People v. Taylor
| Decision Date | 30 April 1986 |
| Citation | 180 Cal.App.3d 622,225 Cal.Rptr. 733 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Steven Edward TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant. Crim. 13256. |
John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., James T. McNally, Thomas R. Yanger and Susan Rankin Bunting, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.
Haight & Lieberman and Andrew V. Alder, San Francisco, Gregory Lawrence, Los Angeles, for defendant and appellant.
A jury convicted defendant of the rape of a mentally incompetent person. (Pen.Code, § 261, subd. (1).) 1 He appeals, contending: (1) insufficiency of the evidence; (2) error in the denial of his motion for a psychiatric examination of the victim; (3) hearsay evidence was erroneously admitted; (4) error in admitting evidence of an uncharged act; and (5) his motion to introduce evidence of his reputation for truth and veracity was erroneously denied. We conclude the last contention has merit, and in this close case where credibility was the key issue, that the error requires reversal.
Defendant was employed as an orderly at the Laurel Hills Developmental Living Center for developmentally handicapped persons. The Center consists of three residential buildings: the main building, Sierra Cottage and Foothill Cottage. One hundred fourteen persons reside at the center. A school for handicapped students, the Laurel Ruff Center, is located adjacent to Laurel Hills. Prior to the incident in question, defendant had been employed at Laurel Hills for approximately eight months.
On the morning of September 13, 1982, defendant was assigned to work in Foothill Cottage, where the "highest functioning" persons live. That morning, three of the residents of Foothill Cottage were 21-year-old Dawn the victim), 22-year-old Amy and 22-year-old Nancy. Dawn testified that after breakfast she was in her bedroom writing a letter to her mother. Her roommate, Amy, was watching television. Defendant entered the room, took her pen and asked her to go into the bathroom. Once in the bathroom, defendant lifted her up onto the counter and pulled down her pants and panties. Defendant then pulled down his own pants and underwear and kissed Dawn on the mouth and breasts. Defendant placed Dawn's legs on his shoulders and accomplished an act of sexual intercourse. Dawn testified Amy and Nancy witnessed this act. Defendant told Dawn not to say anything.
On cross-examination, Dawn testified she screamed before defendant took her to the bathroom. Moreover, defendant pinned her on her bed and hit her. She then testified that all that happened on the morning in question was the defendant brought her toilet paper, at her request, and handed it to her as she stood with her pants down by the toilet. She further testified that Amy, who talked about sex all the time, told her how the incident happened. She agreed "[i]t all came from Amy," and indicated she "must be making up a lie."
Amy testified she saw the act of sexual intercourse occur in the bathroom and that she had seen a television program the previous evening in which a man who looked like defendant attacked a girl. Amy agreed the program upset her and she thought about it a lot.
Nancy testified to a similar incident with defendant; that she was in the bathroom with Dawn when defendant lifted her (Nancy) onto the counter. He then touched Nancy on the breast and pubic area on top of her clothes. Further that she saw defendant lift Dawn onto the counter. She was in the television room and she saw defendant touch Dawn between the legs beneath her clothes. Defendant's pants were down at the time. Nancy left the room because she did not want to see anything happen to Dawn.
Defendant's version of the incident corresponded to that elicited from Dawn on cross-examination. He was in the laundry room when Dawn approached him. She complained there was no toilet paper in the bathroom. Defendant accompanied Dawn to the bathroom and ascertained she was correct. They went to the nurses' station to locate some toilet paper. Finding none there, defendant asked Dawn to wait. He found some in the staff bathroom and returned to the nurses' station, but Dawn had left. He proceeded to the girls' hall and called for Dawn. She answered from the bathroom. Defendant entered and saw Dawn standing next to the toilet with her pants down, stuttering that there was no toilet paper. Defendant handed the roll to Dawn, told her to get ready for school and left.
Dawn attended school on the 13th. She did not report the incident to her teacher, Judy Eberlein, and Ms. Eberlein noticed nothing unusual about Dawn. At about 9:30 p.m. that evening, a Laurel Hills counselor, Beth Von Striver, went in to say "goodnight" to Dawn and Amy. The girls looked at one another and then Dawn said she had something to tell her. Both girls began to recount the incident in a loud, excited manner. After talking to the girls separately, the police were called and Dawn was taken to a hospital. A physician attempted to conduct a rape examination on Dawn. Dawn did not cooperate, however, because of what appeared to be acute embarrassment and the doctor was unable to determine whether or not a sexual assault had occurred.
There was extensive testimony concerning Dawn's developmental disability. Although her chronological age was 21, Dawn had the mental age of a seven- to eight-year-old. The numerous intelligence tests given to Dawn throughout her life generally showed her to be in the moderate range of mental retardation. Asking questions which call for a "yes" or "no" answer of a person with this degree of retardation may result in inaccurate answers, because there are no explanatory words to indicate the person has understood the question. In Dawn's case, she might guess at an answer she did not know, hoping to give the answer she thought the questioner wanted to hear. Dawn had not been taught anything about sexual intercourse prior to the incident. She was often overly and inappropriately affectionate. The expert opinions differed on whether Dawn was mentally capable of consenting to a sexual act. 2
Initially we consider defendant's contention of error in denying admission of his proferred reputation evidence as our conclusion on this issue is dispositive of the case. Defendant urges the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to present evidence of his reputation in the community for truth and veracity. He relies on Evidence Code section 1102 and on article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution, 3 referred to hereafter as section 28(d). We conclude the latter provision mandates the admissibility of this evidence and the trial court's ruling denying admission was error.
However, the defendant's reliance on Evidence Code section 1102 is unavailing. At trial defendant eschewed reliance on this section 4 and cannot now assert it as a viable ground for admission of the disputed testimony.
Moreover, Evidence Code section 1102 does not support defendant's position. Section 1102, as pertinent, provides: The character evidence permitted a defendant under section 1102 is limited to evidence of the character or trait of character relevant to the offense charged. (2 Jefferson, Cal.Evidence Benchbook (2d ed. 1982) p. 1181.) Defendant's reputation for truth was relevant not to the elements of the rape itself, but only on the issue of whether he was testifying truthfully.
At trial, defendant asserted a right to admission of such reputation testimony under section 780 of the Evidence Code, which permits "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute" the court or jury to consider in determining the credibility of a witness, among other factors, "his character for honesty or veracity or their opposites." (Evid.Code, § 780, subd. (e).) Evidence relating to the credibility of a witness is relevant evidence. (Evid.Code, § 210.) Unless precluded by statute, any evidence is admissible to support or attack the credibility of a witness if it establishes a fact that has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of the witness' testimony. (2 Jefferson, Cal.Evidence Benchbook, supra, at pp. 844-845.) Evidence Code section 780 "is a general catalog of those matters that have any tendency in reason to affect the credibility of a witness", including his or her "character for honesty or veracity or their opposites." (Cal.Law Revision Com. com. to Evid.Code, § 780, 29B West's Ann.Evid.Code (1966 ed.) p. 280.) The rationale for allowing evidence of a witness' character for honesty or veracity is that it is logical to conclude the witness will act in conformity with his or her character for honesty or dishonesty while testifying on the stand. (2 Jefferson, Cal.Evidence Benchbook, supra, at p. 873.)
However, Evidence Code section 790 is an exception to section 780 "otherwise provided by statute." It provides: "Evidence of the good character of a witness is inadmissible to support his credibility unless evidence of his bad character has been admitted for the purpose of attacking credibility." The prosecution produced no evidence of defendant's bad character; hence, the evidence of defendant's good character for truth and veracity was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 790.
Evidence Code section 790 does not render evidence in support of defendant's credibility irrelevant; it simply restricts its admissibility. The basis for this restriction is that "[u]nless the credibility of a...
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