People v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 26 February 1968
• Docket Number: Cr. 13720
• Citation: 259 Cal.App.2d 448,66 Cal.Rptr. 514
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Alfred Andrew TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 514

66 Cal.Rptr. 514

259 Cal.App.2d 448

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Alfred Andrew TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 13720.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

Feb. 26, 1968.

Rehearing Denied March 18, 1968.

Hearing Denied April 24, 1968.

Marshall S. Freedman, Los Angeles, under appointment by Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Edward J. Horowitz, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

STEPHENS, Associate Justice.

In an information filed by the District Attorney of Los Angeles County, defendant was accused in three counts. In count 1, he was accused of violating Penal Code, section 459 (burglary); in count 2, with violating Penal Code, section 209 (kidnapping for the purpose of robbery); and in count 3, with violating Penal Code, section 261, subd. 3 (forcible rape). Defendant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. On November 22, 1966, the defendant requested a reduction in bail, a hearing under Penal Code, section 995, and the appointment of a private attorney in lieu of the public defender. All three requests were denied. Trial by jury was begun on December 16, 1966, and on motion of the People, count 2 of the information was amended to charge simple kidnapping only. The jury was unable to reach a verdict, and a mistrial was declared. A second trial was begun on February 6, 1967. At this trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of counts 1 and 3, but not guilty of count 2. Defendant's motions for a new trial and probation were denied. Defendant was then committed to the California Youth Authority on count 1 for the term prescribed by law. Defendant appeals from the judgment (Welfare and Institutions Code, § 1737.5) and from the order denying his motion for a new trial.

The facts out of which this prosecution arose will only be dealt with briefly as they are not crucial to the point urged on appeal. In the early morning hours of October 5, 1966, defendant entered the apartment where Mrs. Demeris Robertson lived with five of her children and a man named Christopher C. Armelin. Defendant took a paring knife from the kitchen and made his way upstairs to the room in which Mrs. Robertson and Mr. Armelin were sleeping. He forced Mr. Armelin into the bathroom, and told him to stay there. He then returned to the bedroom and had sexual intercourse with Mrs. Robertson against her will, holding the knife against her. Mrs. Robertson's son, John Carter, was awakened and overheard some of what had happened. He then went for help, and returned with the police, who arrested the defendant.

Defendant's sole contention on this appeal is that it was error to deny his request that the court appoint private counsel in lieu of the public defender. ¹ He contends that this denied him due process and choice of counsel, and argues that it amounted to a denial of equal protection. He contends that although the cases are clear that the appointment of the public defender satisfies the requirement of right to counsel, these cases have not looked into the equal protection aspects of the issue. He contends that since a more wealthy defendant can change counsel, the indigent should likewise be allowed to change counsel. He points to the 'indigent panel' as an available source of attorneys to serve in the stead of the public defender in such situations in which an indigent defendant would prefer not to be represented by the public defender. ² We do not agree. The basic California law in this area was expressed by our Supreme Court in People v. Hughes, 57 Cal.2d 89, 97--100, 17 Cal.Rptr. 617, 367 P.2d 33. There, it made clear that the right to counsel is satisfied by the appointment of the public defender, and that a defendant does not have the right to have any particular attorney appointed. This principle has been reaffirmed and accepted in cases subsequent to the United States Supreme Court decisions in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 and Douglas v. People of State of California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811, imposing upon the states the obligation to make qualified counsel available to every indigent defendant. (People v. Bourland, 247 Cal.App.2d 76, 83, 55 Cal.Rptr. 357 (cert. den. 388 U.S. 920, 87 S.Ct. 2142, 18 L.Ed.2d 1367); People v. Lee, 249 Cal.App.2d 234, 241, 57 Cal.Rptr. 281; People v. Jackson, 250 Cal.App.2d ---, ---, ^* 58 Cal.Rptr. 776; People v. Norman, 252 Cal.App.2d ---, ---, ^** 60 Cal.Rptr. 609.) In the instant case, no reason whatsoever for the request for the appointment of counsel other than the public defender appears in the record. The public defender did not indicate any reason or desire not to represent defendant. Had the request by defendant related only to the individual attorney assigned by the public defender's office and been substantiated by any valid reason of defendant, we have no doubt but that a different individual attorney from that office would have been made available. No reason of any kind for defendant's request is shown in the record, and the only reason argued on appeal is, in substance that since a person of wealth has the right to change his attorney without stating (or even having) a reason other than desire, so Must an indigent defendant have the like right, or he is not being Provided equal justice. ...