People v. Taylor

Decision Date13 February 1990
Parties, 552 N.E.2d 131, 58 USLW 2514 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John TAYLOR, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ronnie V. BANKS, Appellant.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Mario Malerba and Vincent F. Siccardi for appellant in the first above-entitled action.

James M. Catterson, Dist. Atty., Suffolk County (Mark D. Cohen, Riverhead, of counsel), for respondent in the first above-entitled action.

James S. Bartlow, Rochester, for appellant in the second above-entitled action.

Howard R. Relin, Dist. Atty., Monroe County (Alan Cruikshank, Rochester, of counsel), for respondent in the second above-entitled action.

OPINION OF THE COURT

WACHTLER, Chief Judge.

In these two cases, we consider whether expert testimony that a complaining witness has exhibited behavior consistent with "rape trauma syndrome" is admissible at the criminal trial of the person accused of the rape. Both trial courts admitted the testimony and the Appellate Division affirmed in both cases. We now affirm in People v. Taylor, 142 A.D.2d 410, 536 N.Y.S.2d 825, and reverse in People v. Banks, 145 A.D.2d 944, 536 N.Y.S.2d 316. While we recognize that the unchecked admission of expert testimony in this area has peculiar dangers, we believe that under certain circumstances and subject to certain limitations evidence of rape trauma syndrome is both relevant and admissible. We believe, however, that the trial court in Banks erred in allowing the expert to testify under the facts present in that case.

I. People v Taylor

On July 29, 1984, the complainant, a 19-year-old Long Island resident, reported to the town police that she had been raped and sodomized at gunpoint on a deserted beach near her home. The complainant testified that at about nine that evening she had received a phone call from a friend, telling her that he was in trouble and asking her to meet him at a nearby market in half an hour. Twenty minutes later, the same person called back and changed the meeting place. The complainant arrived at the agreed-upon place, shut off the car engine and waited. She saw a man approach her car and she unlocked the door to let him in. Only then did she realize that the person who had approached and entered the car was not the friend she had come to meet. According to the complainant, he pointed a gun at her, directed her to nearby Clarke's Beach, and once they were there, raped and sodomized her.

The complainant arrived home around 11:00 P.M., woke her mother and told her about the attack. Her mother then called the police. Sometime between 11:30 P.M. and midnight, the police arrived at the complainant's house. At that time, the complainant told the police she did not know who her attacker was. She was taken to the police station where she described the events leading up to the attack and again repeated that she did not know who her attacker was. At the conclusion of the interview, the complainant was asked to step into a private room to remove the clothes that she had been wearing at the time of the attack so that they could be examined for forensic evidence. While she was alone with her mother, the complainant told her that the defendant John Taylor, had been her attacker. The time was approximately 1:15 A.M. The complainant had known the defendant for years, and she later testified that she happened to see him the night before the attack at a local convenience store.

Her mother summoned one of the detectives and the complainant repeated that the defendant had been the person who attacked her. The complainant said that she was sure that it had been the defendant because she had had ample opportunity to see his face during the incident. The complainant subsequently identified the defendant as her attacker in two separate lineups. He was arrested on July 31, 1984, and was indicted by the Grand Jury on one count of rape in the first degree, two counts of sodomy in the first degree and one count of sexual abuse in the first degree.

The defendant's first trial ended without the jury being able to reach a verdict. At his second trial, the Judge permitted Eileen Treacy, an instructor at the City University of New York, Herbert Lehman College, with experience in counseling sexual assault victims, to testify about rape trauma syndrome. The prosecutor introduced this testimony for two separate purposes. First, Treacy's testimony on the specifics of rape trauma syndrome explained why the complainant might have been unwilling during the first few hours after the attack to name the defendant as her attacker where she had known the defendant prior to the incident. Second, Treacy's testimony that it was common for a rape victim to appear quiet and controlled following an attack, responded to evidence that the complainant had appeared calm after the attack and tended to rebut the inference that because she was not excited and upset after the attack, it had not been a rape. At the close of the second trial, the defendant was convicted of two counts of sodomy in the first degree and one count of attempted rape in the first degree and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 7 to 21 years on the two sodomy convictions and 5 to 15 years on the attempted rape conviction.

II. People v Banks

On July 7, 1986, the defendant Ronnie Banks approached the 11-year-old complainant, who was playing with her friends in the City of Rochester. The complainant testified that the defendant told her to come to him and when she did not, he grabbed her by the arm and pulled her down the street. According to the complainant, the defendant took her into a neighborhood garage where he sexually assaulted her. The complainant returned to her grandmother's house, where she was living at the time. The next morning, she told her grandmother about the incident and the police were contacted. The defendant was arrested and charged with three counts involving forcible compulsion--rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree and sexual abuse in the first degree--and four counts that were based solely on the age of the victim--rape in the second degree, sodomy in the second degree, sexual abuse in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child.

At trial, the complainant testified that the defendant had raped and sodomized her. In addition, she and her grandmother both testified about the complainant's behavior following the attack. Their testimony revealed that the complainant had been suffering from nightmares, had been waking up in the middle of the night in a cold sweat, had been afraid to return to school in the fall, had become generally more fearful and had been running and staying away from home. Following the introduction of this evidence, the prosecution sought to introduce expert testimony about the symptoms associated with rape trauma syndrome.

Clearly, the prosecution, in an effort to establish that forcible sexual contact had in fact occurred, wanted to introduce this evidence to show that the complainant was demonstrating behavior that was consistent with patterns of response exhibited by rape victims. The prosecutor does not appear to have introduced this evidence to counter the inference that the complainant consented to the incident, since the 11-year-old complainant is legally incapable of consent (Penal Law § 130.05[3][a]. Unlike Taylor, the evidence was not offered to explain behavior exhibited by the victim that the jury might not understand; instead, it was offered to show that the behavior that the complainant had exhibited after the incident was consistent with a set of symptoms commonly associated with women who had been forcibly attacked. The clear implication of such testimony would be that because the complainant exhibited these symptoms, it was more likely than not that she had been forcibly raped.

The Judge permitted David Gandell, an obstetrician-gynecologist on the faculty of the University of Rochester, Strong Memorial Hospital, with special training in treating victims of sexual assault, to testify as to the symptoms commonly associated with rape trauma syndrome. After Gandell had described rape trauma syndrome he testified hypothetically that the kind of symptoms demonstrated by the complainant were consistent with a diagnosis of rape trauma syndrome. At the close of the trial, the defendant was acquitted of all forcible counts and was convicted on the four statutory counts. He was sentenced to indeterminate terms of 3 1/2 to 7 years on the rape and sodomy convictions and to definite one-year terms on the convictions of sexual abuse in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child.

III. Rape Trauma Syndrome

In a 1974 study rape trauma syndrome was described as "the acute phase and long-term reorganization process that occurs as a result of forcible rape or attempted forcible rape. This syndrome of behavioral, somatic, and psychological reactions is an acute stress reaction to a life-threatening situation" (Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 131 Am.J. Psychiatry 981, 982 [1974]. Although others had studied the reactions of rape victims prior to this publication (see, e.g., Sutherland & Scherl, Patterns of Response Among Victims of Rape, 40 Am.J. Orthopsychiatry 503 [1970], the Burgess and Holmstrom identification of two separate phases in a rape victim's recovery has proven enormously influential.

According to Burgess and Holmstrom, the rape victim will go through an acute phase immediately following the incident. The behavior exhibited by a rape victim after the attack can vary. While some women will express their fear, anger and anxiety openly, an equal number of women will appear controlled, calm, and subdued (Burgess & Holmstrom, op. cit., at 982). Women in the acute phase will also experience a number of physical reactions. These reactions include the actual physical trauma that resulted from the...

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