People v. the Bd. of Commissioners of The Ill.

• Citation: 3 Scam. 153,4 Ill. 153,1841 WL 3279
• Parties: The People, ex relatione Richard J. Hamilton,v.The Board of Commissioners of the Illinois and Michigan Canal.
• Decision Date: 31 December 1841
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

3 Scam. 153

4 Ill. 153

1841 WL 3279 (Ill.)

The People, ex relatione Richard J. Hamilton,

v.The Board of Commissioners of the Illinois and Michigan Canal.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

December Term, 1841.

Application for a Writ of Mandamus.

In construing statutes, we should look at the real object and intention of the law-makers, as gathered from an examination and comparison of the context of the whole act,--its spirit, and import. ^a

If it is apparent, that, by a particular construction of a statute, in a doubtful case, great public interests would be endangered or sacrificed, it ought not to be presumed that such construction was intended by the legislature. ^b

It is not the province of a court to decide upon the expediency and propriety of a statute, but to ascertain its just, reasonable, and true construction; and when this is satisfactorily ascertained, it has only to pronounce the decision.

An assignee of a certificate of purchase of a canal lot in Chicago or Ottawa, in 1836, is entitled to all the rights of the original purchaser, and he may, under the “Act for the relief of the purchasers of canal lots in Chicago and Ottawa, in 1836,” apply the payments made on such lot, in part payment of any lot purchased by himself, and forfeited for non-compliance with the conditions of purchase; and it is the duty of the board of canal commissioners to allow such application; and, in case of refusal, a writ of mandamus will be granted against them.

This cause was submitted upon an agreed statement of facts, made by J. Young Scammon, counsel for the relator, and I. N. Morris, president of the board of commissioners of the Illinois and Michigan canal, by which it appeared that the relator was the purchaser of lot four (4) in block two (2), in the original town of Chicago, at the canal sale in 1836, and had made partial payment therefor, but had forfeited the lot by failing to make the subsequent payments, according to the terms of sale. That Henry G. Hubbard was also a purchaser at said sale, of other lots in said town, which he had in like manner forfeited. That Hubbard had assigned his certificates of purchase to Hamilton, and Hamilton had tendered to the treasurer of the board the payment for said lot four (4), by applying the payments made by Hubbard upon said lots purchased by him, with other payments, upon said lot four (4), and had at the same time offered to relinquish the lots purchased by Hubbard. That the treasurer and the board refused to permit him to make such application, or to pay for said lot by the application of the payments made by Hubbard.

The agreed case also stipulated that the questions in difference should be submitted to the final decision of this court, without the issuing or serving of a rule to show cause, or of an alternative mandamus, and that upon the determination of the matter in controversy, by this court, a peremptory writ of mandamus should issue to the defendants, provided the case was a proper one for the issuing of a writ of mandamus, and provided the law was with the relator. It was further stipulated and agreed, that the only question to be adjudicated by the court, was as to the right of said relator to apply the payments made by said Hubbard, upon the lot selected by said relator, and in part payment therefor, under the statute.

J. Young Scammon, for the relator.

L. Trumbull and I. N. Morris, for the defendants.

SMITH, Justice, delivered the opinion of the court:

This case is submitted by the parties to the court, for its decision on the statement of facts contained in an agreed case.

It is an application for a writ of peremptory mandamus, against the canal commissioners, to compel them to allow the relator to make a selection of a certain lot, to wit, number four (4) in block number two (2), in the original town of Chicago, heretofore purchased by the relator, at a public sale of lots, in that town; and to apply certain certificates of purchase of other lots, in said town, and payments made thereon, by himself, as, also, four other certificates of payment, made by another person, which have been bona fide assigned to the relator; and for such commissioners to accept and receive the same, on the relator's relinquishing all his title to the lots specified in the three other certificates of his purchase, and of the four assigned certificates, under the act entitled, “An act for the relief of purchasers of canal lots in Chicago and Ottawa, in 1836,” approved 27th of February, 1841; ¹ and further, to direct, in pursuance of the said act, a patent to be procured and delivered by the commissioners to the relator. It is mutually agreed to, and stipulated, by the parties of the case, that the only question to be decided is, as to the right of the relator to apply the payments, made by his assignor, to the lot selected by him, and in part payment thereof.

The better to understand the character of the application and its merits, it will be necessary to briefly recite the provisions of the act. The first section declares that all persons who have, heretofore, purchased any of the property belonging to the canal, any of the canal lands, or of any of the lots in any town sold by the authority of the state; and who have made advances to the state, by way of payment for the same; and who have, by any means, forfeited the same, by not complying with the other stipulations of the contract, shall be entitled to the relief hereinafter granted, upon the conditions hereinafter mentioned, to wit: every person who has paid any money upon such purchases shall first ascertain the amount, from the proper authority; and next he shall have or procure to be described the particular lot or land upon which payment shall have been made; and shall be allowed the right to select so much of his original purchase, at his option, as the said payments will cover, deducting from the original price stipulated for 33 1/3 per centum.

The second section provides that the purchaser shall relinquish all claim to the lots or lands which he does not choose to purchase (that is, to complete the payment on deducting 33 1/3 per cent), and, in writing, make his selection known to the board of canal commissioners, who are directly authorized and required to procure and deliver to such purchaser a deed or patent for the lands or lots, agreeably to the laws in force for patenting lands and lots sold by the canal commissioners.

The third section provides that, if any balance shall be due by the purchaser, that the same shall be paid; but if there is a balance due to the purchaser, after his selection, and application of payments, then it shall be liquidated by a further conveyance, by the commissioners, of other lands or lots, originally sold, at the original price, deducting 33 1/3 per cent.

The fourth section declares in what manner the division or subdivision of lots may be made.

The fifth section provides that payments may be placed on land other than town lots, though this provision is supposed to have been rendered nugatory by the proviso to the seventh section of the act, which confines the act to the town lots of Chicago and Ottawa.

The sixth section requires a record of the proceedings had under the act to be kept by the commissioners, and a report to be made to the general assembly.

The seventh section declares, in these words, that “the rights of the purchasers, under the provisions of this act, may be the subject of transfer, in writing, signed by the purchaser, or his legal representative, which shall be filed and recorded by the board.”

This is an analysis of the whole act.

Before proceeding to an examination of the rights conferred on the purchasers, and the duties required by the commissioners, under the several provisions of the act applicable to the present case, it may not be improper to inquire whether, if the commissioners, in the execution of their duties under the act, had allowed parties who were original purchasers, and who had made their payments of installments as they became due, according to contract, and who were not in default, and had not in any way incurred a forfeiture, by not complying with the stipulations of the contract, to avail themselves of the full benefits of the act, such a decision would have been against the equitable construction of the act. It is true it would have been out of the letter of the act, for the first section requires that these facts shall concur, to entitle the party to the benefit of the law:

First. That he shall be an original purchaser of a lot.

Second. That he shall have made advances by way of payment for the same.

Third. That he shall have forfeited the lot purchased, by not complying “with the other stipulations of the contract,” beyond the first payment. Now, the party who had punctually and in good faith observed the performance of his contract, is not recognized, by the letter of the act, as one of the persons for whose benefit the act was adopted; yet it would be repugnant to every principle of equity and exact justice to exclude him from a participation in its equitable objects.

It could not have been intended that he who had been unable to complete his engagement, or unwillingly neglected its performance, should alone reap the beneficent provisions contemplated by its framers, and intended to be conferred alike on the purchasers of the property sold by the state, at a price admitted to have been greatly beyond its real value, at the time of sale; while it is certain that a construction admitting a party, in such a case, to participate in the benefits of the law, could not be rested on its letter; the spirit, intention and equity of its provisions would abundantly sustain the propriety of such a decision. The relief was not intended to be partial, and confined to those alone who had forfeited their titles. Its objects were broad and comprehensive, and it was intended that all purchasers should participate equally in its liberality....