People v. Superior Court (Carl W.

• Citation: 124 Cal.Rptr. 47,539 P.2d 807,15 Cal.3d 271
• Decision Date: 19 September 1975
• Docket Number: S.F. 23272
• Parties: , 539 P.2d 807 The PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY, Respondent; CARL W., a minor, Real Party in Interest.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 47

124 Cal.Rptr. 47

15 Cal.3d 271, 539 P.2d 807

The PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY, Respondent;

CARL W., a minor, Real Party in Interest.

S.F. 23272.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Sept. 19, 1975.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward P. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert R. Granucci and Harriet Wiss Hirsch, Deputy Attys. Gen., for petitioner.

Joseph P. Busch, Dist. Atty. (Los Angeles), Harry B. Sondheim and Jay J. Becker, Deputy Dist. Attys., as amici curiae for petitioner.

Sheldon Portman, Public Defender, Leonard P. Edwards, Frank D. Berry, Jr., and Philip H. Pennypacker, Deputy Public Defenders, for real party in interest.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

On December 17, 1974, a petition was filed in the juvenile court alleging that real party in interest Carl W. comes within the provisions of section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and should be adjudged a ward of the court. The petition went on to charge in four paragraphs that the minor had violated Penal Code sections 187 (murder) and 288 (lewd or lascivious act upon the body of a child under 14), and Vehicle Code sections 10851 (auto theft) and 20002, subdivision (a) (misdemeanor hit and run). The minor denied each of the charging allegations.

On January 21, 1975, prior to the jurisdictional hearing, counsel for the minor moved that the matter be tried by a jury. The motion was fully briefed and argued by counsel for the minor and the deputy district attorney representing the People, and on January 27, 1975, the juvenile court denied the motion for a trial by jury but ordered that an advisory jury be empaneled 'to aid and assist the court in the adjudicative stage only'. It was further ordered that an agreement by at least three-fourths of the jury would be required to render an advisory verdict and that the number of peremptory challenges should be the same as is fixed by statute in civil proceedings.

The People seek a writ of mandate to compel the juvenile court to vacate the aforesaid orders. We issued an alternative writ and an order staying all further proceedings pending our determination of the matter.

We observe at the outset that this is not a case of constitutional dimension. As all parties hereto are fully aware, neither the state nor the federal Constitution guarantees a jury trial in a juvenile proceeding. (McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647; Richard M. v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 370, 376, 93 Cal.Rptr. 752, 482 P.2d 664; In re Daedler (1924) 194 Cal. 320, 332, 228 P. 467; In re T.R.S. (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 178, 181--182, 81 Cal.Rptr. 574.) Rather, we here face the narrow question whether a juvenile court in this state has the power to empanel an Advisory jury to assist it in resolving factual issues involved in the adjudicatory or jurisdictional (as opposed to the dispositional) phase of proceedings brought before it pursuant to section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. ¹ The court in the instant case was of the view that such a power not only had a firm inherent basis in the exercise of equitable jurisdiction but also was included within the broad statutory grant relating to the control and conduct of juvenile proceedings. (§ 680.) Looking to particular circumstances of the case which were thought to warrant the exercise of that power, the court chose to do so. The People, joined by amicus curiae, urge that no such power exists. ²

I

Section 680, the statute pursuant to which the juvenile court purported to act in this case, provides as follows: 'The judge of the juvenile court shall control all proceedings during the hearings with a view to the expeditious and effective ascertainment of the jurisdictional facts and the ascertainment of all information relative to the present condition and future welfare of the person upon whose behalf the petition is brought. Except where there is a contested issue of fact or law, the proceedings shall be conducted in an informal nonadversary atmosphere with a view to obtaining the maximum cooperation of the minor upon whose behalf the petition is brought and all persons interested in his welfare with such provisions as the court may make for the disposition and care of such minor.' (Italics added.) The minor in this case urges that the juvenile court correctly determined that its power to 'control (the) proceedings . . . with a view to the . . . effective ascertainment of the jurisdictional facts' necessarily included a power to empanel an advisory jury in order to assist in the determination of 'contested issue(s) of fact or law.' The People, along with amicus curiae, strenuously dispute this conclusion.

Reviewing the history of juvenile court law in general and California juvenile court law in particular, the People and amicus curiae urge that the trial of juvenile matters by a jury is both contrary to the spirit of the law and inconsistent with its express provisions. Significant reliance is placed upon the two-part report of the Governor's Special Study Commission on Juvenile Justice (hereafter Commission) which was issued in 1960 and was the basis of much of our present juvenile court law, including section 680. It is first pointed out that in part II of the report (i.e., that part entitled 'A Study of the Administration of Juvenile Justice in California') specific reference is made to the question of juries in juvenile matters, and that this reference rejects the use of the jury system in juvenile proceedings. ³ Secondly, we are urged to note that, judging from the recommendations made by the Commission in part I of the report (i.e., that part entitled 'Recommendations for Changes in California's Juvenile Court Law'), section 680 was intended not to expand the powers of juvenile court judges in the area of fact-finding techniques but rather was meant only to relate to the adoption and use by such judges of certain legal rules of procedure and evidence which had not been applied with uniformity in the past. ⁴ When these two points are considered together, it is urged, it becomes clear that the Commission did not contemplate the use of juries in juvenile proceedings, and that the subsequent passage of section 680, pursuant to the recommendations of the Commission, in no way was intended to authorize a juvenile court to empanel an advisory jury to assist in the determination of factual issues.

We agree with the People and amicus curiae that the 1960 report of the Commission should be given significant weight in determining the intent of the Legislature with respect to section 680. 'Reports of commissions which have proposed statutes that are subsequently adopted are entitled to substantial weight in construing the statutes. (Citations.) This is particularly true where the statute proposed by the commission is adopted by the Legislature without any change whatsoever and where the commission's comment is brief, because in such a situation there is ordinarily strong reason to believe that the legislators' votes were based in large measure upon the explanation of the commission proposing the bill.' (Van Arsdale v. Hollinger (1968) 68 Cal.2d 245, 249--250, 66 Cal.Rptr. 20, 23, 437 P.2d 508, 511; see also Holmes v. City of Oakland (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 378, 385, fn. 2, 67 Cal.Rptr. 197.) It is notable, however, that in adopting section 680 the Legislature, by Senate amendment, made a change in the bill proposed by the Commission which must be considered significant: it added to the second sentence of the bill the introductory clause (italicized in our quotation of § 680) '(e)xcept where there is a contested issue of fact or law.' (See 1 Sen.J. (1961 Reg.Sess.) p. 1548.) Thus, whereas the second sentence as proposed by the Commission provided in effect that In all cases the proceedings should be conducted in an informal nonadversary atmosphere, the Legislature, by adding the language in question, clearly indicated that more formality should be observed when there was a contested factual or legal issue.

We do not consider that the above amendment is by itself dispositive of the question before us. But we think that it is a factor of substantial significance when considered in the light of the broad language of section 680 as it relates to the powers and responsibilities of the juvenile court judge at the jurisdiction hearing, ⁵ the growing practice of holding formal jurisdiction hearings where the disposition hearings remain informal, ⁶ and the rather inconclusive comments of the Commission relative to the use of juries. Assessing the above amendment therefore against this backdrop, we are unable to discern any intent on the part of the Legislature to foreclose the judge from empanelling an advisory jury at the jurisdiction hearing in a contested case when, in the exercise of a sound discretion, he determines that such use of a jury will assist him in 'the expeditious and effective ascertainment of the jurisdictional facts.' (§ 680.) Looking to the comments of the Commission we find that those speaking directly to the use of juries (set forth in fn. 3, Ante) while indicating disapproval of the institution of a jury System in juvenile cases, do not speak directly to the question of the use of Advisory juries in cases thought by the court to warrant them. More importantly, we observe that the Commission's comment expressly notes that juries are used in some states 'in contested cases.' By its amendment of the Commission version of section 680 to indicate that the goal of informality should be accorded less emphasis in contested cases, the Legislature might well be considered to have disassociated itself from the Commission's misgivings concerning the use of juries in cases which were to be contested.

The Commission's comment relating specifically to section 680 (set forth in fn. 4, Ante) does little to dispel this impression. Although it ...