People v. Taylor
| Decision Date | 19 November 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 38570,38570 |
| Citation | 211 N.E.2d 673,33 Ill.2d 417 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Alonzo TAYLOR, Plaintiff in Error. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Richard Loundy, Chicago, for plaintiff in error.
William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Elmer C. Kissane and Kenneth L. Gillis, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for defendant in error.
Defendant was, after a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, convicted of the offense of rape and sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of 45 years. This writ of error questions the propriety of the trial court's admission of allegedly coerced confessions, which, it is argued, deprived defendant of due process of law.
The 80-year-old complaining witness testified that on December 24, 1959, at about 2:00 A.M., she heard a noise at her apartment entrance. She thereupon engaged the 'burglar chain' and partially opened the door. A man identified by the complaining witness as the defendant, whom she had previously seen around the apartment building, appeared and persuaded her to open the door fully to receive a 'Christmas present'. The man, upon gaining entrance to her apartment, ushered her to the bed, threatened to shoot her with a gun-like object, and after a scuffle, during which the complaining witnesse was slapped several times, forcibly had sexual intercourse with her. She called the police two hours after the occurrence, explaining that the delay was due to her fear that the assailant was waiting in the hallway where the telephone was located. Defendant was identified by the complaining witness in a line-up two days after the offense. She stated that he was known to her by the name of 'Robert' or 'Robin'.
A neighbor of the complaining witness testified that she also heard a noise at her own door at about 2:00 A.M. on the same date. She heard someone say, whereupon she opened the door partially, leaving the burglar latch engaged, and told 'Robert' that the family had retired for the evening. She identified the defendant as 'Robert', stating that she had previously seen him about the building and that he had visited her and her husband several times.
Chicago police officer Kobar arrested defendant at 9:30 A.M. on December 26, 1959, and testified that upon being asked, defendant stated that he was sometimes called 'Robert'. Defendant was searched and a small toy pistol was found, subsequently identified by the complaining witness as the gun-like object she had observed in her assailant's hand. After the arrest, defendant was transported to a police station where the line-up was arranged. Kobar testified a conversation was had with defendant several hours later in the presence of Kobar and officer Walter McCarthy during which defendant orally confessed committing the rape.
On December 28, 1959, defendant was questioned by assistant State's Attorney Donigan at the Sex Bureau, where he signed a statement in the presence of Donigan, detective John Geimer, and Lena Woodson. Donigan testified that officer Klauses was also present and, on cross-examination of Donigan, it appears that, reading from the above signed statement, he spelled the name of officer Klauses and pointed it out. However, the statement as it appears in the record makes no mention of Klauses, and no other witness agrees with Donigan that Klauses was present.
Defendant testified he had been at 6034 Harper Avenue with friends at the time of the crime; that he had subsequently confessed because of beatings and threats upon his life by officers Kobar, Geimer and an unknown policeman; that he was innocent and that he had never used the name of 'Robert'. Two alibi witnesses substantially corroborated defendant's statement as to his whereabouts at the time of the alleged offense.
In rebuttal, officer Kobar denied striking defendant; officer Geimer denied seeing defendant until December 28, when the latter was taken to the Sex Bureau. This latter testimony, however, was contradicted by a surrebuttal witness who maintained that Geimer was present at defendant's arrest.
The oral confession was admitted into evidence at the trial without objection, but the subsequent written statement came in over objection on grounds of involuntariness. Although it is well settled in this State that a confession may be challenged either by preliminary hearing on a motion to suppress (People v. Spencer, 27 Ill.2d 320, 189 N.E.2d 270) or by appropriate objection thereto at the trial (People v. Wagoner, 8 Ill.2d 188, 133 N.E.2d 24), and failure to pursue one of these devices ordinarily precludes consideration of the matter on appeal (People v. Williams, 26 Ill.2d 190, 192, 186 N.E.2d 353; People v. Jones, 31 Ill.2d 42, 50, 198 N.E.2d 821), we believe the questions as to the voluntariness of both confessions are so inextricably interwoven that timely objection to the written statement adequately preserved all alleged error in admission to both confessions for review. Implicit in defendant's brief is the contention that coercion with regard to the oral confession remained a continuing influence and precipitated the subsequent written statement. With the exception of one threat, ('(an officer) told me that if I didn't go on and confess to the prosecuting attorney downstairs that I would get killed when I go back, they would give me a worse whipping than they had already, had did') all of the claimed duress occurred prior to the oral confession. If the original oral confession was unlawfully obtained, subsequent statements made while under the same constraint, although apparently voluntary, are nevertheless inadmissible. (People v. Sloss, 412 Ill. 61, 104 N.E.2d 807; People v. LaCoco, 406 Ill. 303, 311, 94 N.E.2d 178, cert. denied 340 U.S. 918, 71 S.Ct. 348, 95 L.Ed. 663; People v. Tomlison, 400 Ill. 555, 81 N.E.2d 434.) Our disposition accordingly must consider both the written statement and the prior oral confession
Defendant contends that where, as here, timely objection is made to the admission of a confession, it becomes incumbent upon the court to conduct a separate hearing upon the question of its admissibility even without a specific request therefore, citing People v. Jackson, 31 Ill.2d 408, 202 N.E.2d 465. The State concedes this procedure is ordinarily required but argues that since '* * * the trial judge, sitting without a jury, did hear all the evidence he should have heard on a 'voluntariness' hearing * * * ...
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