People v. Strait
| Citation | 154 N.Y. 165,47 N.E. 1090 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. STRAIT. |
| Decision Date | 26 October 1897 |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from supreme court, trial term, Chemung county.
Martin V. Strait was convicted of murder in the first degree, and from the judgment, and an order denying a motion for new trial, he appeals. Reversed.
Hosea H. Rockwell, for appellant.
Charles H. Knipp, for the People.
At a term of the court of oyer and terminer held in the county of Chemung in November, 1894, the defendant was indicted for the crime of murder in the first degree. It was charged that on the 16th day of November, 1894, at the city of Elmira, in that county, he deliberately and with premeditation shot and killed his wife, Joan H. Strait. In the following May he was tried, and a verdict of guilty was rendered. From the judgment of conviction entered on that verdict he appealed to this court, where it was reversed, and a new trial granted. The reversal was upon the ground that the court erred in admitting improper evidence. The defendant was again tried at a term of the supreme court held in that county commencing December 7, 1896, and was again convicted of the same crime. When arraigned for sentence, his counsel moved for a new trial upon the minutes, under section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the motion was denied. From the latter judgment and the order an appeal has been taken to this court.
That the defendant, at the time and place alleged, shot his wife, and that she died from the result of the wounds, thus inflicted, was proved, and not denied. Indeed, that the defendant killed her was conceded on the trial, and is conceded here. The only issue of fact presented in the case was that of the defendant's sanity. His defense was that, when the homicide occurred, he was laboring under such a defect of reason as not to know the nature and quality of his act or that it was wrong. A great amount of evidence was introduced by each party, and witnesses, both lay and expert, were called, and testified upon that issue. The witnesses called by the defendant gave testimony tending to show that he was laboring under such a defect of reason as not to know the nature and quality of his acts, or that they were wrong. Upon the other hand, the testimony of the people's witnesses tended to show that he was sane, and responsible for his acts. With our views of this case we deem it unnecessary to consider the facts, or to do more than examine a few of the exceptions taken by the defendant. On the trial, after the people rested, and the case had been turned over to the defendant, and he had introduced his proof and rested his defense, the people proved that the defendant, to a greater or less extent, indulged in the use of intoxicating drinks, and that upon the day of the homicide he had been drinking. The court then permitted the prosecution, under the objection and exception of the defendant, to ask its expert witnesses whether all of the conditions of mental distrubance described in the hypothetical questions put to witnesses for the defendant might not be accounted for on the ground of intoxication, and they testified that they thought they might. The prosecution was also permitted to prove by its experts that the conditions mentioned, which were the result of intoxication, might exist and pass away when the intoxication was terminated, and the person be sane all the time. Without referring specially to the various instances contained in the record, it may be said generally that the learned district attorney made a continued and persistent effort during the entire trial of the issue to establish that the defendant drank intoxicating liquors habitually, and that he was intoxicated upon the day of the homicide. This effort was opposed by the defendant with equal persistence. The evidence, however, was admitted. The district attorney also sought to establish by the evidence of the experts called in behalf of the people that all the acts and conduct of the defendant which were relied upon by the defense as evidence of insanity might be accounted for on the ground of his intoxication. Witnesses called by the people were permitted to give testimony to that effect. After this evidence had been received, the people for a second time rested. The defendant then recalled Dr. Wagner, who was a qualified expert, and offered to prove by him whether alcohol, when taken internally, acted upon the brain, was a direct brain poison, or was regarded as a cause of insanity. To this proof the district attorney objected, upon the ground that it was reopening the case. The court sustained it, and the evidence was excluded. The defendant also sought to prove that he did not use intoxicating liquors, or at least to the extent testified to by the witnesses for the people. This evidence was also objected to by the district attorney upon the same ground, and excluded by the court. To all of these rulings the defendant duly excepted. That the purpose of this evidence was to disprove the theory of the prosecution, that the acts and conditions relied upon by the defendant as evidence of insanity might be attributed to his intoxication, is manifest. It is equally manifest that the object of showing that he did not indulge in the use of intoxicating drinks or to the extent proved by the witnesses called by the prosecution, was also to contradict and disprove that theory. It is extremely difficult to discover any ground upon which these rulings can be sustained. An examination of the record discloses that the issue of intoxication, so far as it was a basis of explaining the defendant's acts as consistent with sanity, was one presented by the people, and upon which they introduced a great amount of evidence, both as to the fact and by opinions of experts, while no such issue was, or could well have...
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