People v. Tatum

Citation73 Cal.Rptr.3d 718,161 Cal.App.4th 41
Decision Date24 March 2008
Docket NumberNo. D051185.,D051185.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesThe PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Robert TATUM, Defendant and Respondent.

Michael A. Ramos, District Attorney, Grover D. Merritt and Mary L. Andonov, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Doreen Boxer, Public Defender, and Pamela P. King, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and Respondent.

IRION, J.

The District Attorney for the County of San Bernardino (District Attorney) appeals the trial court's dismissal of a petition to involuntarily commit Robert Tatum as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) upon the expiration of his parole period. The trial court ruled that due to the District Attorney's delay in the filing of the petition, the petition was untimely in that the trial could not be commenced at least 30 days prior to Tatum's release as required by statute. The court also found the District Attorney's nearly six-month delay in filing the petition was not excused by "good cause," and that the proffered explanation for the delay was "outrageous" and "callous[]," amounting to, at most, "inexcusable negligence." The court further determined that were the petition allowed to go forward, it would necessitate trial well after. Tatum's release date, requiring a significant extension of Tatum's involuntary commitment without statutory authorization. Balancing the justification for the delay against the resulting "actual prejudice," the trial court ruled that the delay in filing the petition violated Tatum's constitutional rights to due process, and dismissed the petition.

On appeal, the District Attorney contends that despite the untimely filing of the MDO petition, the absence of good cause for the delay and the resulting violation of the statute governing MDO commitment, the trial court "erred as a matter of law" by dismissing the petition. As discussed below, we disagree and affirm the dismissal.

While we are, of course, cognizant of the public safety concerns arising from the release of potentially mentally ill offenders who have completed their sentences, we can find no legal flaw in the trial court's actions. The federal and state Constitutions, as well as California statutory law, require a certain bare minimum of due process before a person can be involuntarily committed to the custody of the state. ` (People v. Allen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 91, 98, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 124, 164 P.3d 557 (Allen).) As the District Attorney's "inexcusable negligence" in filing Tatum's MDO petition and subsequent delay in providing necessary discovery, caused the proceedings in the instant case to fall below that minimum, the trial court acted well within its statutory and constitutional authority in dismissing the petition. Consequently, the trial court did not "err[] as a matter of law," and we have no authority to reverse its ruling.

We note, as our own Supreme Court has done in recently affirming the dismissal of an MDO petition, that due to the availability of other statutory avenues of involuntary commitment, such as the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.), our ruling "does not necessarily mean [Tatum] will be released." (Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 95, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 124, 164 P.3d 557.)

"Because [Tatum] has been evaluated and treated only under the MDO Act up to this point, there has been no occasion to determine whether [he] would be subject to the requirements of the LPS Act. [Citation.] Thus, we underscore that our decision should not be construed as requiring [Tatum's] release if he is still in need of mental health treatment. Assuming he still requires such treatment, we presume that responsible parties will take appropriate steps to ensure [Tatum] receives custodial treatment, for as long as is necessary, under the LPS Act." (Id. at p. 108, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 124, 164 P.3d 557; Welf. & Inst.Code, § 5150.)

I FACTS

On February 7, 2007, the District Attorney filed a petition in superior court to commit Tatum as an MDO pursuant to Penal Code1 section 2970. The petition requested that the court appoint counsel for Tatum, that the appointed counsel "provide discovery" to the District Attorney and that the court, set a trial date. The petition stated that Tatum had a "severe mental disorder" and was committed to the State Department of Health under section 2962 as a condition of his parole, where he was receiving "continuous treatment." The petition also stated that Tatum's mental disorder was not in remission, and "by reason of his severe mental disorder," Tatum "represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others." The petition noted that Tatum had a "maximum commitment date of March 12, 2007."

After appointing a deputy public defender (Pamela King) to represent Tatum, the court held a hearing on the petition on February 9. Tatum was not present. At the hearing, King stated that the petition was untimely and by law Tatum had a "right to begin trial today." King noted, however, that as she had just been appointed to the case, had no familiarity with Tatum, and had "received no discovery," she was not prepared for trial. She requested that the court calendar a motion to dismiss the petition and stated that her office would "do our best to prepare ... for trial" before Tatum's "commitment expires." King also requested an order that Tatum be transported to the court for the next hearing.

The deputy district attorney addressed the issue of discovery, stating that to avoid burdening the state hospital with two identical subpoenas (one from the defense and one from the prosecution), he would subpoena Tatum's mental health records "into the court." The deputy explained that the records would then be delivered directly to the court which would notify Tatum's counsel immediately upon receipt, giving the defense the first "opportunity to copy the records." The court then summarized the representation, reiterating that the District Attorney was "going to subpoena all records from the different locations involving Mr. Tatum and make it available for the defense."

The deputy district attorney also acknowledged that "[t]ypically the cases are filed more timely," and that "the burden will be on the People to show why it is—it may or may not have been timely." The court set a hearing date of February 23 "for motion to dismiss and possible trial."

On February 15 Tatum filed a written motion to dismiss the petition. The motion stated that Tatum had served his sentence and had been paroled to Atascadero State Hospital, later being transferred to Patton State Hospital. The State Department of Mental Health had prepared a report declaring that Tatum met the criteria for recommitment under section 2970 on July 26, 2006—199 days prior to Tatum's discharge date. The District Attorney failed to act on the report for almost six months, until February 7, 2007. Tatum contended that absent a showing of good cause, this delay required dismissal.

The District Attorney opposed the motion to dismiss, contending that without a showing of prejudice, the court was not required to evaluate the cause of any delay, and the petition could move forward. The District Attorney acknowledged that a report regarding Tatum's need for commitment had been mailed to the District Attorney's Office by the State Department of Mental Health on August 14, 2006. Nevertheless, the District Attorney's "MDO staff became aware on February 7, 2007, that the filing in this matter was in issue" and, after obtaining the paperwork by fax, filed the petition on that date. In an undated, supporting declaration, the assigned deputy ?district attorney, Diane Harrison, attested that the first time she recalled becoming aware of the case was on February 7, and she "filed the case as soon as she became aware of it." Harrison stated that the case had been entered on the "Master Calendar, kept only by the lead secretary," Barbara Stevens, as of August 29, but Harrison was "unaware of where the case might have been since its arrival" in August, "and it is not possible to ask Barbara Stevens now, due to [a] severe medical condition." Stevens had not worked since January 10, and was in a coma, "unable to speak or write."

The trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on February 26. Deputy Public Defender Don Wingfield appeared for Tatum who was, again, not present, and Harrison appeared for the People. At the hearing, the court found that due to the District Attorney's delayed filing of the petition, the parties "cannot ... begin trial" as statutorily required—30 days prior to the expiration of Tatum's sentence. Consequently, the trial court ruled, the District Attorney needed to establish "good cause" for the delay.

Harrison reiterated the explanation given in her declaration for the delay, adding that her office had never been able to find the original file for the Tatum case, but had relied instead on a second packet of materials rushed from Patton State Hospital to initiate the February court filing. The court then suggested that rather than a full evidentiary hearing, the parties could stipulate that the report from the hospital arrived at the District Attorney's office before August 29, 2006, and through negligence, the petition was not filed until February 7, 2007. The parties agreed to the stipulation. The court stated that the District Attorney's office "simply dropped the ball," and "[a]s soon as the ball materialized, they got on it." The court then ruled, "I cannot find that there is no good cause," and "basically it's ... simple negligence;" so "I find good cause" for the failure to begin trial at least 30 days before Tatum's release date.

With respect to scheduling trial, Tatum's counsel then informed the court that he had "just received" 1,200 pages constituting the prison records relating to Tatum, but was still awaiting the mental health records from Tatum's commitment at...

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