People v. Talley
| Decision Date | 01 December 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 61480,61480 |
| Citation | 340 N.E.2d 167,34 Ill.App.3d 506 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael TALLEY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
James J. Doherty, Public Defender, Cook County (Judith A. Stewart, Asst. Public Defender, Chicago, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.
Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Cook County (Laurence J. Bolon and John T. Theis, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.
Michael Talley was found guilty after a bench trial of the crimes of unlawful use of a weapon and unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, pars. 24--1(a)(10) and 83--2.) He was sentenced to a term of six months in the House of Correction on each charge, the sentences to run concurrently. Defendant appeals contending that the court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence.
The evidence presented at the hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence consisted entirely of the testimony of the arresting officer, Chicago Police Officer Metroyer. Officer Metroyer testified that on October 31, 1974, at approximately 10:00 P.M., he observed the defendant and a second man standing near a building at 1555 North Dearborn in Chicago. On direct examination by defendant's counsel, the officer testified that he did not have an arrest warrant or search warrant for either of the individuals, and he did not observe them violating the law. However, on cross-examination by the prosecution, the officer testified that his attention was drawn to the defendant because the defendant and his companion 'fitted the description of two individuals that was (sic) wanted in a home invasion in the 1400 block of Dearborn.'
The defense immediately objected to this answer, arguing that the statement was merely the officer's conclusion, and that no details of the description had been presented. The court overruled the defense's objection. Testimony regarding what the description of the home invaders consisted of was not presented at the trial. The officer then testified that this home invasion had taken place on October 28, 1974, three days prior to the defendant's arrest, approximately a block from the location of the defendant's arrest. On redirect, the officer testified that he had found out about this home invasion through a 'flash message' he had heard on October 28, 1974.
The officer testified that on the day of the defendant's arrest he approached the defendant and his companion and announced that he was a police officer. He then searched the defendant's person and retrieved a .357 magnum revolver loaded with three magnum shells. Following this, he placed the defendant under arrest. After hearing this testimony, the court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence.
The defendant's sole contention on appeal is that the court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence. Defendant argues that once it has been shown that the officer did not have a warrant for the defendant's arrest, and the officer did not observe the defendant violating any law, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to show that the officer had reasonable grounds for the search. The officer's statement alone that the defendant fit the description of a home invader, defendant argues, failed to establish such reasonable grounds.
The arresting officer testified at the hearing that he did not have a warrant for the defendant's arrest or for a search of his person and that he did not observe the defendant violating any law. While the burden of proof that a search is unlawful rests with a defendant moving to suppress the evidence, a defendant may meet that burden by establishing a prima facie case in showing that the officer conducting the search did not have an arrest or search warrant and that the officer did not observe the defendant doing anything unusual. Once the defendant has established such a prima facie case showing an unlawful search, the burden of going forward with the evidence is shifted to the prosecution to show that the officer had reasonable grounds for the search. (People v. King, 12 Ill.App.3d 355, 298 N.E.2d 715; People v. Moncrief, 131 Ill.App.2d 770, 268 N.E.2d 717; People v. Cassell, 101 Ill.App.2d 279, 243 N.E.2d 363.) The testimony at the hearing to suppress clearly established that the burden of going forward with the evidence had shifted to the prosecution. The remaining question is whether the prosecution met this burden.
The State contends that the officer who made the search had probable cause to arrest the defendant and therefore the search was proper, being a search incident to a lawful arrest. The State argues that the officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant was one of the home invaders he had heard about in a police report three days prior.
In Illinois, an officer may arrest a person when that officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed an offense. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 107--2(c).) However, the reasonable caution in believing the person unless the arresting officer has knowledge of facts or circumstances from reliable sources which would warrant a man of reasonable caution in believing the person to be arrested has committed an offense. People v. Higgins, 50 Ill.2d 221, 278 N.E.2d 68; In re Marsh, 40 Ill.2d 53, 237 N.E.2d 529; People v. Bates, 9 Ill.App.3d 882, 293 N.E.2d 358.
Whether an arresting officer had knowledge of such facts and circumstances and whether the facts and circumstances warranted a reasonable belief that the person to be arrested had committed an offense are questions for the court to ultimately decide. a court may not rely solely upon an arresting officer's subjective good faith, but must be presented with the objective facts upon which the arresting officer acted. (Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142.) The principles announced in Beck that objective facts rather than an arresting officer's subjective conclusions be presented to the court in determining whether there was probable cause for an arrest apply to cases where an officer merely stops a suspect for temporary questioning. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889.
In the instant case the testimony established that the officer had...
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