People v. Stump
Decision Date | 09 November 2012 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jacob STUMP, Defendant–Appellant. |
Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Bridget L. Field, Rochester, for Defendant–Appellant.
Lawrence Friedman, District Attorney, Batavia (William G. Zickl of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, LINDLEY, AND WHALEN, JJ.
On appeal from a judgment convicting him as a juvenile offender upon his guilty plea of rape in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.35[1] ), defendant contends that his bargained-for sentence of imprisonment of 3 to 9 years is unduly harsh and severe and that County Court erred in directing him to pay a DNA databank fee and a sex offender registration fee. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that there is no basis upon which to modify the sentence of imprisonment in the interest of justice ( seeCPL 470.15[2][c] ), but we agree with defendant that the sentence should be vacated insofar as it directed him to pay those fees.
( People v. McFadden, 205 A.D.2d 560, 560, 614 N.Y.S.2d 266;see People v. Hurd, 220 A.D.2d 454, 454, 631 N.Y.S.2d 871; William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 39, Penal Law § 60.10). Section 60.10(1) provides that a juvenile offender who is convicted of a crime may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in accordance with section 70.05 or may be sentenced upon a youthful offender finding in accordance with section 60.02. Here, it is undisputed that there was no youthful offender finding. Section 60.10(2) provides that subdivision 60.10(1) applies when sentencing a juvenile offender “notwithstanding the provisions of any other law that deals with the authorized sentence for persons who are not juvenile offenders” other than when considering the use of a juvenile offender conviction as a predicate offense. Although neither Hurd nor McFadden involved DNA databank or sex offender registration fees, the reasoning of those cases applies herein. Section...
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...In fact, a YO is not even subject to a mandatory surcharge imposed to collect DNA (CPL 60.02[3], 60.35[10] ; People v. Stump, 100 A.D.3d 1457, 1458, 953 N.Y.S.2d 441 [4th Dept. 2012], lv denied 20 N.Y.3d 1104, 965 N.Y.S.2d 800, 988 N.E.2d 538 [2013] ).The only reason we are faced with issue......
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