People v. Szczytko
| Decision Date | 20 November 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 10,10 |
| Citation | 212 N.W.2d 211,390 Mich. 278 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dennis R. SZCZYTKO, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
James K. Miller Kent County Pros. Atty., by Donald A. Johnston, III Chief Appellate Atty., Grand Rapids, for plaintiff-appellee.
Vander Veen, Freihofer & Cook, Grand Rapids, for defendant-appellant; by George E. Pawlowski, Grand Rapids.
Before the entire Bench.
We are here called upon to consider the question of comment by the prosecuting attorney upon the effect of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
The Court of Appeals told the story of this crime in great detail. People v. Szczytko, 40 Mich.App. 161, 198 N.W.2d 740 (1972). For this opinion, it is sufficient to note that defendant was informed against upon two counts; assault with intent to commit rape and felonious assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, and was found guilty as charged by a jury verdict. He was sentenced to a prison term of 7 1/2 to 10 years.
The defense of insanity was interposed at trial. During the People's summation to the jury, the following occurred:
'Counsel brings up, if you come back by reason of--not guilty by reason of insanity that the defendant will go to a mental institution appropriate considered 'Mr. Pawlowski: Well, now, wait a minute. Objection.
and according to the laws of the State of Michigan. That's right. But, All he has to do is, through some legal paper work ask to be released . . . (emphasis added)
'Mr. Zerial: He brought it up on his argument, your Honor.
'The Court: You may proceed.
'Mr. Zerial: A writ of habeas corpus and . . .
'Mr. Zerial: I think when opposing counsel brings up an argument that I am allowed to rebut it and I say that . . .
In its instructions to the jury, the court stated:
We granted leave to appeal in this case to review the apparent conflict between the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present matter and the holdings of two other panels of that court in similar cases. People v. Lewis, 37 Mich.App. 548, 195 N.W.2d 30 (1972); and People v. Secorski, 37 Mich.App. 486, 195 N.W.2d 8 (1972).
At issue is the propriety of prosecution comment to the jury upon the disposition of a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity.
In People v. Cole, 382 Mich. 695, 719, 720, 172 N.W.2d 354 (1969), a majority of this court adopted the rule in Lyles v. United States, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 254 F.2d 725 (1957), requiring the court to instruct the jury that a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity is not thereby released and discharged, but is committed to a mental hospital.
In Cole, the court made a choice between two competing considerations (p. 720, 172 N.W.2d p. 366):
'(1) the possible miscarriage of justice by imprisoning a defendant who should be hospitalized, due to refusal to so advise the jury; and (2) the possible 'invitation to the jury' to forget their oath to render a true verdict according to the evidence by advising them of the consequence of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.'
Not considered in Cole was another possibility; that of a miscarriage of justice in hospitalizing a defendant who should be imprisoned due to advice to the jury which:
a) suggests that the disposition of a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity is more humane and rehabilitative than the range of dispositions possible under a verdict of guilty, or
b) suggests that the disposition of a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity is more protective of society than the range of dispositions available under a verdict of guilty.
The general rule, of course, has always been that neither the court nor counsel should address themselves to the question of the disposition of a convicted defendant. Indeed, it is proper for the court to instruct the jury that they are not to speculate upon such matters; that they are to confine their deliberations to the issue of guilt or innocence.
The Lyles-Cole rule is an exception to that general proposition. It proceeds from the following rationale, quoted in People v. Cole from Lyles v. United States pp. 719--720, 172 N.W.2d p. 365:
There are a number of problems with this line of reasoning. First, common knowledge that a verdict of guilty subjects the defendant to 'such punishment as the court may impose' is a far cry from knowing the maximum penalty for the crime charged, whether probation can be imposed and upon what condition, whether parole can be granted and after how long, or who makes the judgment to put the defendant at his liberty and upon what considerations.
There is simply no comparison between a vague understanding that a guilty defendant will be subject to some kind of punishment and the specific understanding that an insanity-acquitted defendant 'will be confined in a hospital for the mentally ill until the superintendent of such hospital certifies, and the court is satisfied, that such person has recovered his sanity and will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others.'
Thus the Lyles argument that the jury 'has a right to know the meaning of (the insanity verdict) as accurately as it knows by common knowledge the meaning of the other two possible verdicts' does not support the jury instruction which Lyles approves.
The Lyles charges gives the jury a very definite understanding of the effect of an insanity acquittal. It presents a picture of certain, humane and safe disposition of the accused. By comparison, the common understanding of the jury with respect to the effect of a conviction is likely to be very confused. Published reports of recidivism, prison atrocities, and community skepticism of judicial leniency combine to suggest that the traditional rule against jury speculation upon the disposition of a defendant was well conceived.
But the specificity of the Lyles charge is not its only shortcoming.
Of more immediate concern to the case at hand is the fact that the Lyles charge invites argumentation by counsel.
As a general proposition, lawyers base their arguments on the Court's instructions. While they are not permitted to instruct the jury on points of law, or urge arguments of legal propositions to the jury, it is nevertheless commonplace and permissible for a lawyer to say to the jury, 'Now the court will instruct you in such and such a fashion' and proceed to build his summation upon the legal framework of the court's charge.
The function of the court's instruction to the jury is to acquaint them with the pertinent, relevant points of law which they need to know in order to enter upon their deliberations and discharge their responsibilities. It would be a novel rule indeed if the court is obligated to instruct the jury upon a certain point of law, and then promptly inform them that such point of law is immaterial to their consideration and should be ignored.
In Cole, a majority of this court opened the door to jury consideration of the postverdict disposition of an insanity-acquitted defendant. Having done so, we must recognize that zealous defense counsel will argue to the jury from that charge, emphasizing their client's claimed insanity and pleading for humane care and treatment, while pointing out that the security of the community is protected.
Argument used in People v. Lewis is typical:
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People v. Lee, 2
...such reasonable assistance as may be necessary to perfect and prosecute an appeal.'6 See, for example, People v. Szczytko, 390 Mich. 278, 298, 212 N.W.2d 211 (1973) (dissenting opinion), and People v. Merriweather, 50 Mich.App. 751, 753, 213 N.W.2d 756 (1973), leave to appeal den., 391 Mich......
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