People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 12 March 1981
• Docket Number: No. 79-723,79-723
• Citation: 418 N.E.2d 840,49 Ill.Dec. 820,94 Ill.App.3d 241
• Parties: , 49 Ill.Dec. 820 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald WILLIAMS and Mylon Cross, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 840

418 N.E.2d 840

94 Ill.App.3d 241, 49 Ill.Dec. 820

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald WILLIAMS and Mylon Cross, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 79-723.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division.

March 12, 1981.

Rehearing Denied April 9, 1981.

[49 Ill.Dec. 823] Ralph Ruebner, Deputy State Appellate Defender, Patricia Unsinn, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for defendant-appellant Williams

Julius Lucius Echeles, Frederick F. Cohn, Chicago, for defendant-appellant Cross.

Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee; Marcia B. Orr, Myra J. Brown, Mark A. Graf, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, of counsel.

LINN, Justice:

Mylon Cross and Ronald Williams were charged by an information filed on April 28, 1978 with the offenses of rape (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 11-1) and deviate sexual assault (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 11-3). The public defender was appointed to represent each defendant. On August 11, 1978 the information was amended to charge each defendant additionally with three counts of aggravated kidnapping (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 10-2), three counts of kidnapping (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 10-1), one count of unlawful restraint (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 10-3) and two counts of aggravated battery (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 12-4).

On September 11, 1978, the case proceeded to jury trial, and at the conclusion, verdicts were returned finding each defendant not guilty of one count of kidnapping, but guilty of all other charges. The trial court, however, entered judgment only on the guilty verdicts of rape, deviate sexual assault, three counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated battery.

On November 29, 1978 after denial of all post trial motions, including a petition for discharge, Mylon Cross was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of thirty years for rape and deviate sexual assault and ten years for each count of aggravated kidnapping while Ronald Williams was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of twenty-five years for rape and deviate sexual assault and ten years for each count of aggravated kidnapping. Defendants were not sentenced on the aggravated battery conviction.

On appeal, defendants contend: (1) they were denied their statutory right to a speedy trial (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 103-5); (2) they were denied effective assistance of counsel (U.S.C.Amend. VI) because they were jointly represented despite the existence of a conflict of interest in their defenses; defendant Cross individually contends: (3) he was denied competent counsel because counsel failed to object to We affirm the convictions for rape and deviate sexual assault and we reverse the three aggravated kidnapping convictions and the one aggravated battery conviction on which judgments of guilty were entered.

[49 Ill.Dec. 824] the admission of evidence which was the result of an illegal search; (4) the prosecutor improperly presented evidence of his post-arrest silence; (5) the trial court improperly allowed the prosecutor to present evidence of his codefendant's statement which implicated him; (6) the trial court erred in admitting his statement given in violation of his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694); defendant Williams individually contends: (7) he was denied a fair trial by the prosecutor's improper and prejudicial closing arguments; and (8) the judgments and sentences on three counts of aggravated kidnapping were improperly entered.

Since defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, only those facts necessary to resolve the issues raised will be stated.

The complainant testified that on April 13, 1978, while she was on her way to a liquor store, she saw the defendants. She had met the defendants previously when she was in the company of her boyfriend. The defendants were sitting in a white Cadillac car. Cross called to her. When she approached the car, she heard Cross tell Williams, "Get that bitch." Williams then grabbed her wrist, opened the car door, and shoved her inside the car. Cross grabbed her arms; Williams held onto her legs. The defendants then drove off with the complainant. As they drove along, the complainant attempted to escape, but Cross locked the car doors. He repeatedly slapped her face and told her he wanted her to be his whore.

They arrived at the DeGrace Hotel on Chicago's southside. Cross brandished a gun and told the complainant that if she tried to run away, he would kill her. Nevertheless, as they were getting out of the car, she again attempted to flee. Cross ran behind her and grabbed her. Again, he slapped her face and also threatened to kill her. Cross gave the gun he was holding to Williams who held the gun to the complainant's back. The three then went to Cross' room in the hotel.

In the room, Cross put on a tape recording and ordered the complainant to remove her clothing. She refused. Cross then struck her across her face with his fist, knocking her to the floor. He kept striking her until the complainant removed her clothes. Cross then forced her onto the bed and penetrated her vagina with his penis. He did not climax. Cross then forced her to the floor and, with a belt, he beat her on her back and shoulders. He then forced her to perform fellatio upon him. When the complainant vomited, Cross beat her again until, at his direction, she licked the vomit off the floor and swallowed it.

The complainant further testified that Williams then forced her to lay on the bed and he penetrated her vagina with his penis. He then began slapping the complainant's face. At that moment, Cross struck Williams and told him no one could hit "that bitch" except him. He told Williams "to get him some." Williams then forced the complainant to perform an act of fellatio upon him while he beat her with a belt buckle. The complainant further asserted that Williams forced her to submit to sexual intercourse four times and Cross forced her to do so five times. Later, Cross made her go into the bathroom where he forced her to kneel and he then urinated on her face. He again told her she would be his whore.

At approximately 4 a. m., Cross told the complainant to turn on the lights in the room. She went towards the door, opened it, and, in a state of nakedness, escaped. As she fled from the hotel, she exclaimed to the hotel desk clerk that she had been raped. She then ran into the street. A cab driver, Warren Jamieson, saw the complainant, stopped his cab, and told her to get in. As she did so, she saw the defendants getting into their car. The cab driver and another car followed the defendants' car until the defendants stopped.

The complainant also testified that as a result of being beaten, her forehead and eyes were swollen and discolored and one of her eyes was cut which necessitated a later insertion of four stitches. She also stated that as a result of the beating and whipping she had received, her back and shoulders were permanently scarred. Photographs of her injuries were introduced into evidence.

Jamieson, the cab driver, and John Bonner, the driver of the other car which had followed the defendants' car, testified that they saw the complainant running from the DeGrace Hotel. She was naked. She was crying hysterically. Her face was badly bruised and swollen. They also explained how they drove after the defendants until the defendants' car stopped and the police arrived.

Defendant Williams did not testify. Cross, in his testimony, asserted that although they were in the hotel room, nothing unusual happened. Cross said he had fallen asleep and Williams had gone out to get cigarettes. When Cross awoke, the complainant was gone. Cross denied that he or Williams forced the complainant into a car or into the hotel room. He also denied that the beating, rape, and deviate sexual assault occurred. He asserted that on many previous occasions he had had sex with the complainant. Several witnesses also testified that they knew Cross and the complainant had previously engaged in sexual relations.

In rebuttal, an assistant state's attorney testified to a prior inconsistent statement given to him by Cross. At the close of the evidence, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all charges except one count of kidnapping. Following the entry of judgment and sentencing as indicated, this appeal was filed.

OPINION

I

Defendants first contend that they were denied their statutory right to a speedy trial (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 103-5) on the three charges of aggravated kidnapping and one charge of aggravated battery upon which judgments of guilty were entered and which were included in the nine new and additional charges filed on August 11, 1978. Both defendants and the State agree that the nine new and additional charges were filed on the 120th day after the defendants' arrest and that no dispute exists that defendants were tried within term time on the original charges.

The speedy trial statute provides that every person in custody for an alleged offense shall be tried within 120 days from the date he is taken into custody, unless delay is occasioned by the acts of the defendant. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 103-5.) With respect to offenses committed on or after March 1, 1977, such as here, any delay occasioned by the defendant temporarily tolls, for the time of the delay, the 120 day period within which defendant must be tried. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 103-5(f).) The speedy trial statute is tolled only when there has been actual delay of trial which is clearly attributable to the defendant. (People v. Perkins (1980), 90 Ill.3d 975, 46 Ill.Dec. 388, 414 N.E.2d 110.) Thus, the inquiry in the instant case is whether some act of defendants, or some act to which they consented, necessitated a delay in their trial. People v. Jones (1971), 130 Ill.App.2d 769, 266 N.E.2d 411...