People v. Superior Court (Henry)

• Decision Date: 05 September 1974
• Citation: 116 Cal.Rptr. 24,41 Cal.App.3d 636
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF the State of California, COUNTY OF VENTURA, Respondent; Opal HENRY, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 44454.

Page 24

116 Cal.Rptr. 24

41 Cal.App.3d 636

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF the State of California, COUNTY OF VENTURA, Respondent Opal HENRY, Real Party in Interest.

Civ. 44454.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Sept. 5, 1974.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 23, 1974.

Hearing Denied Oct. 30, 1974.

C. Stanley Trom, Dist. Atty. of Ventura County, by Arthur S. Zittell, Deputy Dist. Atty., for petitioner.

Randolph E. Siple, Ventura, for real party in interest.

FLEMING, Acting Presiding Justice.

The People seek to reverse an order of the superior court suppressing evidence in the murder prosecution of Opal Henry, real party in interest. The suppressed evidence, found during a warrantless search of Henry's residence after the discovery of a dead body in her living room, includes a revolver (the death weapon) from a bedroom dresser drawer, ammunition for the revolver from the same drawer, and ammunition from other rooms of the residence.

About 10:30 in the evening of 17 February 1974 police officers responding to an emergency call discovered the body of Augusta Spratt, Jr., in the living room of Henry's residence in Ventura. From bystanders the officers learned that neighbors summoned by Henry discovered the wounded Spratt in the street and carried him into Henry's residence, where he died. Inside, the officers found Henry sitting on the living room couch visibly upset. She complained she was cold and her arm had been bruised. In answering the telephone she told the caller, 'God save me, God save me, I need money, he's dead.' She then asked if she could go into the bedroom, 'It is just something I need to get.'

After the officers secured the premises, Officer Cotner asked Henry what happened. She replied that Spratt forced his way into her house and said he was going to have sex with her; when she refused, Spratt grabbed her arm, and they tussled. Cotner asked if he could look through the house. Henry said she would go with him and show him. She then said she shot at Spratt but missed him and hit the wall. What with? asked Cotner. A gun, she replied. Where's the gun? In a dresser drawer in the bedroom, she said, and she offered to show Cotner where it was. Another officer then escorted Henry out of the residence on her way to the police station, and Cotner entered the dimly-lit bedroom, shone his flashlight into the partially-open dresser drawer, and saw a revolver and ammunition. Later that night, police investigators seized the entire bedroom dresser drawer and its contents. In a search of the residence, investigators seized additional ammunition in a hallway closet and a kitchen drawer, two purses containing ammunition in the living room, and other items of possible evidentiary value from the bedroom, kitchen, and living room.

The superior court suppressed all evidence except that found in the living room, concluding (1) that Henry consented to a search for the gun on the condition that she lead the search, and (2) the exigent circumstances did not justify a search of the residence without a warrant. Since these conclusions do not pass upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight of conflicting evidence, bur rather involve the legal effect of undisputed facts, we are not bound by the conclusions of the trial court but are required to exercise our independent judgment on these matters. (Cf. People v. Superior Court (Peck), 10 Cal.3d 645 648--649, 111 Cal.Rptr. 565, 517 P.2d 829.) We find ourselves in disagreement with both the trial court's conclusions, and we reverse the order of suppression.

1. From our appraisal of the facts we think it clear that Henry's statement about the location of the gun amounted to an implied consent to look for it. Words may imply consent as well as express it. (Cf. People v. Harrington, 2 Cal.3d 991, 995, 88 Cal.Rptr. 161, 471 P.2d 961.) In People v. Smith, 210 Cal.App.2d 252, 26 Cal.Rptr. 620, a police officer asked a defendant, just arrested for theft, where the registration slip for his automobile was. 'It should be in the glove compartment,' replied defendant. During an inspection of the glove compartment the officer discovered a large envelope containing stolen payroll checks. The court concluded that '(t)he officer could reasonably interpret this statement as indicating that it was all right for him to look into the glove compartment for the registration.' (210 cal.app.2d at 256, 26 cal.rptr. at 622.) in nerell v. superior court,20 Cal.App.3d 593, 97 Cal.Rptr. 702, police officers discovered marijuana while arresting a defendant in his bedroom. When the officers discussed their discovery with a codefendant in the living room, codefendant blurted out, 'All right, you've got me. It is in the case.' The officers searched a briefcase in the bedroom and found inside the case five packages of amphetamine pills and more marijuana. The court concluded the codefendant's 'spontaneous implied admission to the effect that the briefcase contained contraband was sufficient to constitute an invitation to the officers to examine the contents.' (P. 600, 97 Cal.Rptr. p. 706.) We find a similar invitation to search implied in the statement of Henry. Seated in the living room of her residence, she told police officers investigating the events which lead to the discovery of a dead body in her living room that a crucial piece of evidence, the potential death weapon, was located in a bedroom dresser drawer a few feet away.

Was the consent to search conditional? A consent to be exercised only in a certain manner? We think not. In rejecting this argument we observe, first, that the consent was not expressly limited, that no formal terms and conditions were annexed to it. Second, the offer to show the police the location of the gun was not contradictory of an unconditional consent to search. As we view it, the offer looked toward a simplification of the police officer's task, a simplification of benefit to both parties--the police by expediting discovery of the death weapon and Henry by reducing unnecessary...