People v. Superior Court of Santa Cruz Cnty.
| Decision Date | 06 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | H049691 |
| Citation | 87 Cal.App.5th 373,303 Cal.Rptr.3d 534 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CRUZ COUNTY, Respondent; Michael Thomas Cheek et al. Real Parties in Interest. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Counsel for Petitioner Santa Cruz County District Attorney: Jeffrey S. Rosell, District Attorney, Tara L. George, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Lauren A. Apter, Assistant District Attorney
Counsel for Real Party in Interest Department of State Hospitals: Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Cheryl L. Feiner, Assistant Attorney General, Gregory D. Brown, Deputy Attorney General, Kevin L. Quade, Deputy Attorney General
Counsel for Real Party in Interest Michael Thomas Cheek: Law Office of Stephen J. Prekoski, Stephen J. Prekoski
Counsel for Respondent Superior Court of Santa Cruz County: No brief filed
The Santa Cruz County District Attorney petitions for a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order conditionally releasing Michael Thomas Cheek, a sexually violent predator, to a residence in Santa Cruz County. The district attorney contends the order is contrary to law because Cheek has a history of sexual conduct with children and would be placed within a quarter mile of a school, something expressly prohibited by statute.
The superior court found the statute ( Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6608.5, subd. (f) ) would not prohibit the proposed placement because the school in question is a private home school that did not exist until after the community was notified of Cheek's pending release—suggesting the school was created for the very purpose of preventing placement in that area. But the statute prohibiting placement of certain sexually violent predators near a school does not require the school to have been operating for any particular time. Nor does the statute contain any language preventing its application to schools operating in a home. We will therefore issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its placement order.
Cheek was convicted of kidnapping, rape, and forcible oral copulation in 1980.
He was sentenced to 20 years in prison but soon escaped and committed another rape in 1981. The victim in that case was 15 years old. Cheek was convicted of rape and furnishing a controlled substance to a minor, and he was sentenced to an additional 11 years four months. When Cheek's prison term neared its end, the Santa Cruz County District Attorney successfully petitioned to have him declared a sexually violent predator under the Sexually Violent Predators Act ().
The SVPA allows for involuntary commitment of certain convicted sex offenders. A person convicted of a sexually violent offense is subject to involuntary commitment after release from prison if a diagnosed mental disorder makes it likely the person will continue to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior. ( § 6600, subd. (a)(1).) The law's primary purpose is to protect the public; its secondary objective is to provide treatment for the offender's mental health disorder. ( People v. Peyton (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 784, 791-792, 297 Cal.Rptr.3d 469.) Once it is determined that a person no longer meets the definition of sexually violent predator, he or she must be released. (§ 6604.9.) Alternatively, if an offender remains a sexually violent predator but can be treated in a less restrictive setting—and the public can be adequately protected by conditions allowing for close supervision—the offender can be conditionally released to the community under the supervision of the Department of State Hospitals. (§ 6608.)
In 2019, the Department of State Hospitals deemed Cheek an appropriate candidate for conditional release. The superior court found Cheek would not endanger the community and could be adequately supervised in a less restrictive setting, making him eligible for conditional release. The court determined Santa Cruz County to be Cheek's county of domicile, meaning he should be placed there absent extraordinary circumstances. (See § 6608.5, subd. (b).) It later found such circumstances to exist, and the area for potential placement was broadened to include five other counties—Butte, Monterey, San Benito, Santa Clara, and San Mateo.
Liberty Healthcare of California, Inc., the agency that manages the conditional release program, spent over a year to identify a site where it believed Cheek could live without posing unacceptable risk to the surrounding community. The site proposed is a rental home in rural Santa Cruz County, in a small town with a population of just over 3,000. There is no cellular service at the property, though cell phone calls can be made by connecting to the home's wireless internet. The staff responsible for supervising Cheek would be approximately 65 miles away with an estimated response time of 75 minutes.
After receiving the recommendation for Cheek's placement at the Santa Cruz County site, the superior court ordered in July 2021 that the Department of State Hospitals notify the surrounding community of the pending release decision, as required by statute. (See § 6609.1.) The notice prompted a significant community response, with hundreds of residents sending letters to the court urging against the placement. State and local legislators also sent correspondence warning that placing Cheek there would endanger the community. Specific concerns included that the remote site has no cellular service and has a lengthy law enforcement response time; it is close to hiking trails; and it is near a bus stop used by children to get to school. The court carefully considered the issues raised and ordered a further investigation and supplemental assessment of the site based on the community concerns.
In November 2021, several months after notice was given to the community, the district attorney provided additional information to the court in opposition to the placement. Included was a declaration from the administrator of a school operating out of a home less than a quarter mile from the proposed placement site. The administrator stated under penalty of perjury that the school is a private school which began instruction in August 2021 with two teachers, who are parents of students. The school has four full time students and six part time students enrolled, and three applicants for future enrollment. The school uses a 180-day school year and filed its private school affidavit in October 2021 in compliance with applicable Education Code requirements. (See Educ. Code, § 33190 [].)
The district attorney argued Cheek cannot be housed at the proposed site because a sexually violent predator who has a history of improper sexual conduct with children cannot be placed within one-quarter mile of a school.1
(See § 6608.5, subd. (f)(2).) The superior court accepted that there is a school within a quarter mile of the site. But it went on to find the statutory restriction inapplicable because the school was established only after the community was notified of Cheek's proposed release, explaining: The court ordered Cheek conditionally released to the proposed site.
At the district attorney's request, the superior court temporarily stayed its order to allow for appellate review. The district attorney petitioned this court for a writ of mandate and asked for a further stay to allow consideration of the issues. We granted the stay and issued an order to show cause why relief should not be granted.
The decision about where to place a sexually violent predator is a difficult one that requires balancing many interests. The superior court must implement the Legislature's directive that qualifying sexually violent predators receive outpatient treatment in a less-restrictive setting; at the same time, it must protect the community and mitigate any risks to public safety as much as possible. We are confident based on our review of the record that the superior court made a conscientious effort to do all of that here. However, the court's decision cannot stand if it allows something the Legislature has expressly prohibited. To make that determination we must interpret the meaning of the statute, which we do using our independent judgment. ( People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 11 P.3d 956.)
The superior court ruled that section 6608.5 does not prevent Cheek's placement at the proposed site, despite his history of sexual conduct with children and despite a recently created private home school located less than a quarter mile away. The court stated its view that to preclude sexually violent predator placement, a school must exist before community notice of the proposed placement. We must decide whether the statute is susceptible of such a requirement.
When interpreting a statute, we are mindful of a fundamental rule of statutory construction: a court's role is to give effect to the statute as the Legislature wrote it; not adding to it or revising it as the court might see fit. ( Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 474, 478, 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 12, 431 P.3d 151.)...
To continue reading
Request your trial