People v. Thingvold

• Decision Date: 22 November 1989
• Docket Number: No. 2-88-0410,2-88-0410
• Citation: 191 Ill.App.3d 144,547 N.E.2d 657
• Parties: , 138 Ill.Dec. 490 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond THINGVOLD, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 657

547 N.E.2d 657

191 Ill.App.3d 144, 138 Ill.Dec. 490

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond THINGVOLD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-88-0410.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Second District.

Nov. 22, 1989.

Mary Robinson (argued), Robinson & Skelnik, Elgin, for Raymond Thingvold.

Paul A. Logli, Winnebago County State's Atty., Rockford, William L. Browers, Deputy Director, Marshall M. Stevens (argued), State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutors, Elgin, for People.

Justice McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Raymond Thingvold, was charged by information with the offense of solicitation (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 8-1). He allegedly solicited George Nalan over a period of time to arrange the murder of defendant's wife, Barbara Thingvold. He was found guilty and sentenced to a prison term of 25 years.

Defendant initially attacks the sufficiency of the information under which he was charged, contending that it failed to properly allege that the offense occurred within the applicable statute-of-limitations period or to adequately plead an exception to the statute. We disagree.

A prosecution for the offense of solicitation must commence within three years of the commission of the crime. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 3-5(b).) When the offense is based on a series of acts performed at different times, the limitation period starts when the last such act is committed. Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 3-8.

The information in this case was filed on June 25, 1987. However, it charged that defendant committed the offense of solicitation "between the dates of December 1, 1983 and * * * the 30th day of April, 1986," and that the offense was "being based upon a series of acts performed at different times." The information also specifically referred to section 3-8 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 3-8). The period of December 1, 1983, through June 24, 1984, is clearly outside the three-year statutory boundary. The State argues that it has remedied the problem by alleging that defendant's offense is a series of acts committed in a period of time which ended within the limitation period. Therefore, the entire series of defendant's actions would be within the statute of limitations.

Nowhere, however, does the information allege that any of defendant's actions were performed within the limitation period. No facts are alleged that even the last of the series of acts occurred after June 24, 1984. Defendant cites as controlling in this situation People v. Toolen (1983), 116 Ill.App.3d 632, 72 Ill.Dec. 41, 451 N.E.2d 1364. In Toolen, the indictment alleged that criminal conduct occurred between " 'January 1, 1979 and October, 1980.' " (Toolen, 116 Ill.App.3d at 653, 72 Ill.Dec. 41, 451 N.E.2d 1364.) However, the first month of that period lay outside the limitation period. The indictment alleged no facts to establish that the last of a series of acts occurred any time after the first month. The court there ruled that the failure to allege such facts rendered the indictment insufficient to charge an offense. Toolen, 116 Ill.App.3d at 653, 72 Ill.Dec. 41, 451 N.E.2d 1364.

We are not persuaded by the reasoning in Toolen. Our supreme court has held that if a charging document does not allege that the crime was committed within the period fixed by the statute of limitations, facts must be alleged and proved which would toll the running of the statute under the various provisions, including section 3-8. (People v. Strait (1978), 72 Ill.2d 503, 505-06, 21 Ill.Dec. 365, 381 N.E.2d 692.) The grounds on which the State seeks to toll the statute should be stated in the information with sufficient specificity to enable defendant to defend against them. (Strait, 72 Ill.2d at 506, 21 Ill.Dec. 365, 381 N.E.2d 692.) We conclude that the information in the case before us was sufficiently explicit to enable defendant to prepare his defense and to apprise him that the last act occurred within the time prescribed by the statute of limitations. The information alleges the applicability of section 3-8, which places defendant on notice that he is being charged with a series of actions in the period shown. The fact that no one particular act was alleged to have occurred within the limitation period is not fatal. In addition, the court instructed the jury that, to sustain the charge of solicitation, the State must prove, among other things, "[t]hat the defendant * * * encouraged or requested George Nalan on at least one occasion within three years prior to April 23, 1987." Thus, defendant could not be convicted if the State could not prove that at least one of the alleged actions took place within the limitation period. We conclude that the information adequately charged defendant and allowed him to prepare his defense. Therefore, the judgment will not be reversed on this basis.

Defendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing testimony of three men who claimed that defendant also solicited them to kill his two wives.

Roger Atkinson testified that, between 1974 and 1976, defendant on more than one occasion brought up the possibility of having his wife at that time, Diane, killed. Atkinson, defendant, and possibly other co-workers discussed methods of killing Diane so that defendant could collect a large insurance settlement. In addition, Atkinson testified that defendant asked him if he knew anyone that would do the job, to which he replied in the negative. Defendant and Diane were divorced in 1978.

Sid Haffendon, a former co-worker of defendant for several years, testified that, between 1980 and 1986, defendant and he discussed killing defendant's second wife, Barbara, numerous times. Haffendon testified that defendant tried to enlist his aid in transmitting money to a hired killer on several occasions and offered him financial incentives, such as a new car and a partnership in a business venture, to get involved. Defendant had even chosen the method with which to kill her; since Mrs. Thingvold had undergone a stomach operation, a stab wound to the stomach would most likely cause her to hemorrhage to death. According to Haffendon, defendant wanted to collect under the insurance policies on Mrs. Thingvold's life.

James Wagaman met defendant through Sid Haffendon, but was never more than a casual acquaintance of defendant. Wagaman testified that defendant approached him in 1983 in a grocery store and asked him to kill Barbara Thingvold. Again, defendant recommended stabbing Mrs. Thingvold in the stomach. According to Wagaman, defendant offered him $5,000 to do the deed. Wagaman also testified that defendant wanted the insurance money and was not happy with his wife.

In general, evidence of offenses other than those with which the defendant is charged is inadmissible. (People v. Romero (1977), 66 Ill.2d 325, 330, 5 Ill.Dec. 817, 362 N.E.2d 288.) However, evidence of other offenses may be admissible to show motive, intent, identity, absence of mistake or modus operandi. (Romero, 66 Ill.2d at 330, 5 Ill.Dec. 817, 362 N.E.2d 288.) Such evidence must be so clearly connected with the main issue that it tends to prove the accused guilty of the crime for which he is being tried. (People v. Wolfbrandt (1984), 127 Ill.App.3d 836, 846, 82 Ill.Dec. 771, 469 N.E.2d 305, overruled on other grounds sub nom. Daley v. Hett (1986), 113 Ill.2d 75, 99 Ill.Dec. 132, 495 N.E.2d 513.) The trial court must weigh the probative value of the evidence against the prejudicial effects, if any, of presenting the evidence. (People v. Senez (1980), 80 Ill.App.3d 1021, 1023, 36 Ill.Dec. 348, 400 N.E.2d 928.) The trial court's ruling as to the admissibility of such evidence will not be reversed absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. People v. King (1985), 140 Ill.App.3d 937, 941, 93 Ill.Dec. 445, 486 N.E.2d 978.

The trial court allowed the testimony of Atkinson as proof of motive or intent. Defendant argues that the testimony had no probative value on either issue because it was too remote in time and detail. While remoteness in time may decrease the probative value of evidence (King, 140 Ill.App.3d at 941, 93 Ill.Dec. 445, 486 N.E.2d 978), it does not necessarily preclude the use of evidence so removed in time. (See People v. Carter (1967), 38 Ill.2d 496, 232 N.E.2d 692.) In Carter, the supreme court approved the State's use of testimony concerning a crime allegedly committed by the defendant seven years after the crime for which he was on trial. (Carter, 38 Ill.2d 496, 232 N.E.2d 692.) In this case, the alleged solicitation of Atkinson occurred up to 11 years before the current charge of solicitation of George Nalan to kill Barbara Thingvold. Under Carter, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion because of the timing of the alleged other crime.

Defendant also argues that the testimony of Atkinson, Haffendon and Wagaman lacked sufficient probative value on the issues of intent and motive because it is remote factually. We disagree.

"Motive" is defined as "that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act." (Black's Law Dictionary 914 (5th ed. 1979).) All three of these witnesses and George Nalan testified that defendant mentioned the collection of life insurance proceeds as his reason for wanting his wives murdered. The collection of these proceeds was the common motive or stimulation behind defendant's solicitation of these men. This common motive sufficiently connects the alleged prior solicitations to that of George Nalan and tends to prove defendant guilty of soliciting Nalan. (See Wolfbrandt, 127 Ill.App.3d at 846, 82 Ill.Dec. 771, 469 N.E.2d 305.) Defendant points out that the testimony of Atkinson, Haffendon, and Wagaman provided no independent evidence of the insurance motive as established by evidence of actual insurance policies. Defendant testified, without contradiction, that Diane was covered by insurance worth...