People v. Superior Court

Decision Date10 February 1971
Citation15 Cal.App.3d 146,92 Cal.Rptr. 916
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of California, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent; Leroy JOHNSON, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 37337.

Evelle J. Younger, Dist. Atty., County of Los Angeles, Harry Wood and Arnold T. Guminski, Deputy Dist. Attys., for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Richard S. Buckley, Public Defender, County of Los Angeles, James L. McCormick, Malcolm MacMillan and Leighton A. Nugent, Deputy Public Defenders, for real party in interest.

ALARCON, * Associate Justice.

The People seek a writ of mandate to require the respondent Superior Court of Los Angeles County to vacate its order of September 11, 1970, granting the motion of the real party in interest (hereinafter referred to as defendant) to suppress a watch seized at the time of booking.

Factual Background

Only one witness testified at the evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1538.5(i). The evidence relevant to the problem we must resolve may be summarized as follows:

Richard Hodges, a police officer in the City of Signal Hill, was on duty in a marked police vehicle and in uniform at approximately 4:00 a.m. At about that time he received a radio call dispatching him to 2350 Lewis Avenue to apprehend 'a prowler there now.' He proceeded to that location and within a 'matter of moments' after hearing the first radio call he received a second call relating to a prowler 'there now' in the 2600 block of Lewis Avenue. This location was about three blocks from 2350 Lewis Avenue. He proceeded immediately toward Burnett Avenue.

When Officer Hodges reached the corner of Burnett and Lewis he saw the defendant coming out of a dark area between Lewis and California at Burnett. The area from which the defendant emerged was between a 'residential home' of four units and a 'plastics company.' Between the residential and business buildings there is 'a dirt passageway or--almost an alleyway between the two that goes all the way down the block behind the residences that face Lewis.' This location was four or five houses away from the location reported in the second prowler call. When first observed the defendant was just coming around the corner of the building 'about five or six feet away from the street.' He was in slacks that appeared to be light in color and a dark jacket or sweater. The defendant had nothing in his hands. The business concern was not open for business at the time and the officer did not remember at the hearing whether there were any lights on in the four unit dwelling. When the officer first saw the defendant he turned and faced in the direction of the police vehicle and appeared to notice the officer. He started running for a distance of 'probably 50 to 75 yards,' proceeding west toward California Avenue and then south on California. After turning south on California the defendant started walking and was stopped by the officer on a bridge at California, just south of Burnett.

The officer made a cursory search for weapons but did not find any. He asked the defendant for identification and was given an Arizona driver's license in the name of Leroy Johnson with an Arizona address and his picture. The defendant said, 'I'm not prowling, I'm just lost.' He was the first person to use the word 'prowler.' The officer asked the defendant if he had been in the area very long. The defendant stated that he had only been in the area for about two weeks. The officer then asked for clarification, if he had been in this particular immediate area and what he was doing there. 1 The defendant replied that he had been at a party. The officer asked 'who was at the party or if he could direct him to some people that could tell the officer he was with them at this party,' and the defendant said that 'he didn't know where the party was and that he didn't know who was at the party.' The officer then asked the defendant where he lived, in relation to the area. The defendant said that 'he lived, I believe it was the 1400 block of Lime, which is some distance away, and he was on foot.'

During the course of the conversation, 'it came out that he had been in trouble in Arizona for burglary' and 'that he had just gotten out of jail in Long Beach for prowling * * * a few weeks prior.' The officer did not ask the defendant if he had been in the area the previous morning or whether the defendant had perpetrated any burglaries that might have occurred at any time in that area.

The officer placed the defendant under arrest 'for investigation of burglary.' The defendant was transported to the police station. In the course of booking a watch was removed by the defendant and placed in a drawer. This watch was introduced into evidence at the preliminary hearing.

There were early morning burglaries in the area prior to the detention of the defendant. The officer believed that the last cat burglary in the area occurred on the previous day in the early morning hours. The officer did not have a specific burglary in mind when he placed the defendant under arrest.

Problem

The petitioner contends that the evidence was sufficient to establish reasonable cause for an arrest and search without a warrant. In granting the defendant's motion to suppress the watch the trial court stated as follows: 'The Motion is granted. I don't think the officer had a right to arrest him. He certainly had a right, and duty, to question him because it was a suspicious situation.

'If there had been a felony committed anywhere around that area anywhere around that time, then the arrest might have been in order, but in view of the fact that the closest felony was a burglary the day before, there is no connection between finding him there then and connecting him with that burglary.

'For that reason, the Motion is granted.'

We construe the foregoing language as indicating that the trial court saw the problem before it as purely a matter of law and not on the basis of the credibility of Officer Hodges or any dispute as to the facts.

It is the defendant's contention before us that while a temporary detention may have been proper under these facts, the arrest and search violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Discussion

An arrest and search of a person is reasonable when the evidence supports a finding that probable cause existed for the arrest and that the search was incident to the arrest (People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 373--374, 62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202; Cunha v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.3d 352, 356, 85 Cal.Rptr. 160, 466 P.2d 704; People v. McGrew, 1 Cal.3d 404, 409, 82 Cal.Rptr. 473, 462 P.2d 1).

The question of reasonable cause to make an arrest and search without a warrant must be tested by the facts which were known to the officers at the time of the search (People v. Talley, 65 Cal.2d 830, 835, 56 Cal.Rptr. 492, 423 P.2d 564). If they point to specific articulable facts and circumstances which would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe, or entertain a strong suspicion, that the person arrested is guilty of a felony (Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 85 S.Ct. 564, 13 L.Ed.2d 408; Cunha v. Superior Court, Supra, 2 Cal.3d 352, 356, 85 Cal.Rptr. 160, 466 P.2d 704) an incidental search is reasonable although the officer may be mistaken as to the exact crime shown by the facts (see People v. Kelley, 3 Cal.App.3d 146, 151, 83 Cal.Rptr. 287; People v. Walker, 273 Cal.App.2d 720, 725, 78 Cal.Rptr. 439).

In the matter before us the officer advised the defendant he was being arrested for 'investigation of burglary.' An arrest cannot be made merely for the investigation of crime. To be lawful an arrest by a peace officer must be made pursuant to an arrest warrant setting forth the commission of a specific crime (Pen.Code, § 814) or without a warrant: '1. Whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense in his presence. 2. When a person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence. 3. Whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a felony, whether or not a felony has in fact been committed.' (Pen.Code, § 836.)

'When the police do not know whether a crime has been committed and do not have probable cause to arrest a suspect on a specific charge it is self-evident they do not possess valid authority to take a suspect into custody.' (People v. Manis, 268 Cal.App.2d 653, 667, 74 Cal.Rptr. 423, 432.)

Thus, in the instant matter the search of the defendant cannot be justified as an incident to an 'arrest for investigation.' However the test for determining whether reasonable cause exists for an arrest is objective and not dependent upon the arresting officer's subjective good faith or the accuracy of his knowledge of the ephemeral law of arrest, search and seizure. The decision as to whether the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time he made the arrest were sufficient to lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously to entertain a strong suspicion that the law was being violated or had been violated must be made independently by the judicial branch of the government regardless of the characterization or label attributed to the defendant's conduct by the arresting officer (People v. Boyles, 45 Cal.2d 652, 656, 290 P.2d 535; see also, People v. Ingle, 53 Cal.2d 407, 413--414, 2 Cal.Rptr. 14, 348 P.2d 577). Our task is to determine if under these facts there was reasonable cause to arrest the defendant for any crime. If there was we can disregard the fact that the defendant was told he was being arrested for investigation of burglary.

We have concluded that in view of what the officer saw and knew there was reasonable cause for the arrest for one of several possible criminal...

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