People v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 27 January 1976
• Docket Number: Docket No. 23982
• Citation: 240 N.W.2d 273,67 Mich.App. 76
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alonzo Francis TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant. 67 Mich.App. 76, 240 N.W.2d 273
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 273

240 N.W.2d 273

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alonzo Francis TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 23982.

67 Mich.App. 76, 240 N.W.2d 273

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Jan. 27, 1976.

Released for Publication April 13, 1976.

[67 MICHAPP 77] George Stone, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Patricia J. Boyle, Appellate Chief, Asst. Pros. Atty., Timothy A. Baughman, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before DANHOF, P.J., and McGREGOR and KAUFMAN, JJ.

KAUFMAN, Judge.

Defendant was convicted of armed robbery, M.C.L.A. § 750.529; M.S.A. § 28.797, after a bench trial in Detroit Recorder's Court. He was subsequently sentenced to a term of from 3 to 20 years in prison.

Defendant was charged with having committed the crime of robbery armed on January 21, 1975. Complainant testified at trial that he met defendant on a street in the city of Detroit and the [67 MICHAPP 78] defendant asked him to drive defendant to a location in the city for a dollar. When the parties reached the location the complainant stopped the car and waited for the defendant to pay him the dollar. Instead, defendant reached into his jacket and pulled out a gun. He took the leather coat which complainant was wearing as well as his watch.

Approximately one or two weeks later complainant saw the defendant on the street, and he recognized the leather coat which defendant was wearing as the one that had been taken from him. At a later time, the complainant's brother also saw the defendant on a street in Detroit wearing the same leather coat. He followed the defendant to his residence and notified his brother who called the police.

During the police investigation of the alleged armed robbery, police went to a house to which defendant had been followed by complainant's brother. An older woman answered the door and the police were admitted. They looked for the defendant inside the house but at the time they did not find him. The police left the house but two officers waited near the house for a short period of time. While they were waiting, they observed the defendant walking down the street. He matched the description given police by the complainant and was wearing a leather coat which fit the description of the coat described in the complaint filed with the police. Defendant then entered the house which was under police surveillance.

At this time, the police reentered the house, found the defendant hiding in the attic and placed him under arrest. After the police had arrested the defendant, they discovered the leather coat under a couch in the living room. The police did [67 MICHAPP 79] not have a search warrant at the time of the defendant's arrest.

On appeal defendant raises one claim of error which appears meritorious. He contends that the admission into evidence of the leather coat represents a reversible error because it was seized by police as the result of a warrantless search conducted in violation of U.S.Const., Am. IV and Const.1963, art. 1, § 11.

We find from a review of the record that our ability to resolve this claim is irremediably impaired by the confusing and cursory way in which the trial was conducted. The prosecutor and defense counsel combined to create a transcript devoid of the facts necessary to determine the validity of the challenged search.

Rather than holding a pretrial suppression hearing, the appropriate vehicle for such a claim, People v. Hill, 34 Mich.App. 669, 192 N.W.2d 84 (1971), the prosecutor and defense counsel agreed to resolve the issue at trial. For most of the trial, the leather coat was deemed a 'proposed exhibit.' Random interjections by the parties served as an argument. At one critical point in an officer's description of the search the prosecutor felt it necessary to add some extraneous nonjudicial material, apparently in an attempt at comic relief. Finally, the trial court held that the coat was legitimately seized as part of a 'search incident to an arrest'.

Under the limited facts here we can hold that, of the possible exceptions to the warrant requirement, the 'search incident to an arrest' exception clearly does not apply. The parameters of that exception were set forth in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969):

[67 MICHAPP 80] 'There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control'--construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.

'There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs--or, for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself. Such searches, in the absence of well-recognized exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a search warrant.' (Footnote omitted.)

In the instant case, defendant was arrested in the attic....