People v. Terry-Outlaw
| Docket Number | 360457 |
| Decision Date | 31 August 2023 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TRAVON DONTRELL TERRY-OUTLAW, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Berrien Circuit Court LC No. 2021-001489-FH
Before: Yates, P.J., and Borrello and Patel, JJ.
Defendant appeals by leave granted[1] a trial court order denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence found pursuant to a traffic stop. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence found in violation of the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.[2] For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.
The facts in this case are largely not in dispute; what is in dispute are the legal implications arising from the facts.
In the early morning hours of May 13, 2021, Michigan State Police Trooper Shay Wresinski watched defendant stop at a stop sign and then aggressively accelerate through the intersection exceeding the speed limit. The trooper initiated a traffic stop and found defendant in the driver's seat of the vehicle with two additional occupants seated in the front passenger seat and the back seat.[3]
Trooper Wresinski asked defendant if any drugs, alcohol, or weapons were present in the vehicle. Defendant responded that there were none. The trooper walked back to his patrol car and conducted a Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN) search, which indicated that defendant had an outstanding bench warrant for his arrest for failure to appear for assault charges. Trooper Wresinski detained defendant in front of his patrol vehicle. Defendant inquired if he could pay the trooper his bond, to which Trooper Wresinski stated he could not take payment for $20,000. Because the other occupants did not have valid driver's licenses, Trooper Wresinski told defendant that he planned to tow defendant's vehicle. Defendant called his mother and indicated at some point that his mother was on the way to the scene to pick up the car.
Trooper Wresinski asked for permission to search the car. Defendant declined consent. During this conversation, Trooper Wresinski smelled the odor of alcohol on defendant. Trooper Wresinski approached defendant's car and asked the other occupants to exit the vehicle. As the passengers got out, Trooper Wresinski saw an open container of alcohol in the rear passenger area. Trooper Wresinski conducted a search of the passenger compartment and found "several individually packaged baggies of marijuana" under the front passenger seat. Trooper Wresinski thought that the quantity of marijuana found was a legal amount to possess, however, based on his training and experience, Trooper Wresinski believed that the manner of packaging suggested an intent to distribute rather than an intent to use for personal consumption. Trooper Wresinski proceeded to search the trunk of the vehicle for additional alcohol or marijuana without a warrant. In the trunk he found a loaded, AR-style pistol. Shortly thereafter, defendant's mother arrived on the scene and took the vehicle. The county prosecutor charged defendant with carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, for the firearm seized from the trunk of the vehicle.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to suppress evidence found in the car. Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Notably, the trial court relied on caselaw applying the automobile exception,[4] but the trial court stated it denied the motion because "the search was valid incident to taking the defendant into custody on a valid warrant . . . ."
Defendant now appeals.[5]
This Court reviews a trial court's factual findings in a suppression hearing for clear error. People v. Attebury, 463 Mich. 662, 668; 624 N.W.2d 912 (2001). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake. People v. Franklin, 500 Mich. 92, 100; 894 N.W.2d 561 (2019). This Court reviews constitutional questions de novo. People v. Hughes, 506 Mich. 512, 522; 958 N.W.2d 98 (2020). Likewise, this Court reviews a trial court's ultimate ruling at a suppression hearing de novo. People v. Pagano, 507 Mich. 26, 31; 967 N.W.2d 590 (2021).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees to the people the right to be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const, Am IV. The Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 11, generally provides the same protections as those secured by the Fourth Amendment. People v. Slaughter, 489 Mich. 302, 310-311; 803 N.W.2d 171 (2011). Whether suppression of evidence seized through an unconstitutional search is appropriate in a given case pursuant to the exclusionary rule is a separate question from whether the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591-592; 126 S.Ct. 2159; 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006); People v. Goldston, 470 Mich. 523, 529, 538, 541; 682 N.W.2d 479 (2004).
The constitutionality of a search or seizure ultimately depends upon its reasonableness. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171-172; 128 S.Ct. 1598; 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008); People v. Moorman, 331 Mich.App. 481, 485; 952 N.W.2d 597 (2020). "Searches or seizures conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable, subject to several well-delineated exceptions," and demonstrating that a search complied with the Fourth Amendment therefore requires the police to "show either that they had a warrant or that their conduct fell within one of the narrow, specific exceptions to the warrant requirement." Moorman, 331 Mich.App. at 485. See also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338; 129 S.Ct. 1710; 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) () (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In this case, it is undisputed that the search of defendant's vehicle was conducted without a search warrant. The trial court found that the search was valid, apparently because an exception to the warrant requirement applied, but the precise exception on which the trial court relied is unclear from the record. As previously noted, the trial court relied on caselaw applying the automobile exception but nonetheless reasoned that "the search was valid incident to taking the defendant into custody on a valid warrant . . . ."
On appeal, defendant asserts that the search was not permissible under a variety of theories. First, defendant maintains that he has "standing" to challenge the search in this case even though he was driving a rental car. As defendant notes, the United States Supreme Court has held that "as a general rule, someone in otherwise lawful possession and control of a rental car has a reasonable expectation of privacy in it even if the rental agreement does not list him or her as an authorized driver." Byrd v. United States,___US___,___; 138 S.Ct. 1518, 1524; 200 L.Ed.2d 805 (2018).[6]
However, it does not appear that defendant's standing to challenge the search is contested. Moreover, the concept of "standing" in the Fourth Amendment context is not distinct from the merits of the alleged Fourth Amendment claim and is merely "a useful shorthand for capturing the idea that a person must have a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest in the place searched before seeking relief for an unconstitutional search . . . ." Byrd,___US at___; 138 S.Ct. at 1530. So-called Fourth Amendment standing is" 'more properly subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine.'" Id., quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139; 99 S.Ct. 421; 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). See also People v. Mead, 503 Mich. 205, 213 n 2; 931 N.W.2d 557 (2019) () (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140) (ellipses in original). "Because Fourth Amendment standing is subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine, it is not a jurisdictional question and hence need not be addressed before addressing other aspects of the merits of a Fourth Amendment claim." Byrd,___US at___; 138 S.Ct. at 1530.
Here, defendant argues that under Byrd,___ US at___; 138 S.Ct. at 1524, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car that he was driving. However, the trial court never ruled that defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle or that defendant lacked so-called Fourth Amendment standing. The trial court instead determined that the search was constitutional because an exception to the warrant requirement applied. Moorman, 331 Mich.App. at 485.
Hence, although defendant appears to be correct that he has Fourth Amendment standing, this argument does not demonstrate any basis on which we could grant him appellate relief. Thus, we now turn our attention to the exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Defendant is correct in arguing on appeal that the search did not fall within the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest exception.
Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a search of an...
To continue reading
Request your trial