People v. Taylor
| Decision Date | 11 June 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. B097693,B097693 |
| Citation | 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 364,55 Cal.App.4th 924 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Previously published at 55 Cal.App.4th 924 55 Cal.App.4th 924, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4483, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7411 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Timothy TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant. |
Carlo Andreani, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, San Francisco, for Defendant and Appellant.
Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Senior Assistant Attorney General, William Bilderback, Deputy Attorney General, Juliet H. Swoboda, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Timothy Taylor was convicted of residential robbery and burglary of an aged person and sentenced to 25 years to life under the "three strikes" law. On appeal he claims the trial court impaired his ability to exercise peremptory challenges in violation of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. He also requests a remand for an informed exercise of the trial court's discretion to strike his prior convictions. We affirm Taylor's conviction but vacate the sentence and remand the matter for resentencing.
We state the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment (People v. Williams (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 467, 468, 118 P.2d 369). Taylor committed residential burglary and robbery of Theodore Smith, 89 years of age. Appellant stole cash ($30-40) while holding his hand around Smith's neck. He also stole a partial roll of 32 cent postage stamps. After Taylor left Smith's house, Smith called the police.
When the police arrived at Smith's house they found the glass panel on the back door was broken and blood was scattered in that area as well as the kitchen, hallway, and front porch. Smith also had some of the blood on his sweater.
While the police were investigating the crime scene at Smith's house, a few blocks away paramedics were assisting a person in an unrelated matter. Taylor ran up to the paramedics and told them he cut himself while working on his car. Taylor was transported to a hospital for treatment. Later, the police took Smith to the hospital to see if he could make an identification. Smith positively identified Taylor as the person who had robbed him. The police seized Taylor's clothes and blood samples were taken. A criminalist testified 10 percent of the population have the same blood type as Taylor and the blood found on Smith's sweater 1.
The district attorney filed a two count information. Taylor was charged in count I with first degree residential robbery (Pen.Code § 211), a serious felony (Pen.Code § 1192.7 subd. (c)(19)). He was charged in count II with first degree residential burglary (Pen.Code § 459). It was further alleged as to counts I and II pursuant to Penal Code sections 1170.12, subdivision (a) through (d), and 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), that Taylor had suffered two robbery convictions in 1984, a conviction for attempted robbery in 1985 and a 1987 conviction for robbery. The information also alleged, pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1), Taylor had suffered two robbery convictions in 1984, one attempted robbery conviction in 1985 and one robbery conviction in 1987. It was further alleged, pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), as to counts I and II appellant had suffered a conviction for vandalism causing damage of over $1000 for which he served a prison term and following which he, within five years, committed another offense resulting in a felony conviction. Finally, the information alleged as to counts I and II appellant violated Penal Code section 667.9, subdivision (a) in that the victim was 89 years old.
Taylor pleaded not guilty and denied the special allegations.
Prior to trial, Taylor made numerous motions including motions to strike his prior convictions in the interest of justice and to declare his potential punishment under the During trial, as we discuss in more detail below, a defense Wheeler 2 motion was denied and a defense motion for two additional peremptories was also denied.
"three strikes" law cruel and unusual punishment. His motion for bifurcation of trial issues was granted.
Trial was by jury. The jury found Taylor guilty as charged on count I and found the robbery to be of the first degree. The jury further found the allegation Taylor committed the offense against a person 65 years of age or older to be true. On count II, the jury found Taylor guilty and found the burglary to be of the first degree. The jury found the allegation Taylor committed the offense against a person 65 years of age or older to be not true.
Before trial commenced on the allegations of prior convictions, Taylor agreed to admit to two of the convictions for purposes of third strike sentencing in return for the district attorney's agreement not to pursue the enhancements.
The court denied probation and denied the defense's motion for a new trial. Taylor was sentenced to state prison for a term of 25 years to life pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(A). 3 The court imposed a restitution fine of $200 and 336 days of presentence custody credit, consisting of 224 days in custody and 112 days conduct credit. The sentence as to count II was stayed.
I. THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE DEFENSE TO EXERCISE ITS PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BECAUSE ADEQUATE GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL EXISTED; HOWEVER, THE TRIAL JUDGE DID OFFER A CURE WHICH THE DEFENSE ACCEPTED, THUS WAIVING THE ERROR.
After the defense exercised its eighth 4 peremptory challenge against Juror BS (female) 5, the trial judge requested both counsel to approach the bench for a sidebar conference, outside the hearing of the jury 6. At this time, the trial judge told them further exclusion of jurors will be made at sidebar After further voir dire of prospective jurors, the defense exercised a ninth peremptory against Juror IM (male). Then the prosecutor excluded Juror RR (male) with a third peremptory, and the defense made a Wheeler motion based on the second exclusion of a black male. The prosecutor voluntarily articulated reasons for the peremptory challenge; the trial court ruled they were legitimate and denied the Wheeler motion.
and he must be notified as to which juror will be excluded prior to exclusion 7.
The defense exercised its next three peremptory challenges against Juror MD (female), Juror VG (male), Juror PC (female, Asian). The defense then attempted to exercise a peremptory against Juror JM (male) which was initially denied, but later granted. The defense exercised its peremptory to excuse Juror SG (female, Caucasian) and then excused Juror SM (female, African American), a law student whose husband had been a police officer for eight years. The defense's attempt to excuse Juror SS (male, Latino) with its next peremptory was denied, as follows:
The use of peremptory challenges to eliminate prospective jurors because of their race is prohibited by the federal Constitution (Powers v. Ohio, (1991) 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411; Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69) and by the California Constitution (People v. Wheeler, supra ). In Wheeler, the California Supreme Court held the California Constitution prohibits litigants from using their statutory right to peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors on the basis of group bias: "We conclude that the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the sole ground of group bias violates the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community...." (Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d. at pp. 276-277, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.) The court defined group bias as a presumption certain jurors are biased merely because they are members of an identifiable group distinguished by racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds. (Id. at p. 276, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.)
A party claiming such discrimination has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 135, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) To establish a prima facie case, a party must make as complete a record as the circumstances permit, must establish the challenged prospective jurors are members of a cognizable group, and must show a "strong likelihood" they were challenged because of their group association. (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.)
Once a prima facie case is established, then the burden shifts to the other party to come forward with a race-neutral explanation related to the...
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People v. Taylor
...282 PEOPLE, Respondent, v. Timothy TAYLOR, Appellant. No. S062924. Supreme Court of California. Oct. 1, 1997. Prior report: Cal.App., 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 364 Respondent's petition for review The matter is transferred to the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, with directi......