People v. Sykes
| Decision Date | 26 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 1–15–0023,1–15–0023 |
| Citation | 2017 IL App (1st) 150023,96 N.E.3d 468 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Ladina SYKES, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Roxanna A. Mason, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Christine Cook, and Leonore Carlson, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 Ladina Sykes and her two children were leaving a beach in Evanston when their car struck a wall in the parking lot. Paramedics took Sykes to Evanston Hospital, where she was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. Sykes was deemed mentally unable to provide consent, so when she refused to provide a doctor-ordered urine sample, a nurse catheterized her while several people, including two Evanston police officers, held her down because she was being physically uncooperative. Sykes was released from the hospital into police custody and charged with child endangerment, damage to property, and driving under the influence of alcohol. Sykes made a demand for trial. Several months later, after receiving the results of the urine test, which was positive for cannabis and phencyclidine (PCP), the State added two additional charges: driving under the influence of drugs and driving under the influence of cannabis.
¶ 2 Before trial, Sykes moved to suppress the results of the urine test, arguing the forcible catheterization
was an unlawful search. The trial court denied the motion, finding the Evanston police officers' participation in the procedure was not an illegal search. The court also denied her motion to dismiss the DUI-cannabis counts on speedy-trial grounds, finding the new charges were not statutorily mandated to be joined with the original charges, as the State had no knowledge of them until receiving the urine test results. After a bench trial, Sykes was found guilty of child endangerment and driving under the influence of cannabis and sentenced to 18 months court supervision.
¶ 3 Sykes contends her conviction should be vacated because (i) the police violated her fourth amendment rights by holding her down while a nurse forcibly catheterized her and (ii) the State violated her right to a speedy trial by failing to bring her to trial on the DUI-cannabis charge within 160 days of her demand for trial.
¶ 4 We affirm. Although the better practice would have been for the police officers to refrain from restraining Sykes during the forced catheterization
, their conduct did not transform the medical procedure, ordered and conducted by private actors, into state action. Further, Sykes's right to a speedy trial was not violated. The State was not required to join the DUI-cannabis charge with the original charges, as it did not know of the positive urine test until it received the results several months after Sykes's trial demand.
¶ 6 On the evening of August 19, 2013, Sykes and two of her children were swimming at a beach in Evanston. At about 10 p.m., the family left the beach and went to the parking lot. A few minutes later, a bystander saw Sykes's car drive into a wall. He found her unconscious and removed the key from the ignition and called 911. When Evanston paramedics and police arrived, Sykes was conscious and had no visible injuries. Her speech was slurred, and she told a paramedic she drank some alcohol. Evanston police officer Michael Pratt spoke to Sykes and smelled a slight odor of alcohol. He did not see any alcohol bottles or drugs on Sykes or in her car.
¶ 7 The paramedics took Sykes to Evanston Hospital, where a triage nurse assessed her condition. She was stable and had no complaints but was deemed to have an altered mental state because even though she was alert and oriented as to person and place, she did not know the date or time of day. Officer Pratt told hospital staff he suspected Sykes was under the influence of something. Pratt was standing outside Sykes's room when he heard her tell the nurse she had one alcoholic drink that evening. He went in her room and asked her if she had been drinking. She told Pratt she had not been drinking or taking any drugs. Pratt arrested her for driving under the influence, based on the odor of alcohol, slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and overall demeanor. Pratt asked Sykes to provide blood and urine samples, and she declined. He did not ask hospital staff to obtain samples for him.
¶ 8 Dr. Patel examined Sykes and ordered a CT scan
and blood and urine teststo determine why Sykes was in an altered mental state and to decide on a proper course of treatment. The urine test, in particular, would determine if she had drugs in her system. Colleen Costello, the supervising nurse, asked Sykes for a urine sample. Sykes refused. Costello then decided to catheterize her. Costello said patients can refuse treatment unless, like Sykes, they have an altered mental state. When Costello began the catheter procedure, Sykes was combative, swinging her arms, kicking her legs, and moving her hips to resist catheterization
. She also tried to get out of the bed. Costello called for assistance, and about nine people responded, including Evanston police officers Pratt and Magnas, who had been standing outside the room. Pratt and Magnas stood at the head of the bed and held Sykes down by her shoulders. Once Sykes was restrained, Costello extracted the urine with a catheter. Afterward, Pratt left the hospital and returned to the police station; officer Magnas stayed with Sykes.
¶ 9 The blood and urine tests
were sent to the hospital lab. Sykes's blood test showed she was well within the legal limit for alcohol, and her urine test was presumptively positive for cannabis and PCP, a reading later verified by a lab in Minnesota. Costello told Sykes about her test results. A police officer was standing outside Sykes's room at the time, but it is unclear whether the door was open or closed.
¶ 10 After Sykes's CT scan
showed no evidence of injury and her mental state improved, Evanston Hospital discharged her into police custody. The State charged Sykes with endangering the life of a child ( 720 ILCS 5/12C–5(a) (West 2012)), driving under the influence of alcohol ( 625 ILCS 5/11–501(a)(2) (West 2012)), and damaging city property, under an Evanston ordinance. She was released on bail. On November 7, Sykes made a demand for trial, and the case was set for December 13. Sykes demanded trial again on December 13. The State informed the trial court it was waiting for Sykes's medical records from Evanston Hospital, and the case was continued to January 17, 2014, for trial on the State's motion. On January 17, Sykes again demanded trial. The State was not ready, and the case was continued to February 24. The State provided Sykes's medical records to the defense on February 24, and the parties agreed to a continuance to April 4.
¶ 11 On April 4, 2014, the State was granted leave to add two charges: driving under the influence of drugs ( 625 ILCS 5/11–501(a)(4) (West 2012)) and driving under the influence of cannabis ( 625 ILCS 5/11–501(a)(6) (West 2012)). Sykes objected to the new charges, but the trial court overruled the objection and set the case for a May 14 trial. On May 12, the trial court granted Sykes's request that the case be taken off the trial call and be set for motions on June 17.
¶ 12 On May 30, Sykes moved to dismiss the two new charges, DUI–Drugs and DUI-cannabis, on the grounds that they violated the speedy-trial statute ( 725 ILCS 5/103–5 (West 2012) ), the Constitution of the United States ( U.S. Const., amend. VI ), and the Illinois Constitution ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8 ). Sykes contended that the new charges arose from the original charges and the State was presumed to know the results of her urine and blood tests
on August 20, 2013, when final results were generated by the Evanston Hospital lab. Relying on People v. Williams , 94 Ill. App. 3d 241, 49 Ill.Dec. 820, 418 N.E.2d 840 (1981), Sykes argued the new charges are subject to compulsory joinder with the original charges and that because 229 days had passed since the original charges were brought, which exceeds the 160 days permitted by the Act, the new charges should be dismissed.
¶ 13 The State argued it subpoenaed Sykes's medical records but did not receive them until February 24, 2014, because Sykes used her maiden name, Moore, at the hospital instead of the name on her driver's license, Sykes, under which the police charged her. The State argued that the new charges were not statutorily mandated to be joined with the original charges as the State had no knowledge of them when the case began. The trial court agreed, finding that neither the State's Attorney nor the police knew Sykes tested positive for cannabis until the State received the medical records. The trial court also found that Sykes should not have been surprised by the new charges, the State having repeatedly informed the court and defense counsel it was trying to obtain her urine and blood test
results, and the hospital having told Sykes she tested positive for cannabis and PCP.
¶ 14 Sykes also moved to quash the arrest and suppress the results of her blood and urine tests
, asserting violations of her fourth amendment rights. Sykes argued the Evanston police officers' participation in the forcible extraction of her blood and urine to test for drugs or alcohol, without a warrant, was an illegal search and the results of the search should be suppressed. Sykes also filed a motion in limine, arguing the results of the blood and urine tests are not admissible under section 11–501.4 of the Illinois Vehicle Code ( 625 ILCS 5/11–501.4 (West 2012) ), as they were not conducted under the regular course of providing emergency...
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People v. Gonzalez
...applies, "the filing of a later charge does not give rise to a new, separate speedy-trial period relative to that charge." People v. Sykes , 2017 IL App (1st) 150023, ¶ 38, 420 Ill.Dec. 383, 96 N.E.3d 468. Further, delays attributable to a defendant in connection with the original charges m......