People v. Superior Court (Alvarez)

• Citation: 14 Cal.4th 968,60 Cal.Rptr.2d 93
• Decision Date: 16 January 1997
• Docket Number: No. S053029,S053029
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: , 928 P.2d 1171, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 400, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 633 The PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; Steven ALVAREZ, Real Party in Interest.

Page 93

60 Cal.Rptr.2d 93

14 Cal.4th 968, 928 P.2d 1171, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 400,

97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 633

The PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent Steven ALVAREZ, Real Party in Interest.

No. S053029.

Supreme Court of California.

Jan. 16, 1997.

Rehearing Denied March 12, 1997.

Gil Garcetti, District Attorney, Frank Elmer Sundstet, Assistant District Attorney, Diana L. Summerhayes and Joseph N. Sorrentino, Deputy District Attorneys, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Michael P. Judge, Public Defender, Albert J. Menaster, Matthew Huey and Alex A. Ricciardulli, Deputy Public Defenders, for Real Party in Interest.

Charles H. James, Public Defender (Contra Costa) and Ron Boyer, Deputy Public Defender, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

BROWN, Justice.

In this case, we address the scope of trial courts' sentencing discretion pursuant to Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b), to reduce to a misdemeanor an offense originally charged as a felony under the three strikes law. (Pen.Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12.) ¹ Because neither version of the three strikes law qualifies the statutory authority by which a trial court may determine a crime to be "a misdemeanor for all purposes" (§ 17, subd. (b)), we conclude courts continue to have broad authority the exercise of which should be reviewed in accordance with the generally applicable standard. While a defendant's recidivist status is undeniably relevant, it is not singularly dispositive.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The current problems began for real party in interest, Steven Alvarez (defendant), shortly after noon on December 25, 1994, when Long Beach Police Officer Timothy O'Hara observed him "on the wrong side of the street riding a skateboard." A subsequent consensual search of a nylon bag in defendant's possession produced drug paraphernalia as well as a "baggie" containing 0.41 grams of powdered methamphetamine.

Based on this evidence, the prosecution charged defendant with a felony violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a). The complaint further alleged four prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of the three strikes law. (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b).) The matter went to jury trial. At the close of the People's case, defendant moved to have the charge declared a misdemeanor; ² the trial court took the motion under submission. After defendant testified in his own behalf, the jury returned a guilty verdict. Defendant admitted the truth of the prior conviction allegations.

The probation report recommended against probation. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court reviewed the circumstances of the crime as well as defendant's criminal history. Although uncertain whether it had authority to dismiss any of the prior convictions (§ 1385), the court decided it still retained discretion to declare the charge to be a misdemeanor, and indicated its intention to do so because "that's for sure what it was." ³ Citing section 17, subdivision (b)(3), the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on three years' summary probation on the condition he serve one year in the county jail.

The People petitioned for writ review. The Court of Appeal determined the trial court had abused its discretion because the reduction failed sufficiently to take into account defendant's criminal past with its implications for public safety. Moreover, in declining to punish defendant as a recidivist under the three strikes law, the trial court had judicially substituted its views of proper sentencing policy for that of the Legislature and electorate. We granted defendant's petition for review, and now reverse.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Continuing Discretion Under the Three Strikes Law

As relevant here, section 17, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 17(b)), authorizes the reduction of "wobbler" offenses--crimes that, in the trial court's discretion, may be sentenced alternately as felonies or misdemeanors--upon imposition of a punishment other than state prison (§ 17(b)(1)) or by declaration as a misdemeanor after a grant of probation (§ 17(b)(3)). ⁴ This court has not previously considered the threshold question whether courts retain this authority under the three strikes law. (Cf. People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628 (hereafter Romero) [trial courts retain discretion to dismiss priors under section 1385].) However, several Court of Appeal decisions have unanimously concluded "the Legislature [and electorate] did not intend to abrogate the trial judge's long-standing powers under section 17, subdivision (b)(1) and did not intend to supersede the court's authority under subdivision (b)(3) of that section to determine whether a wobbler should be reduced to a misdemeanor when such authority is exercised at the initial sentencing." (People v. Superior Court (Perez), supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 363-364, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 107 (hereafter Perez); see People v. Dent, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 1726, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 746 (hereafter Dent); People v. Trausch (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1239, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 (hereafter Trausch); People v. Vessell (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 285, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 241.) We agree.

Neither version of the three strikes law speaks directly to the continuing vitality of this discretionary authority. Rather, each provides that a three strikes sentence must be imposed "[n]otwithstanding any other law, if a defendant has been convicted of a felony and it has been pled and proved that the defendant has one or more prior felony convictions as defined ...." (§§ 667, subd. (c), 1170.12, subd. (a).) Thus, regardless of qualifying prior convictions, the initial sentencing determinant is whether the defendant "has been convicted of a felony" in the current proceeding. (Trausch, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1245, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 836.)

As to whether a guilty plea or verdict constitutes a "conviction" for purposes of section 667, subdivision (c), the court in Trausch properly concluded "that section 17 is sui generis. It specifically leaves the determination of the nature of the conviction to the discretion of the judge to be determined at sentencing. It applies only to 'wobblers' and to no other crimes. It also provides that once the court has imposed a misdemeanor sentence, the offense becomes a misdemeanor 'for all purposes.' " (Trausch, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 836.) "Accordingly, until the trial court pronounces sentence on the new offense, it cannot be determined if a predicate current 'felony' exists for application of the three strikes laws." (Id., at p. 1247, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 836.) It follows that "where the trial court has exercised its discretion to impose a punishment other than imprisonment in state prison, which by operation of law renders the conviction a misdemeanor, the three strikes law is not triggered." (Ibid.) The same rationale applies to a grant of probation pursuant to section 17(b)(3). (Perez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 363-364, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 107.)

The overarching intent "to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses" (§ 667, subd. (b); Ballot Pamp., text of Prop. 184, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994) p. 64) does not alter this conclusion. Although presumptively aware of preexisting law, including sections 17(b)(1) and 17(b)(3) (see People v. Hernandez (1988) 46 Cal.3d 194, 201, 249 Cal.Rptr. 850, 757 P.2d 1013), neither the Legislature nor the electorate "specifically limit[ed] the court's power under these provisions in regard to determining the nature of the current conviction in the three strikes law. And, nothing in the language or history of the three strikes legislation suggests the drafters contemplated abrogation of this well-established authority. [Citation.]" (Perez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 362, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 107.) Moreover, "[s]ubdivision (d)(1) of section 667 expressly provides that the determination whether a prior felony conviction qualifies as a 'strike' 'shall be made upon the date of that prior conviction and is not affected by the sentence imposed unless the sentence automatically, upon the initial sentencing, converts the felony to a misdemeanor.' (Italics added.) Thus, the Legislature clearly recognized the effect of sentencing pursuant to section 17 in the context of the three strikes statute and did not override that effect in its scheme determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as a strike." (Trausch, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, fn. omitted; see Perez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 363, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 107; see also § 1170.12, subd. (b)(1).) While in many instances the three strikes law was "intended to restrict courts' discretion in sentencing repeat offenders" (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 528, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628), it left section 17(b) undisturbed.

We thus turn to the question at issue here: the scope of the trial court's discretion when a wobbler is initially filed under the three strikes law.

B. Scope of Section 17(b) Discretion in Three Strikes Cases

Initially, we reject defendant's argument that a trial court's exercise of discretion under the authority of section 17(b) should be unreviewable, either as a matter of parity with the prosecutor's unreviewable decision to charge a wobbler as a felony or misdemeanor (see People v. Adams (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 697, 708, 117 Cal.Rptr. 905) or as a matter of constitutional mandate under the separation of powers doctrine. (Id., at pp. 706-707, 117 Cal.Rptr. 905.) The prosecutor's unreviewable charging discretion differs significantly from the trial court's sentencing authority under section 17(b). "The action of a district attorney in filing an information is not in any way an exercise of a judicial...