People v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 30 November 2006
• Docket Number: No. C051946.,C051946.
• Citation: 145 Cal.App.4th 473,51 Cal.Rptr.3d 670
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Shasta County, Respondent; Robert Edward Maury, Real Party in Interest.

51 Cal.Rptr.3d 670

145 Cal.App.4th 473

The PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Shasta County, Respondent Robert Edward Maury, Real Party in Interest.

No. C051946.

Court of Appeal, Third District.

November 30, 2006.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Senior Assistant

Attorney General, Ward A. Campbell, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen, Deputy Attorney General, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Michael Laurence, San Francisco, Charles J. Press, and Kevin Bringuel, for Real Party in Interest.

ROBIE, J.

Penal Code¹ section 1054.9 allows persons subject to a sentence of death or life in prison without the possibility of parole to file a motion for postconviction discovery to assist in seeking a writ of habeas corpus or an order vacating the judgment. The question in this case is whether section 1054.9 requires a defendant to show, as a prerequisite to obtaining an order for discovery materials under the statute, that the requested materials actually exist and are in the possession of the prosecution and/or the relevant law enforcement authorities, or, at the very least, that a defendant has a good faith basis to so believe. As will be explained, we believe the answer to this question is "no."

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1989 in Shasta County, real party in interest Robert Edward Maury was convicted of the murder of three women and sentenced to death. In 2003, the California Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentence. (See People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.)

In August 2005, Maury filed a discovery motion pursuant to section 1054:9. He asked the court to order the prosecution to provide 22 items of discovery "to the extent that such materials are in the actual or constructive possession, custody, or control of the District Attorney or any law enforcement agency involved in any aspect of the case."²

The prosecution opposed the motion, arguing, among other things, that Maury needed to show he had a good faith basis for believing the requested materials actually existed and were in the possession of the prosecution.

After four hearings on the discovery request, the court granted the motion, subject to the limitation that the prosecution need not produce any materials the court deemed privileged. The court explained to the prosecution that if the requested materials did not exist or were not in its possession, then "compliance with the discovery request would be as simple ... as an indication ... that having made [a] good faith effort to locate the documents requested, you've made a determination that you're not in possession or that those documents don't exist." The court then ordered Maury to submit an amended proposed discovery order.

On January 24, 2006, the court signed and filed the amended discovery order. The order specified that the prosecution had the option of either "reviewing the files" itself and certifying in writing the nonexistence, loss, or destruction of any material covered by th[e][o]rder" or permitting Maury's attorney or designated representative to review the file.

On February 21, 2006, the People commenced this proceeding by filing a petition for writ of mandate in this court challenging respondent court's discovery order. We stayed the order and issued an alternative writ of mandate.

DISCUSSION

I

Section 1054-9

As relevant here, section 1054.9 provides as follows:

"(a) Upon the prosecution of a postconviction writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment in a case in which a sentence of death or of life in prison without the possibility of parole has been imposed, and on a showing that good faith efforts to obtain discovery materials from trial counsel were made and were unsuccessful, the court shall, except as provided in subdivision (c) [relating to access to physical evidence for the purpose of examination], order that the defendant be provided reasonable access to any of the materials described in subdivision (b).

"(b) For purposes of this section, `discovery materials' means materials in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities to which the same defendant would have been entitled at time of trial."

In In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 536, 85 P.3d 444—the only case from our Supreme Court to address section 1054.9—the People argued that section 1054.9 is "only a `file reconstruction statute,' and the discovery it permits is limited to replacing materials that the defense once possessed but has since lost." (Steele, at p. 693, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 536, 85 P.3d 444.) In rejecting this argument, the court delineated four categories of discovery materials to which a defendant is entitled under section 1054.9. (Steele, at p. 697,10 Cal.Rptr.3d 536, 85 P.3d 444.) The Steele court explained: "we interpret section 1054.9 to require the trial court, on a proper showing of a good faith effort to obtain the materials from trial counsel, to order discovery of specific materials currently in the possession of the prosecution or law enforcement authorities involved in the investigation or prosecution of the case that the defendant can show either (1) the prosecution did provide at time of trial but have since become lost to the defendant [category No. 1 materials]; (2) the prosecution should have provided at time of trial because they came within the scope of a discovery order the trial court actually issued at that time, a statutory duty to provide discovery, or the constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence [category No. 2 materials]; (3) the prosecution should have provided at time of trial because the defense specifically requested them at that time and was entitled to receive them [category No. 3 materials]; or (4) the prosecution had no obligation to provide at time of trial absent a specific defense request, but to which the defendant would have been entitled at time of trial had the defendant specifically requested them [category No. 4 materials]." (Ibid.) With these four categories in mind, we turn to the People's contentions.

II To Obtain Access To Discovery Materials Pursuant To Section 1054.9, A Defendant Is Not Required To Show That The Materials Actually Exist And Are In The Possession Of The Prosecution And/Or Relevant Law Enforcement Authorities Or That Defendant Has A Good Faith Basis To So Believe

As noted, subdivision (a) of section 1054.9 authorizes court-ordered postconviction discovery for defendants subject to a sentence of death or life in prison without the possibility of parole "on a showing that good faith efforts to obtain discovery materials from trial counsel were made and were unsuccessful."

The People contend the court erred in failing to require Maury to establish, as a prerequisite to court-ordered postconviction discovery, that his efforts to obtain the materials from trial counsel were "unsuccessful." In the People's view, "[t]o make such a showing, Maury must establish that some discovery materials actually exist beyond those obtained from trial counsel. Unless additional discovery materials are shown to exist, there is no basis to conclude that Maury was unsuccessful in obtaining the discovery materials defined by section 1054.9."

Although the People purport to premise their argument on the word "unsuccessful," a careful examination of the argument reveals that it actually rests more substantially on the definition of "discovery materials" contained in subdivision (b) of section 1054.9. Subdivision (b) expressly defines "discovery materials" as "materials in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities to which the same defendant would have been entitled at time of trial." As the Supreme Court explained in Steele, this definition encompasses only those materials "in their possession currently." (In re Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 695, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 536, 85 P.3d 444.) According to the People, under this definition "a finite set of [discovery] materials actually exists for every case"— specifically, those materials to which the defendant would have been entitled at time of trial that are currently in the possession of the prosecution or of a law enforcement authority that was involved in the investigation or prosecution of the case.

Under subdivision (a) of the statute, a fundamental prerequisite to obtaining a discovery order is "a showing that good faith efforts to obtain discovery materials from trial counsel were made and were unsuccessful." (§ 1054.9, subd. (a), italics added.) By the People's reasoning, a defendant cannot establish the requisite lack of success "[u]nless [he] establishes that some materials from th[e] finite universe [of `discovery materials'] were missing from trial counsel's files." In other words, the defendant must prove that the material he is seeking is "discovery material" in the first place by proving not only that the material is something to which he would have been entitled at time of trial, but also that the material is currently "in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities." Under this reasoning, if the material does not exist, then it cannot be "in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities" and is therefore not "discovery material" subject to discovery under section 1054.9.

Accordingly, under the People's reading of the statute, before he can obtain a discovery order under section 1054.9, the defendant must prove that any particular material or category of material to which he seeks access: (1) is something to which he would have been entitled at time of trial; (2) actually exists; (3) is currently in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities that were involved in the investigation or prosecution of the case; and (4) was not provided to him by trial counsel, despite his good faith...