People v. Superior Court (Alexander), B085837

• Decision Date: 25 January 1995
• Docket Number: No. B085837,B085837
• Citation: 31 Cal.App.4th 1119,37 Cal.Rptr.2d 729
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; Shannon ALEXANDER, Real Party in Interest.

Page 729

37 Cal.Rptr.2d 729

31 Cal.App.4th 1119

The PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent Shannon ALEXANDER, Real Party in Interest.

No. B085837.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

Jan. 25, 1995.

As Modified Feb. 23, 1995.

Review Denied April 13, 1995.

Gil Garcetti, Dist. Atty., Brent Riggs and Brentford J. Ferreira, Deputy Dist. Attys., for petitioner.

De Witt W. Clinton, County Counsel, and Frederick R. Bennett, Asst. County Counsel, for respondent.

Michael P. Judge, Public Defender, Eugene Hall and John Hamilton Scott, Deputy Public Defenders, for real party in interest.

INTRODUCTION

CHARLES S. VOGEL, Associate Justice.

This writ proceeding, initiated by the People, was triggered by the trial court's dismissal

of a pending criminal prosecution for failure to bring the defendant to trial within the period mandated by Penal Code section 1382. This cause, therefore, requires us to determine the legality of the case management policy which led to the dismissal order. We conclude that the trial court's policy contravenes existing law; however, because of the manner in which the trial court proceeded, we are compelled to uphold the dismissal order of the underlying criminal action.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The South District of the Los Angeles Superior Court, the court in which the present proceeding arose, is composed of separate courtrooms, designated as departments. Criminal cases are handled as follows. The case is initially calendared in a particular department for the defendant's arraignment upon the information. If the Office of the Public Defender is appointed to represent the accused, the case is assigned to the deputy who handles cases arising out of that court. That court is known, in the local legal vernacular, as the deputy public defender's "home court." Generally, pretrial proceedings will be conducted in the "home court." However, when the case is ready for trial, if the "home court" is not available for trial because of conflicting calendar obligations, the case will be transferred to another courtroom, Department South "D," for reassignment. Judge Arthur Jean presides in Department South "D," handling felony arraignments and preliminary hearing conferences. And, as noted, the six trial courts in the South District send him felony trial matters when it appears that those courts will not be able to commence trial within the statutory period set forth in Penal Code section 1382.

On May 25, 1994, the People filed, in Department South "K," an information charging defendant Shannon Alexander with two crimes (Pen.Code, §§ 273.5, subd. (a) and 245, subd. (a)(1)) arising out of her attack upon her husband Jacobe Alexander. She pled not guilty and Deputy Public Defender Eugene Hall (Hall) was appointed as her counsel. The same day, the People filed an information charging Jesus Ramirez with two drug offenses. Ramirez pled not guilty and Hall was appointed as his attorney. Trial on both matters was set for July 21 in Department South "K," Hall's "home court." ¹ The last day within Penal Code section 1382's 60-day period to bring each defendant to trial was July 25.

On July 21, both cases were called; each was ready for trial. Department South "K" was then engaged in a trial which was anticipated to continue beyond July 25. Accordingly, both cases were continued to July 22 and transferred to Department South "D" for reassignment.

On July 22, Judge Jean, in Department South "D," called both cases. Each remained ready for trial and was continued to July 25.

On July 25, Judge Jean called the Ramirez case. The People announced "Ready." Hall was not present. Judge Jean stated: "... Mr. Hall has several cases. I'm going to transfer that case to Department 'G' for trial...."

When Judge Jean thereafter called defendant's case, Hall was not present nor was any other deputy public defender. ² The following By stating that on the next day defendant's case would be "60 of 60 days," the court indicated there would be no period in which the case would trail and that as a result, trial would have to commence that day--July 26. ⁴

colloquy occurred between Judge Jean and the prosecutor staffing Department South "D": "The Court: Shannon Alexander will go over until tomorrow as 60 of 60 here in this department. [p] [Deputy District Attorney]: It's our position that since counsel is engaged the case automatically becomes zero of ten. [p] The Court: I read the cases that you supplied me and I don't think that's what the law is. I think the law is where there's consent of some sort, I haven't heard the consent from anybody in this case. [p] [Deputy District Attorney]: Your Honor, then what it's appropriate to do is to bring the defendant up before the court, indicate to the defendant that his attorney is engaged in trial and he has several options. One of them is to ask for another attorney. One of them is to go pro per and the other one is to agree that the case can go over until tomorrow. [p] The Court: The case is going over until tomorrow as 60 of 60 days, Miss Carvajal." ³

Later that afternoon on July 25, Judge Jean again called defendant's case. At first, he indicated he would send it "to Department 'G' forthwith for further proceedings" but then decided to wait until the next day because the prosecutor handling the case (Kevin Greber) was not then available.

At some point during that day (July 25), Hall went to Department South "G" to handle People v. Ramirez (Super.Ct. L.A. County, 1994, No. NA019513). At 2:20 p.m., the parties conducted reported proceedings about a possible plea bargain during which Ramirez repeatedly stated his dissatisfaction with the proposed sentence. After an off-the-record discussion between Ramirez and Hall, Hall stated: "Let's go to trial." However, at 2:45 p.m., Ramirez pled guilty, thereby disposing of the matter.

Hall thereafter returned to Judge Jean's court and indicated his ready status in defendant's matter. At that point, defendant, who was in custody, had already been returned to county jail. Believing it to be impractical to attempt to return defendant to court that afternoon, Judge Jean let his prior order remain in effect. Hall never lodged a formal objection to Judge Jean's earlier order continuing defendant's case to July 26.

On July 26, Judge Jean called defendant's case and sent it to Department South "E," Judge Romero presiding, for trial. In Judge Romero's court, the prosecutor, defendant, and Hall appeared. Hall stated: "When I appeared in Department D at approximately nine o'clock, 9:15, I had been told that the matter--that the previous matter [of People v. Ramirez] had been sent to Department G for trial and that this case had been trailed until tomorrow to 7/26.... None of that was done in my presence, however. I understand The court did not immediately rule upon Hall's motion to dismiss but instead engaged in a colloquy with the prosecutor about the failure of the victim (Jacobe Alexander), who had been coming to court, to appear that day. Judge Romero ultimately found the victim's unavailability did not constitute good cause to continue the matter because the victim had not been ordered to return that day. The prosecutor urged the People should have the benefit of the 10-day grace period found in Penal Code section 1382, subdivision (a)(2)(B) to become ready for trial, ⁵ but Judge Romero felt bound by Judge Jean's earlier determination that July 26 was the last day the People had to commence defendant's trial. After the People announced they were unable to proceed because of the victim's nonappearance, Judge Romero granted defendant's motion to dismiss.

that that is--I understand from sources that that is the custom of Judge Jean. However, for the record, I do feel compelled as Miss Alexander's attorney to at this time make a motion to dismiss this case pursuant to 1382 of the Penal Code, since today is 61 of 60, and there was no finding of good cause with her attorney present and with her present as she is entitled to for the case to have been continued even one day.... The case that I was sent to Department G on was a last day case. However, I was not technically engaged...."

Thereafter, the People initiated this writ proceeding to challenge the dismissal of defendant's case as well as Judge Jean's orders continuing two other "last-day" cases (People v. Simpson (Super.Ct. L.A. County, 1994, No. NA019883) and People v. Canales (Super.Ct. L.A. County, 1994, No. NA017798)) in the absence of the defendants. Contending that Judge Jean's case management policy for last day cases is inconsistent with law and improperly "requir[es] the People to be ready at all times in all such cases; a situation which will ultimately lead to many more unwarranted dismissals of criminal cases," the People also seek an order "prohibiting Judge Jean from continuing cases day-to-day without seeking to obtain the attendance of the defendants...."

Based upon the representation in the People's petition that Hall had been present on July 25 when Judge Jean had continued defendant's case--a representation we subsequently learned was incorrect--(see fn. 2, ante ), we issued an order to show cause why a writ should not issue directing the superior court to vacate the dismissal of defendant's case and "to allow the People the required ten-day period to commence trial after the last day to which trial has been continued because the defense is not ready to proceed. (See Malengo v. Municipal Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 81 [17 Cal.Rptr. 10, 366 P.2d 453]....)"

The issues raised in the Simpson and Canales matters, however, are now moot; in Simpson, the defendant pled guilty and, in Canales, a jury trial was conducted. Nonetheless, the petition still presents an important question involving the administration of the criminal justice system: is Judge Jean's "stacking" policy consistent with law? Given that...