People v. Stull
| Decision Date | 23 September 1983 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 60434 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Trent Lee STULL, Defendant-Appellant. 127 Mich.App. 14, 338 N.W.2d 403 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[127 MICHAPP 15] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Jon Newman, Pros. Atty., and Charles D. Sherman, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the people.
Sheldon Halpern, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
Before R.B. BURNS, P.J., and BRONSON and ROBINSON, * JJ.
Defendant was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, M.C.L. Sec. 750.520b(1)(e); M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(2)(1)(e). Sentenced to 10 to 20 years imprisonment, defendant appeals as of right.
Complainant testified that she was hitchhiking [127 MICHAPP 16] in Lansing at approximately 10:00 p.m. on October 21, 1979. She was picked up by defendant, who agreed to drive her to an apartment complex where she intended to visit a friend. When they arrived at the complex, defendant asked complainant if she wanted to spend some time with him and that it would be worth $50. Complainant refused and attempted to get out of the car; however, defendant grabbed her arm and pulled a knife from underneath the car seat. He drove her to a field and forced her to participate in sexual intercourse with him. Afterwards, defendant returned her to the apartment complex and again offered her $50, which she again refused.
Complainant testified that, after being dropped off, she went to a bar. A man, later identified as Jonathan Heglund, introduced himself to her. Complainant testified that she wanted someone to talk to. She gave Heglund her address and told him to come to her apartment after he was through working at the bar. Heglund came to her apartment at approximately 2:00 a.m. He stayed with her from the early morning hours of Monday, October 22, until Wednesday, October 24.
On the afternoon of October 22, complainant and a friend went to a Lansing crisis center called the Listening Ear where a counselor, Robin Slavin, suggested that complainant go to a hospital. She did so, was examined there, and a police investigation soon followed.
Defendant argues that evidence of sexual activity,[127 MICHAPP 17] approximately seven hours after the alleged rape, between complainant and a stranger whom she picked up in a bar is admissible (1) to support defendant's claim of consent, and (2) to impeach complainant's credibility.
The so-called rape-shield law, M.C.L. Sec. 750.520j; M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(10), so far as pertinent to this case provides:
Contrary to defendant's claim, this statute does not only bar evidence of complainant's sexual activity prior to the alleged rape. It bars, with two narrow exceptions, evidence of all sexual activity by the complainant not incident to the alleged rape.
As Justice COLEMAN in People v. Arenda, 416 Mich. 1, 330 N.W.2d 814 (1982), points out, the purpose of this legislation is to minimize the prior practice of trying the complainant for her character instead of the defendant for his conduct, and thereby confusing the fact finder with nonrelevant matters. Her language did not restrict the holding to prior instances of sexual activity.
People v. Williams, 416 Mich. 25, 330 N.W.2d 823 [127 MICHAPP 18] (1982), holds that evidence of such other sexual activity is not relevant to establish consent and is not relevant to impeach complainant's credibility as a witness inasmuch as evidence of a woman's chastity has nothing to do with her propensity for lying.
Defendant's attempt to show complainant's sexual generosity after the incident appears to be a bootstrapping operation designed to establish that if she was free with her gifts after the fact she must have been free with them before the fact. In other words, she was a woman of bad moral character. This reasoning runs head on into Arenda and Williams, supra.
The trial court properly excluded evidence of complainant's subsequent sexual activity.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S
Defendant argues that the trial court's reference to his absconding after release on bond pending trial was more prejudicial than probative. People v. Cammarata, 257 Mich. 60, 74, 240 N.W. 14 (1932), held that, standing alone, evidence of bail forfeiture would not be admissible, but that when coupled with defendant's flight and arrest was admissible as showing defendant's conduct indicating consciousness of guilt.
In the present case the trial court admitted evidence of the absconding, flight and bail forfeiture with an instruction to the jury in the language of Michigan Criminal Jury Instruction 4:4:01 which made it clear that flight can result from other factors than guilt and that it is for the jury to determine what caused defendant to flee.
[127 MICHAPP 19] We find no error in the admission of such evidence.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ADMITTING OPINION TESTIMONY OF A
Defendant's quarrel with the testimony of Robin Slavin, a rape counselor, is directed at what defendant suggests was her use as a "human lie detector" to give opinion testimony as to complainant's credibility. The only testimony by Slavin in this regard was her statement, based on her training and observations of complainant, that she saw nothing in complainant which was inconsistent with the profile of a rape victim. She did not, contrary to defendant's suggestions, express her opinion as to complainant's credibility or as to whether complainant had been raped. The opinion was admitted in response to an issue raised by defendant as to whether a rape victim would have acted as complainant did and its admission was proper. See People v. Wells, 102 Mich.App. 558, 302 N.W.2d 232 (1980).
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT
The committee's note to Michigan Criminal Jury Instruction 20:1:03, "Consent", indicates that consent is an affirmative defense and restricts the instruction to only those cases where there is evidence of consent. There is no evidence of consent in this case.
Assuming, however, that the case did present evidence of consent, nonconsent is not an element [127 MICHAPP 20] of the offense and its inclusion is not required in a jury instruction delineating the elements of the offense of rape.
M.C.L. Sec. 750.520b(1)(d)(ii); M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(2)(1)(d)(ii) defines criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, or rape:
Although consent is clearly admissible to show lack of force or coercion, People v. Khan, 80 Mich.App. 605, 264 N.W.2d 360 (1978), it does not, under this statute, rise to the level of an element of the offense, lack of which the people must prove.
That the silence of the statute on the subject of nonconsent as an element of the offense was a calculated act of the Legislature becomes clear if we examine its June 27, 1974, analysis of the proposed statute (then Senate Bill 1207), of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Beckley
...to call Robin Smietanka as an expert witness. 5 The trial court qualified Ms. Smietanka as an expert pursuant to People v. Stull, 127 Mich.App.14, 338 N.W.2d 403 (1983). 6 However, the court limited the testimony to the victim's behavior observed by the expert which would be consistent with......
-
Com. v. Gallagher
...57,369, slip op. (Kan. July 26, 1985) (psychologist is competent to testify to diagnosis of rape trauma syndrome); People v. Stull, 127 Mich.App. 14, 338 N.W.2d 403 (1983) (testimony of rape counselor that complainant's behavior was consistent with profile of a rape victim held admissible);......
-
State v. Lynch
...Mich. 1000, 756 N.W.2d 77 (2008). 42.People v. Waltonen, 272 Mich.App. 678, 689, 728 N.W.2d 881 (2006) (citing People v. Stull, 127 Mich.App. 14, 19–21, 338 N.W.2d 403 (1983) (“In the context of the [Criminal Sexual Conduct] statutes, consent can be utilized as a defense to negate the eleme......
-
People v. Duenaz
...not incident to the alleged rape.’ ” People v. Adair, 452 Mich. 473, 478, 550 N.W.2d 505 (1996), quoting People v. Stull, 127 Mich.App. 14, 17, 338 N.W.2d 403 (1983). Because the statute excludes evidence that in most cases would be only minimally relevant, the statute's prohibitions do not......
-
The Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Washington on Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and Related Trauma Syndromes: Avoiding the Battle of the Experts by Restoring the Use of Objective Psychological Testimony in the Courtroom
...366 S.E.2d 731 (W.Va. 1988), State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192 (N.M. 1993), State v. Ogle, 668 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. App. 1984), People v. Stull, 338 N.W.2d 403 (Mich. App. 1983), State v. Roles, 832 P.2d 311 (Idaho App. 1992), Taylor v. Com., 466 S.E.2d 118 (Va. App. 1996), Williams v. State, 928 ......