People v. Taylor Billingslea Bail Bonds
| Decision Date | 15 September 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. B122170,B122170 |
| Citation | 74 Cal.App.4th 1193,88 Cal.Rptr.2d 713 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | , 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7706, 1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9761 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TAYLOR BILLINGSLEA BAIL BONDS, Defendant and Appellant. |
Law Offices of Kenneth F. Weston and Kenneth F. Weston, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Appellant.
Lloyd W. Pellman, County Counsel, Louis V. Aguilar, Assistant County Counsel, and Robert E. Ragland, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Taylor Billingslea Bail Bonds appeals from the trial court's denial of its motion under section 1305.4 of the Penal Code 1 to extend the period within which forfeiture of a bond can be vacated or the bond exonerated after that period had already been extended more than 180 days. Appellant also contends that this court should apply a 1999 amendment to section 980 retroactively, and deem the bond exonerated for failure of the criminal defendant's arrest warrant to appear in the National Criminal Information Center computer system (hereafter "NCIC"). We conclude that the trial court correctly construed section 1305.4 to preclude further extensions of time and that appellant failed to present sufficient evidence to the trial court to invoke the provisions of section 980. We, therefore, affirm.
On January 23, 1997, Amwest Surety Insurance Company executed bond number X30-4-00066239 in the amount of $20,000 through its bail agent (appellant), for the release of criminal defendant Edimart Osegueda from custody. 2
On March 14, 1997, Osegueda failed to appear in court as lawfully ordered, and the trial court issued an order forfeiting bail. Timely notice was sent to both the surety and the bail agent on March 26, 1997. In accordance with section 1305, the court had until September 27, 1997, to vacate the forfeiture and/or exonerate the bond.
On August 29, 1997, appellant requested an extension of the 180-day period. The trial court granted an 88-day extension to November 26, 1997.
On November 26, 1997, appellant requested a further extension of the 180-day period. The court granted the request and extended the period within which to vacate the forfeiture/exonerate the bond for 60 days, to January 26, 1998.
Although it does not appear in our record, appellant apparently brought a motion to exonerate the bond. On January 26, 1998, the hearing on the motion was continued by the court to February 17, 1998. 3 At the February 17, 1998, hearing, counsel for appellant stated that he had been told by a superior court bailiff working in a different department that Osegueda's arrest warrant had not been entered into NCIC. According to counsel, the bailiff had obtained that information by telephoning the sheriff's warrant division and was apparently informed by an unknown person that Osegueda's arrest warrant could not be found in the system. Archie Barry, a bounty hunter and paralegal for appellant, confirmed at the hearing that he had discovered Osegueda living in Oregon in January of 1998. According to the trial court's clerk, however, Osegueda's arrest warrant had been entered into the California criminal database (TCIS) which the court believed was hooked into NCIC.
Appellant's counsel told the court that he was unable to acquire additional proof that the arrest warrant had not been entered into NCIC because the database is accessible only to law enforcement personnel. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge expressed the belief that appellant's record was incomplete. The court granted another extension, until March 11, 1998, to give appellant an opportunity to substantiate the claim that Osegueda's arrest warrant was not in NCIC or to obtain Osegueda's return.
In a declaration submitted to the court prior to the March hearing, Barry stated that he had discovered Osegueda living in Eugene, Oregon in January of 1988 and that "the Oregon authorities refused to help us apprehend said fugitive [Osegueda], since there was no warrant in the NCIC system." He obtained a letter from a Eugene Public Safety Officer (which does not appear in our record but was apparently submitted to the trial court) which stated that without entry into NCIC, the Eugene Police Department does not recognize the legitimacy of the bond agent's demand for the defendant.
Appellant's attorney, Kenneth Weston, submitted a declaration in which he stated that he spoke with a district attorney in Oregon who confirmed that Oregon police would not arrest a California fugitive unless he was entered into NCIC or unless California law enforcement personnel sent a direct request. Weston's declaration reiterated the earlier statement that the bailiff serving another department had called the sheriff's "warrant section" and had been told that there was no NCIC warrant for Osegueda.
On March 11, 1998, the trial court continued the motion to March 25 at appellant's request. At the hearing on March 25, appellant's counsel requested a one-week extension to afford him an opportunity to contact the extradition division of the Los Angeles Police Department in the hopes of gaining their cooperation in retrieving Osegueda from Oregon. Appellant did not submit any further evidence to substantiate the claim that Osegueda's arrest warrant was not in NCIC. The trial judge found no further grounds to extend the period under either section 1305 or section 1305.4, and denied appellant's motion to exonerate the bond. In so ruling, the trial judge stated that there was "no authority in either case law or the statute that would permit me to extend the tolling period for more then [sic ] 180 days." This appeal followed.
Under section 1305, the trial court is required to declare a forfeiture of bail when the defendant fails to appear in court without a satisfactory excuse. (§ 1305, subd. (a).) The trial court is also required to cause notice of the forfeiture to be mailed to the bail agent within 30 days thereafter if the amount of the bond or money or property deposited exceeds $400. (§ 1305, subd. (b).) If, inter alia, the defendant appears, is surrendered into custody, or is arrested in the underlying matter within 180 days of the notice of forfeiture, the court must vacate the order of forfeiture and exonerate the bond on its own motion. 4 (§ 1305, subd. (c)(1)-(3); County of Los Angeles v. National Automobile & Casualty Ins. Co. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 271, 275, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 5.) An order of forfeiture may also be vacated on motion. (§ 1305, subd. (c)(4).) Section 1305 allows for a tolling of the 180-day period if the defendant is unable to appear during that time because of "temporary disability" by reason of illness, insanity, or detention by military or civilian authorities. (§ 1305, subd. (e).)
Section 1305.4 was enacted by the Legislature in 1996 to permit, upon a showing of good cause, an extension of the 180-day period within which the court may vacate the forfeiture/exonerate the bond. It provides in pertinent part: (Stats.1996, ch. 354, § 2, No. 7 West's Cal. Legis. Service, p.2039.)
Appellant's primary contention on appeal is that the language of section 1305.4 should be read to permit the trial court to grant an unlimited series of extensions as long as good cause is shown and no single extension is longer than 180 days. We do not believe that the statute should be read so broadly.
The general principles that guide interpretation of a statutory scheme are well established. When assigned the task of statutory interpretation, we are generally guided by the express words of the statute. " " (People v. Amwest Surety Ins Co. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 915, 919-920, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 29, quoting Rudd v. California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 948, 952, 268 Cal.Rptr. 624.)
The language of section 1305.4 is somewhat ambiguous. "The court, upon a hearing and a showing of good cause, may order the period extended to a time not exceeding 180 days from its order." Does "its order" mean the original order extending the period so that the total of all extensions permitted under section 1305.4 cannot exceed 180 days, or does "its order" mean the order issued in response to each request for extension which could result in limitless extensions of time as long as "good cause" is shown and no single extension exceeds 180 days?
Our answer is provided by the Legislative Counsel's Digest. Discussing the background in which section 1305.4 was enacted, the legislative counsel stated: ...
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