People v. Thompson

Decision Date21 August 2013
Citation111 A.D.3d 56,970 N.Y.S.2d 620,2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 05707
PartiesThe PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Eugene THOMPSON, appellant.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Lynn W. L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Erin R. Collins and Kendra L. Hutchinson of counsel), for appellant.

Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Seth M. Lieberman of counsel), for respondent.

DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO, J.P., LEONARD B. AUSTIN, SANDRA L. SGROI, and ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.

MILLER, J.

Because we conclude that the defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to present a defense when the Supreme Court precluded him from offering evidence that the victim in this case, throughout the course of the one-year period following the crime, repeatedly and consistently identified another individual as the perpetrator, we reverse.

The victim in this case, an 81–year–old woman, was repeatedly struck over the head with a telephone by an intruder who entered her home on the night of July 24, 2006. Although the victim identified a man who lived down the street from her as the perpetrator, the police focused their investigation on her next-door neighbor—the defendant in this case. The defendant was eventually charged with burglary in the first degree and related offenses.

At the jury trial, the People presented testimony from the victim's neighbors, which indicated that the victim emerged from her home at about 10:45 p.m. on the night in question, bleeding heavily from her head and asking for someone to call the police. When asked “who did this to you?”, the victim responded, “my neighbor's husband.” The victim's clothing was soaked with blood. The defendant and three other individuals who rented apartments in the building next door to the victim's residence came outside to assist the victim. The defendant went back inside his building and brought the victim a glass of water and a wet rag, which he handed to her. Although the neighbors testified that they did not notice the defendant come into contact with the victim, one of the defendant's neighbors later testified that she observed spots on the back of the defendant's shirt and ear lobe which she thought could have been blood. After a neighbor called the 911 emergency telephone number, the victim sat on the stoop and told one of the neighbors, [m]y neighbor's husband did this to me.” Other neighbors similarly testified that the victim kept repeating the phrase “my neighbor's husband.”

When the police arrived about 10 minutes later, five or six people were congregated on the stoop. A police officer testified at trial that the victim told him that she was awakened from her sleep by a man who attempted to smother her with a pillow and repeatedly hit her over the head with a telephone. The police officer testified that the victim did not identify the defendant as the perpetrator. The victim was eventually transported to a hospital by ambulance.

The victim was interviewed at the hospital the next morning by the detective assigned to the case. The detective testified that the victim identified the man who attacked her as one of her neighbors, named Inderjeet Uppal, who lived on her block. The detective testified that the victim told him that Uppal struck her in the face with her telephone while she was asleep and attempted to suffocate her with her pillow. The detective testified that the victim told him that Uppal attempted to kill her because he had “some type of financial motive.”

The detective testified that he interviewed Uppal later that day. Uppal testified that he was “very close” with the victim, that his wife had a key to the victim's house, and that the victim told him that she had named him in her will about one year before the attack. Uppal testified that the victim spoke to him about her will “all the time,” and his wife stated that the victim had informed her that they would inherit the victim's house in the event of the victim's death. Uppal claimed that he was at home with his wife at the time of the attack. The detective testified that he reviewed surveillance footage depicting “approximately where Mr. Uppal lived” in the hour before the attack, but that the video had “no value” and did not show anyone entering or leaving the Uppals' residence. Although he lived only two or three houses away from the victim's home, Uppal did not come outside on the night of the attack because he did not observe any flashing lights or hear any sirens from the police vehicles or ambulances that responded. During his interview with Uppal, the detective asked him to take off his shirt to see whether his body bore any injuries consistent with a struggle. The detective observed red marks on Uppal's body, and there were scratches on his arms. Uppal claimed that he sustained theses injuries during the course of his employment.

The detective took photographs of Uppal and photographs of the defendant; the defendant did not have any marks on his body. The detective considered the defendant a suspect after an unrecorded interview with an individual who was not identified at the trial. The detective went to the defendant's apartment and was let inside by the defendant, whom the detective described as “very cooperative.” The detective testified that he observed spots on the back of the defendant's shirt and a small smudge on the outside of the kitchen door which the detective thought looked like blood. However, the detective did not take any pictures of the smudge, nor was it ever tested.

The detective returned to the hospital in the afternoon of the day after the attack, and showed the victim a photograph of Uppal and a photograph of the defendant. The detective testified that the victim identified Uppal as the attacker, stating [t]hat's the son of a bitch that tried to kill me.” The detective testified that the victim did not identify the defendant as the attacker. The detective was permitted to testify that the victim was “mistaken” when she identified Uppal as the perpetrator in the days after the attack.

Uppal was later arrested, but the detective testified that, in his opinion, Uppal was not the perpetrator, and the charges were later dropped. The defendant was subsequently arrested after one of the three stains on the back of the shirt he was wearing on the night of the incident tested consistent with the victim's DNA. The other two spots, although tested, were not found to be consistent with the victim's DNA. While in custody, the defendant made a statement that he had broken into the victim's home to steal some food, and that he had been confronted by the victim and pushed her to the ground before fleeing. The victim, whom the detective described as a former employee of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration who maintained her own home and garden, who did “all her own woodwork,” and who “paint[ed] her house,” never identified the defendant or otherwise accused him of being the perpetrator.

Although she was called by the People and testified at the grand jury proceedings, the victim was not available to testify at the trial due to her medical condition. In this regard, the People were permitted to adduce testimony from a doctor, deemed an expert in geriatric medicine, who opined that the victim suffered from “full dementia” and that she was incapable of testifying at the defendant's trial.

The People's expert was also permitted to state his opinion that the victim was suffering from dementia or delirium at the time she was hospitalized in the days after the attack. This opinion was reached on the basis of the “limited information” contained in the victim's hospital records. The People's expert nevertheless conceded that the hospital records indicated that the victim was not ordered to undergo a psychological consultation, which would have been the normal procedure if the medical personnel who treated her had observed any indication of confusion, dementia, or delirium. The hospital records showed that the victim was alert and oriented to the time, to her location, and to her person (commonly referred to as oriented “times three”), a finding inconsistent with dementia and confusion. The victim was discharged without restrictions and in stable condition two days after the attack.

However, the People's expert testified that it was possible that the victim's condition “fluctuated” and that she later became “much better.” The People's expert further testified that, based on his review of the victim's medical records from the summer and fall of 2007, about one year after the attack, the victim was suffering dementia at that time. He opined that, at the time he began treating the victim in February 2008, more than 1 1/2 years after the attack, she suffered from “full dementia.” The People's expert stated that an individual with full dementia had lost his or her cognitive functions, had no past or recent memories, did not know of his or her surroundings, and was totally confused.

After the close of the People's case, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that the victim had recorded the attack in her personal diary two days after the incident, and that she identified Uppal as the perpetrator and described his beard and other characteristics in even greater detail than provided in the detective's account of her hospital identification. The defendant also sought to introduce evidence that the victim had provided an identical account to the director of her senior center in the month after the incident, and that she had executed and sworn to an affidavit identifying Uppal as her assailant about one year later. Finally, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that the victim had subsequently removed Uppal from her will, and that the People had called the victim to testify before the grand jury but had specifically refused to ask her whether she could identify the perpetrator of the attack.

The People objected to the...

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