change on the sentencing of juvenile offenders. In Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 479, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), the Supreme Court held that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution forbids "a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders." In reaching this conclusion, the Miller Court was concerned with the mandatory nature of these punishments that denied a sentencing judge the opportunity to make individualized sentencing determinations and to consider a juvenile's age or circumstances before deciding whether a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was appropriate. Id. at 477-478, 480, 132 S. Ct. 2455. However, Miller did not categorically reject life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. Rather, it required that sentencing courts consider an offender's juvenile status and connected circumstances before determining whether a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was a proportionate sentence. Id. at 479, 132 S. Ct. 2455.

Six years later, the United States Supreme Court revisited its Miller holding in Montgomery v. Louisiana , 577 U.S. 190, 136 S. Ct. 718, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016). Writing for the majority, then Justice Anthony Kennedy described Miller as holding "that a juvenile convicted of a homicide offense could not be sentenced to life in prison without parole absent consideration of the juvenile's special circumstances in light of the principles and purposes of juvenile sentencing." Id. at 193-194, 136 S.Ct. 718 . While Miller expressed a procedural requirement, its holding established that the penological justifications that supported sentencing juvenile offenders to life in prison without the possibility of parole "collapse in light of ‘the distinctive attributes of youth.’ " Id. at 208, 136 S.Ct. 718 quoting Miller , 567 U.S. at 472, 132 S.Ct. 2455. As a result, Miller announced a substantive rule of law that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is an excessive punishment for juvenile offenders "whose crimes reflect transient immaturity." Montgomery , 577 U.S. at 210, 136 S.Ct. 718. And because Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law, its holding had retroactive effect for those juvenile offenders who had been sentenced before Miller was decided. Id. at 212, 136 S.Ct. 718. The Supreme Court suggested that, as an alternative to relitigating sentences that violated Miller ’s holding, states could remedy the situation by providing juvenile offenders serving mandatory sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole the possibility to be considered for parole. Id.

Defendant asserts that these two decisions constituted a retroactive change in the law that rendered his sentences of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole invalid. And, as a result, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his successive motion for relief from judgment. We disagree.

III. ANALYSIS

Before turning to defendant's substantive claims, we must first address a procedural argument put forward by the prosecution. Under MCR 6.502(G)(1), one of several court rules that govern motions for relief from judgment, a criminal defendant is entitled to file "one and only one motion for relief from judgment ... with regard to a conviction." However, a defendant may file a second or subsequent motion for relief from judgment on the basis of "a retroactive change in law that occurred after the first motion for relief from judgment ...." MCR 6.502(G)(2). It is undisputed that Miller and Montgomery brought about a retroactive change in the law after defendant filed his first motion for relief from judgment in 1995. The court rule allows a defendant to file a motion for relief from judgment on the basis of a retroactive change in the law that occurred after a defendant's first motion for relief from judgment, which is precisely what defendant did in the trial court. And defendant's arguments in the trial court and in this Court rely on the retroactive change defined in Miller and Montgomery . While these Supreme Court cases may not, as the trial court concluded, provide substantive support for defendant's motion, they tenuously meet the procedural requirement to allow defendant to file a successive motion for relief from judgment. As a result, we will address defendant's substantive claims.

A. ILLUSORY PLEA BARGAIN

Defendant first asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his successive motion for relief from judgment because his guilty plea was the result of an illusory plea bargain. We disagree.

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree murder and two counts of felony-firearm as a result of a plea agreement he entered into with the prosecution. "A defendant pleading guilty must enter an understanding, voluntary, and accurate plea."

People v. Brown , 492 Mich. 684, 688-689, 822 N.W.2d 208 (2012). "To ensure that a guilty plea is accurate, the trial court must establish a factual basis for the plea. In order for a plea to be voluntary and understanding, the defendant must be fully aware of the direct consequences of the plea." People v. Pointer-Bey , 321 Mich. App. 609, 616, 909 N.W.2d 523 (2017) (quotation marks and citations omitted). When, as is the case here, "a plea is offered pursuant to a bargain with the prosecutor, voluntariness depends upon the defendant's knowledge...