People v. Sullivan

• Decision Date: 28 June 1889
• Citation: 21 N.E. 1039,115 N.Y. 185
• Parties: PEOPLE v. SULLIVAN.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

115 N.Y. 185

21 N.E. 1039

PEOPLE

v.SULLIVAN.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 28, 1889.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, Third department.

Charles S. Nisbet, Dist. Atty., ( H. L. Huston, of counsel,) for appellant.

E. J. Maxwell, for respondent.

PECKHAM, J.

The defendant was duly indicted by the grand jury of the county of Montgomery for having, on the 7th of October, 1887, willfully discharged a loaded firearm at a railway train upon the track of the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company, and at a car which was part of and attached to such train, and thereby endangered the safety of the passengers in said car. He pleaded not guilty, and the trial of the indictment came on regularly at a court of sessions held for the county of Montgomery, at Fonda, on the 12th of March, 1888. A jury was at that time impaneled, and several witnesses were sworn. At the end of the day the court adjourned until 10 o'clock the next morning, March 13th. On the adjourned day no court was held on account, as the record states, of the snow blockade. It was the day of the great ‘blizzard’ of 1888. On the next day the court convened, and the defendant and his counsel were present, and the trial proceeded without objection until its close, when the jury retired, and on returning into court rendered a verdict of guilty of the crime as charged in the indictment. The district attorney moved for sentence, and thereupon the defendant's counsel moved that the verdict be set aside, and a new trial granted, and also moved in arrest of judgment, upon the ground that there was no legal court of sessions held on the 14th day of March, 1888; that being the day upon which the verdict of the jury was rendered. The ground for such statement rested upon the fact that the court on the 12th of March, having been adjourned to meet again on the morning of the 13th, did not meet on that day, and therefore it was dissolved, and had no right to meet on the day thereafter, and that all proceedings before such court were coram non judice, and void for want of jurisdiction. The motions were overruled, and the defendant sentenced to imprisonment in the state-prison. Upon appeal to the general term, that court reversed the judgment, and held that the motion in arrest of judgment was well taken for the reasons therein stated, and that the failure of the defendant to object to the proceedings at the trial could not constitute a court, or confer any jurisdiction upon the judges to continue the trial. From the judgment of reversal the people have appealed to this court.

The question in this case is of the most technical nature. No harm is claimed to have come from the action of the court in proceeding with its business on the 14th instead of the 13th of March. It is not claimed that the prisoner's rights were in any way jeopardized, or that he lost the benefit of any evidence which he would otherwise have had. Nothing but the clear and simple allegation of a loss of jurisdiction exists. The term was legally commenced on the 12th of March, and the trial proceeded during that day. At its end it became necessary to suspend the proceedings in order that all those participating in the trial might obtain requisite rest and refreshment. There was no thought of putting an end to the term. An adjournment was had until the next day. An adjournment of such a nature is simply a suspension of the proceedings then taking place for the purpose of continuing them at a stated time thereafter. At the particular time stated the judges did not appear because of one of the most extraordinary snow-storms known in this portion of the country in modern times, which rendered it impossible for them to reach the court-house. At the earliest opportunity thereafter, which was on the very next following day, they did appear, as did the defendant and his counsel and witnesses, and the trial proceeded without objection from either side. Nothing but the most rigorous rule of law should, under the circumstances, compel a court to admit its loss of jurisdiction, and the consequent failure of all proceedings taken before it. If from the positive commands of any statute, or the decision of some court which is binding upon us, we are compelled to so decide, nothing more need be said. We do not think there is such a statute or decision. The term of the court having been regularly opened, its continued existence thereafter would by the common law be regarded as but one day. All the business done at a term of court was by that law referred to its commencement, unless the law directed certain acts to be done on certain other days. There is an inherent power in a court to adjourn its proceedings from day to day, as long as it is necessary, to finish the business legitimately brought before it, unless by the terms of some statute its existence is sooner brought to a close. The argument for the defendant, brought to its strict logical result, would prevent the further continuance of a court which did not meet until 10 o'clock of the next day, when it had adjourned until the preceding hour of 9. It would seem as if there were no time within which a judge might appear subsequent to the hour and minute to which an adjournment had been had, if the argument of the defendant were carried to its extreme length. The failure of a judge to appear upon the day appointed for the commencement of a term of court is a totally different matter. The term is appointed to be held under the authority of a statute, and an adjourned term of the court at which cases may be noticed and jurors summoned, as if to a new and regular term, is of the same nature. In such a case, in the absence of any statute, the failure of any judge to...