People v. Tatum

Decision Date31 October 1962
Docket NumberCr. 8103
Citation209 Cal.App.2d 179,25 Cal.Rptr. 832
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesThe PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James Luther TATUM, Defendant and Appellant.

Donald D. Roff, Ventura, for defendant and appellant.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., Woodruff J. Deem, Dist. Atty., John R. Hetland, Robert K. Garst, Deputy Dist. Attys., Ventura County, for plaintiff and respondent.

BURKE, Presiding Judge.

On November 7, 1960, the police received a report that a 21-foot house trailer had been stolen from the property of its owner near Lancaster, California. On November 10, 1960, the stolen trailer was discovered in Moorpark, California, parked behind a house, trees, shrubbery and a fence, about 200 feet back from the road, on a lot owned by defendant's father. It could be seen only by coming onto the property. The license plate and serial number plaque had been removed from the trailer and state and national park decals had been scraped off the windows. The trailer had been connected to water and electricity and it was apparent that it had recently been lived in. The trailer owner's personal effects had been removed and placed in a trash pile near the parked trailer and some of the food which had been left in the trailer by its owner had been consumed. The owner testified the trailer had been taken from its location and used without his knowledge or consent.

Defendant was tried and acquitted in Los Angeles County on a charge of stealing the trailer. Thereafter an information was filed charging him in the first count with the crime of receiving stolen property, the trailer, and in a second count with concealing the same trailer in violation of section 496(1), Penal Code, which proscribes knowingly receiving, or concealing and withholding, stolen property. The first count was dismissed and the jury returned a verdict of guilty to the count of concealing and withholding. Defendant's motion for new trial was denied and he was sentenced to the state prison for the term prescribed by law. This is an appeal from the judgment and order denying motion for new trial. 1

Testimony at the trial of the concealing charge presented three versions to the jury concerning how the trailer got to its location on defendant's father's property. Each of the versions support the inference that it had been stolen by someone.

Police officer Edson testified as to the location and condition of the trailer when it was discovered in Moorpark. He said that following his arrest defendant told police officers he had purchased the trailer from a 'Larry Jackson' for $1,000, having paid $300 down with the balance due in monthly installments. He said he met Larry Jackson 'up north' where Jackson was working for defendant's brother. Defendant told officers he did not know where he was to make the monthly payments due on the balance of the purchase price, nor could he produce a bill of sale at the time of the interview. Later he produced a purported bill of sale. Defendant stated to the officers that at the time he purchased the trailer it did not have a license or registration papers and he supposed it was stolen property when he purchased it.

At a later date defendant repeated essentially the same story to other police officers. At this time he stated further that he had asked his father to make some of the payments for him. Defendant's father testified defendant had told him he purchased the trailer but he did not recall any request by his son for him to make any of the payments. Defendant's father further testified that, while he did not see who parked the trailer, the only person he ever observed near the trailer was his son.

Defendant abruptly changed his story on September 1, 1961, when he told police officers he had nothing to do with the stolen trailer and that his former story of having purchased it was concocted to protect his father and brother. In support of this changed position a letter was read into evidence on defendant's behalf which was purported to have been written by defendant's father to defendant's attorney. The letter, dated September 18, 1961, denied defendant had ever stated to his father that the trailer was his. Defendant's father testified that the letter had been written by defendant's sister as a result of a letter received by her from defendant requesting such a letter. Defendant's father admitted that he had signed the letter but he stated he had not read it before signing.

Another version of the facts was presented by the testimony of Judy Ross, defendant's paramour, who was granted immunity from prosecution and compelled to testify as one of the prosecution's witnesses. She testified that she and defendant had been looking for a trailer to steal when they came upon the trailer in question near Lancaster. They attached the trailer to their car and brought it to defendant's father's property where they parked it. She stated she cleaned the trailer out, removed the owner's personal effects and scraped the decals off the windows. She testified however that she did not remove the license or serial number plaques.

The third version was given by defendant's brother who was the only witness for the defense. He testified he was the person who had stolen the trailer, parked it on his father's lot and removed the license and identification material. He said he told his father he purchased it for a rental and did not reveal to defendant that he had stolen the trailer until after they had traveled from Moorpark to Sacramento. They did not return to Moorpark until after the trailer had been discovered and returned to its owner.

The court instructed the jury: '* * * if the defendant charged with concealing or withholding stolen property is found to be the thief, it is necessary for the People to prove that the defendant committed acts or omissions amounting to concealment or withholding of the property from its owner after the completion of the asportation or transportation of the property immediately connected with the perpetration of the theft of the property.' This instruction would enable the jury to find defendant guilty of concealing and withholding property which he himself had previously stolen.

Clearly a thief may not be convicted under section 496(1) of the Penal Code of 'buying' or 'receiving' the goods which he has previously stolen (see, e. g. People v. Jacobs, 73 Cal.App. 334, 341, 238 P. 770; People v. Bausell, 18 Cal.App.2d 15, 18, 62 P.2d 774), with the possible exception of the situation where the thief has disposed of the property and subsequently received it back in a transaction separate from the original theft. (See People v. Kot, 171 Cal.App.2d 9, 14, 339 P.2d 899.) Whether or not he may be adjudged guilty of violating that section by reason of concealing or withholding such property following his theft of it, a question not heretofore decided in this state, is the problem presented here.

Section 496 provides that (1) 'Every person who buys or receives any property which has been stolen or which has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the same to be so stolen or obtained, or who conceals, withholds or aids in concealing or withholding any such property from the owner, knowing the same to be so stolen or obtained, * * * is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison for not more than 10 years, or in a county jail for not more than one year.' In our view, this section is directed at those who knowingly deal with thieves and with their stolen goods after the theft has been committed. In other words, it is directed at the traditional 'fence' and at those who lurk in the background of criminal ways in order to provide the thieves with a market or depository for their loot. Such offenses are essentially different from the actual theft of property prohibited by section 484. Every theft, every wrongful misappropriation, of necessity, contemplates and involves a permanent withholding from the owner. To conceal and withhold is the thief's purpose from the very moment that he gains possession of the property. It is part and parcel of the theft. But such concealment and withholdings is not that envisaged by section 496. If the Legislature had intended in that section to embrace concealment of stolen property by the thief, it would have been a simple matter to say 'every thief or any other person * * * who conceals, etc.'

It is apparent that other sections in the penal code section in the 496 series (§§ 496-496c) are directed principally at activities of others than the thief and which take place subsequent to the actual theft of the property. Experience has shown that by cutting off the 'fence' a major obstacle is placed in the path of encouraging thefts as a profitable venture. These sections are patently designed to accomplish that objective, as can be seen by a cursory reading thereof. They make clear that in the eyes of the law the 'fence' is more dangerous and detrimental to society than is the thief for 'receiving' or 'concealing' of stolen goods draws the heavier maximum penalty. To view these sections otherwise, to consider both the theft and the receiving or concealing sections as being aimed at the thief, would lead to anomolous results. For instance, a thief who steals under $200 may be convicted under section 484 of the theft but the punishment would be limited by section 490 to a $500 fine or maximum imprisonment in the county jail for six months, or both. Yet the same thief, if convicted under section 496 of 'concealing' his booty would be subject to imprisonment in the state prison for a period up to ten years. These conflicts and untoward results are avoided, leaving the underlying purposes unimpaired, by construing section 496 as a statute directed primarily at persons who do not physically participate in the...

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