People v. Sweeney
| Decision Date | 24 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. E043410.,E043410. |
| Citation | 175 Cal.App.4th 210,95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 557 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANNETTE SWEENEY, Defendant and Appellant. |
Christopher Blake, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr., and Angela M. Borzachillo, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Annette Sweeney (Sweeney) appeals from an order committing her to Porterville State Hospital pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500.1 Sweeney was committed for the statutory period of one year after a jury found that she was mentally retarded and dangerous. (§ 6500.) Sweeney makes four contentions: (1) the trial court violated her rights to due process and equal protection; (2) the trial court violated her right to confront witnesses against her; (3) the trial court improperly instructed the jury; and (4) the trial court denied her a fair placement hearing by denying her request for a continuance. We agree that the trial court violated Sweeney's due process rights and that the trial court improperly instructed the jury. We disagree with Sweeney's contentions regarding equal protection and confrontation. We do not address Sweeney's argument concerning her request for a continuance.
We note that the maximum one-year period of confinement has expired. (§ 6500.) Therefore, this case is technically moot. We have not been asked to dismiss the appeal on these grounds. The issues addressed in this appeal are of continuing public importance, and such orders will typically expire before an appeal can be heard and thus will evade review. Therefore, we will address the issues presented by Sweeney; however, we dismiss the appeal as moot.2 (See Conservatorship of David L. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 701, 708-709, 713 .)
On April 2, 2003, the Riverside County District Attorney filed a complaint against Sweeney. The complaint alleged that on or about March 31, 2003 Sweeney (1) willfully and unlawfully used force and violence and inflicted injury upon a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (c)(2)); (2) willfully and unlawfully attempted by means of threats and violence to deter and prevent an executive officer from performing his duties (Pen. Code, § 69); and (3) willfully and unlawfully threw a hubcap at a vehicle on a highway (Veh. Code, § 23110, subd. (a)).
On June 20, 2003, the trial court found Sweeney incompetent to stand trial (Pen. Code, § 1368), and the criminal proceedings against her were suspended (Pen. Code, § 1370.1, subd. (a)(1)(B)). Sweeney was committed to Porterville State Hospital for a maximum period of three years eight months.
On October 25, 2006, the district attorney filed a petition requesting that Sweeney be committed to the State Department of Developmental Services. (§ 6500.) The district attorney alleged that Sweeney was mentally retarded and a danger to herself or others. (Ibid.) On April 23, 2007, a jury found that Sweeney was mentally retarded and dangerous. (Ibid.) The court found Sweeney should continue to be housed at Porterville State Hospital.
(1) Section 6500 authorizes a mentally retarded person to be committed to the State Department of Developmental Services if "he or she is a danger to himself or herself, or others." The definition of "dangerousness to self or others" includes, but is not limited to, "a finding of incompetence to stand trial ... if the defendant has been charged with a felony involving death, great bodily injury, or an act which poses a serious threat of bodily harm to another person." (§ 6500.)
During pretrial motions, the district attorney argued that Sweeney met the definition of dangerous because she had been found incompetent to stand trial, and she had been charged with two felonies that involved great bodily injury or an act which posed a serious threat of bodily harm to another person. Sweeney's trial attorney argued that the jury should determine whether the charges against Sweeney involved "death, great bodily injury, or an act which poses a serious threat of bodily harm to another person." (§ 6500.) The district attorney asserted that such a determination involved a question of law, not fact, and therefore the court should decide whether the charges against Sweeney involved violence or a threat of violence. The district attorney contended two charges, (1) willfully and unlawfully using force and violence and inflicting injury upon a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (c)(2)), and (2) willfully and unlawfully attempting by means of threats and violence to deter and prevent an executive officer from performing his duties (Pen. Code, § 69), qualified as charges involving great bodily injury, or a serious threat of bodily harm.
The trial court concluded that the determination of whether a charge involved violence or a threat of violence is a question of law. The court concluded that the Penal Code section 243, subdivision (c)(2), charge and the Penal Code section 69 charge met the offense criteria of Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500.
At the hearing on the petition, the district attorney presented the jury with evidence of Sweeney's dangerous behavior, and argued that Sweeney was a danger to herself and to others.
In an argument that is entwined with her equal protection contention, Sweeney asserts that her due process rights were violated when the trial court determined that the charges pending against her involved "death, great bodily injury, or an act which poses a serious threat of bodily harm to another person." (§ 6500.) We agree with Sweeney.
In order to commit a person pursuant to section 6500, it must be proven that the person (1) is mentally retarded; (2) is dangerous to himself or others; and (3) has serious difficulty controlling his dangerous behavior because of his mental retardation.3 A person can be considered "dangerous to himself or others" if the person was found mentally incompetent to stand trial on felony charges that involve "death, great bodily injury, or an act which poses a serious threat of bodily harm to another person." Accordingly, Sweeney's argument is focused on the element of "dangerous to himself or others," and more specifically on the portion of the definition of dangerous that addresses the predicate offense. The essential question posed by Sweeney's argument is: Does the court or jury decide if the predicate offense charge involves "death, great bodily injury, or an act which poses a serious threat of bodily harm to another person"? (§ 6500.)
The principles governing the resolution of this issue are discussed in People v. Figueroa (1986) 41 Cal.3d 714 [224 Cal.Rptr. 719, 715 P.2d 680] (Figueroa), and People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395 [272 Cal.Rptr. 803, 795 P.2d 1260] (Hedgecock).4 In Figueroa, the defendant was convicted of selling unqualified securities, in violation of Corporations Code section 25110. (Figueroa, at p. 718.) Our Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that certain "Corporation Promissory Notes" were "securities" within the meaning of the law, because the trial court improperly removed an element of the crime from the jury's consideration. (Id. at p. 734.) The Supreme Court observed that cases which held that the question of what constitutes a security is a question of law, reserved for the trial court, could not withstand scrutiny "under more modern concepts of due process and the right to a jury trial." (Id. at p. 731.) The court concluded that due process required the jury, not the court, to find every element of the offense. (Id. at pp. 732-733.)
In Hedgecock, the court explained: (Hedgecock, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 407.) Thus, the critical question here is: Is the violent or assaultive nature of the felony charge an element that must be proven in section 6500 commitment proceedings? (See Hedgecock, at p. 407.) If it is an element, then (People v. Wilkins (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 761, 778 .)
(2) Being "a danger to himself or herself or to others" is an element of section 6500. The definition of "dangerousness to self or others," in section 6500, includes (1) being charged with a violent or assaultive felony, and (2) being found incompetent to stand trial on that felony charge. Accordingly, to the extent a petitioner relies on this definition in proving the element of "dangerousness to self or others," the violent or assaultive nature of the felony constitutes a subelement of section 6500. In other words, if a trial court were to conclude that a felony charge involves "death, great bodily injury, or an act which poses a serious threat of bodily harm to another person" then the only issue left for the jury to determine on the issue of dangerousness is whether the defendant was found incompetent to stand trial on that charge. In effect, the trial court would be determining one portion of the element of dangerousness, which is problematic because no element of the verdict, even an undisputed element, may be determined by the judge. (Figueroa, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 724, 733.)
A judge's duty is to instruct the jury on the definition of "dangerousness to self or others,"...
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