People v. Strodtman

• Decision Date: 27 October 2011
• Docket Number: No. 11CA1284.,11CA1284.
• Citation: 293 P.3d 123
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner–Appellee, In the Interest of Joyce A. STRODTMAN, Respondent–Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

293 P.3d 123

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner–Appellee, In the Interest of Joyce A. STRODTMAN, Respondent–Appellant.

No. 11CA1284.

Colorado Court of Appeals,

Div. I.

Oct. 27, 2011.

David W. Broadwell, City Attorney, Michael Stafford, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner–Appellee.

Law Offices of Terry Tomsick, Terry Tomsick, Denver, Colorado, for Respondent–Appellant.

Opinion by Judge TAUBMAN.

Respondent, Joyce A. Strodtman, appeals the magistrate's order authorizing the Denver Health Medical Center (DHMC), upon the People's petition, to forcibly administer her antipsychotic medications. We affirm.

I. Background

Strodtman was detained at DHMC in April 2011 and determined to be gravely disabled upon evaluation. Thereafter, the People filed a petition for certification of short-term treatment pursuant to section 27–65–107, C.R.S.2011. They also filed a separate petition requesting an order authorizing DHMC to forcibly administer to Strodtman several antipsychotic medications.

At a May 9 hearing before a probate magistrate, Strodtman, represented by counsel, stipulated as to the short-term certification but objected to the forcible medication order. The hearing proceeded on that matter. At the conclusion of the hearing, the magistrate granted the petition and authorized DHMC to forcibly administer the proposed medications to Strodtman.

Immediately following the hearing, and before a May 13 written order issued, DHMC staff forcibly administered to Strodtman the listed medications. Strodtman then moved the magistrate for an automatic stay pursuant to C.R.C.P. 62(a). The magistrate denied her motion. This appeal followed.

Strodtman has since also entered into a consent order with the People, signed by the magistrate, extending her short-term certification and the DHMC's forcible medication administration authority through October 29, 2011.

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Strodtman contends for the first time on appeal that the magistrate's order is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

“A trial court's determination regarding subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law and is therefore subject to de novo review.” Lee v. Banner Health, 214 P.3d 589, 594 (Colo.App.2009).

B. Analysis

Arguments not raised in the trial court are generally deemed waived. Moody v. People, 159 P.3d 611, 614 (Colo.2007). However, because a challenge to a court's subject matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal, we reach Strodtman's jurisdictional argument.¹Herr v. People, 198 P.3d 108, 111 (Colo.2008).

A court must have subject matter jurisdiction to hear and decide a case. Currier v. Sutherland, 218 P.3d 709, 714 (Colo.2009). C.R.M. 6(e) delineates the jurisdiction of magistrates in mental health cases by authorizing them, with the consent of necessary parties, to “[h]ear and rule upon all matters filed pursuant to C.R.S. Title 25 and Title 27.” C.R.M. 6(e)(2)(B). Thus, whether the magistrate possessed subject matter jurisdiction to authorize the administration of antipsychotic medication turns on the scope of Title 27.

In the seminal Colorado case on forcible medication administration, People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 971 (Colo.1985), the Colorado Supreme Court recognized Title 27's “statutory grant of jurisdiction and venue” to courts to issue such orders. Before deciding what standards courts should apply in such hearings, the court stated:

[I]n the event a patient refuses to accept medication the court which originally ordered the patient's certification shall have “jurisdiction and venue to accept a petition by a treating physician and to enter an order requiring that the [patient] accept such treatment, or, in the alternative, that the medication be forcibly administered to him.”

Id. (quoting Ch. 116, sec. 3, § 27–10–111(4.5), 1982 Colo. Sess. Laws 447); see also Hopkins v. People, 772 P.2d 624, 625 (Colo.App.1988) (affirming a court's jurisdiction to order forcible administration of antipsychotic medications).

Since Medina was decided, former section 27–10–111(4.5) was amended and repealed. Ch. 1043, sec. 1, 1996 Colo. Sess. Laws 1043–44 (adding authority relating to criminal proceedings); Ch. 188, sec. 1, 2010 Colo. Sess. Laws 675 (repealing art. 10). However, the General Assembly added sections substantially similar to those of former article 10 in article 65. Section 27–65–111(5)(a), C.R.S.2011, currently provides in relevant part:

In the event that a respondent ... refuses to accept medication, the court having jurisdiction of the action pursuant to subsection (4) of this section ... shall have jurisdiction and venue to accept a petition by a treating physician and to enter an order requiring that the respondent ... accept such treatment or, in the alternative, that the medication be forcibly administered to him or her.

The court in which a short-term certification was filed under section 27–65–107, has original and continuing jurisdiction under section 27–65–111(4), C.R.S.2011.

We conclude this section is substantially similar to that of repealed section 27–10–111(4.5), and thus the Medina court's analysis applies. This section constitutes a “statutory grant of jurisdiction and venue” in matters concerning forcible administration of medication. Under C.R.M. 6(e)(2)(B), magistrates also possess jurisdiction over these matters. Therefore, the magistrate did not lack jurisdiction to hear and decide Strodtman's case.

III. Full and Fair Adversary Hearing

On the merits, Strodtman contends the magistrate violated her due process rights because he failed to conduct a full and fair adversary hearing. Specifically, she alleges that five hearing errors undermined the fairness of the hearing: the magistrate (1) compelled Strodtman to testify as the People's first witness; (2) admitted Dr. Erin O'Flaherty as “an expert in medicine”; (3) admitted hearsay through the testimony of the People's medical experts; (4) improperly congratulated the People's counsel for his expertise; and (5) improperly commented on Strodtman's mental illness in his final ruling. We reject these contentions.

A. Standard of Review

Strodtman urges us to evaluate her claim that the magistrate conducted an unfair hearing under the criminal standard of Crider v. People, 186 P.3d 39 (Colo.2008). Under Crider, before disregarding as harmless any errors of a “constitutional dimension,” a reviewing court must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the lack of an error's prejudicial impact by evaluating it in the totality of the circumstances. 186 P.3d at 42–43.

We decline to apply this criminal standard to a civil commitment hearing because “civil commitment proceedings in Colorado are not criminal in nature.” People ex rel. Ofengand, 183 P.3d 688, 692 (Colo.App.2008) (citing Gilford v. People, 2 P.3d 120, 124–25 (Colo.2000)). Colorado's mental health statutes afford due process, and so our inquiry turns on whether the magistrate deviated from the statutes. People in Interest of Clinton, 762 P.2d 1381, 1390 (Colo.1988). Thus, we review alleged hearing errors under the due process standards used in Medina, 705 P.2d 961, and the civil commitment statutes. The standard of review applicable to this inquiry depends on the nature of the alleged error. Compare Golob v. People, 180 P.3d 1006, 1011 (Colo.2008) (admission of expert testimony reviewed for abuse of discretion), with Cinemark USA, Inc. v. Seest, 190 P.3d 793, 795 (Colo.App.2008) (interpretations of law reviewed de novo). Then, with respect to any deviation, we apply the two-part Gilford test, evaluating (1) the gravity of any deviation from a statutory or due process requirement and (2) the prejudice to the patient, which we discuss further below. Gilford, 2 P.3d at 126.

B. Analysis

“[E]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.” Goedecke v. State, 198 Colo. 407, 411, 603 P.2d 123, 125 (1979) (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)). Proceedings such as Strodtman's curtail this liberty and therefore must satisfy constitutional standards of due process. When the administration of involuntary antipsychotic medication is at issue, the United States Supreme Court has held that due process requires notice, the right to be present at an adversary hearing, and the right to present and cross-examine witnesses. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 235, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990).

In Colorado, a court must conduct a “full and fair adversary hearing” on the matter with certain “procedural protections.” Medina, 705 P.2d at 963, 972. These are the same statutorily defined procedures that apply to civil commitment and treatment hearings. Id. at 972–74;Ofengand, 183 P.3d at 692. The person seeking to administer treatment bears the burden of proof, by clear and convincing evidence. Medina, 705 P.2d at 972–73. A patient has the right to counsel, to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and to present evidence to support his or her refusal. Id. “If the patient is not present ... or elects not to testify, ... the trial judge [need not] talk with the patient and observe the patient's physical and mental condition.” Id. at 973.

In addition to the enumerated safeguards of Medina, the Colorado Supreme Court has addressed what procedural rights are “essential” to civil commitment proceedings. Gilford, 2 P.3d at 125;Clinton, 762 P.2d at 1390. Generally, treatment hearings under the statute “shall be conducted in the same manner as other civil proceedings before the court.” § 27–65–111(1), C.R.S.2011; see also People in Interest of Hoylman, 865 P.2d 918, 919 (Colo.App.1993) (patient may have jury or bench trial).

Not all statutory deviations or procedural errors in treatment hearings violate a patient's due process rights, however. Clinton, 762 P.2d at 1391 (delays in appointment of counsel not...