People v. Thompson, 89SA466

• Decision Date: 16 July 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89SA466,89SA466
• Citation: 793 P.2d 1173
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mack H. THOMPSON, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 1173

793 P.2d 1173

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mack H. THOMPSON, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 89SA466.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

July 16, 1990.

Norman S. Early, Jr., Dist. Atty., Nathan B. Coats, Chief Appellate Deputy Dist. Atty., Everett Engstrom, Deputy Dist. Atty., Denver, for plaintiff-appellant.

David F. Vela, State Public Defender, Virginia L. Grady, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellee.

Chief Justice ROVIRA delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The People bring this interlocutory appeal, pursuant to C.A.R. 4.1, to challenge an order by the Denver District Court granting the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from the defendant's motel room. We reverse.

I

On November 29, 1988, Denver police officials received information from a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent in Washington state that the defendant, Mack Thompson, was wanted pursuant to a fugitive warrant based upon a parole violation in the state of Washington. The agent provided a description of the defendant, indicated that he should be considered armed and dangerous, and stated that Thompson was registered at a motel under the name Jules White. Finally, the agent stated that Thompson was thought to be with two other men and a woman, all of whom were alleged to have been dealing heroin and cocaine from the motel.

Based upon this information, Bernard Montoya, and other Denver police officers, went to the motel and confirmed that a man fitting Thompson's description had registered under the name Jules White. The police arranged to have the defendant summoned to the front desk and then positioned themselves out of sight. As the defendant approached the desk, he observed the uniformed officers, and immediately fled back down the hall. He was apprehended in front of his room.

As the defendant was being apprehended, the door to his room opened and officers saw a woman who was later identified as Pamela Greer. They restrained her and made a cursory sweep of the room to insure that no one else was present. From the doorway, Montoya observed a plate containing a razor blade and a white substance, which he believed to be cocaine. Both the defendant and Greer were arrested and taken to the police station.

Two officers remained to secure the room while Montoya obtained a search warrant based upon his observations. The subsequent search of the room, conducted pursuant to the warrant, revealed two "false bottomed" canisters which contained 3.56 grams and 1.18 grams of cocaine, respectively. Thereafter, Thompson was charged with one count of unlawful distribution, manufacturing, dispensing, sale or possession of a controlled substance. § 18-18-105, 8B C.R.S. (1989 Supp.).

Following the defendant's arrest, Montoya obtained a teletype copy of the fugitive warrant from the National Crime Information Center computer. At this time, Montoya discovered that the warrant contained the notation "this warrant is entered into WACIC [Washington Crime Information Center] only. No extradition."

Prior to trial, Thompson moved to suppress the evidence seized from his motel room on the grounds that it was obtained as the result of an illegal arrest, and therefore should be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The trial court held that because the warrant was only entered into the Washington system it was not a valid warrant for an arrest in Colorado; the mistake was not within the "good faith" exception contained in section 16-3-308, 8A C.R.S. (1986); and that the officers did not have probable cause for a warrantless arrest at the time they seized the defendant. The trial court also made supplemental findings of fact in which it concluded that the officers "utilized that warrant as an absolute pretext for the arrest because they had other information about the defendant and did not seek a warrant as to the other information." Finally, the trial court found, for purposes of appeal, that if there was probable cause to arrest the defendant, then the protective sweep of the room was justified "to see if there was a weapon in the immediate vicinity."

II

The People contend that there was probable cause for the arrest of the defendant, based upon the officers' reasonable reliance on the outstanding fugitive warrant. It argues that the warrant was not invalidated by the "no extradition" provision it contained. Alternatively, the People assert that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable because the officers' conduct involved a "good faith mistake."

Colorado's extradition act authorizes the arrest of any person within this state pursuant to a warrant issued by a judge, upon the oath or affidavit of any credible person charging the accused with committing a crime in another state and having fled from that jurisdiction to this state. § 16-19-114, 8A C.R.S. (1986). The act also provides that:

The arrest of a person may be lawfully made also by any peace officer or a private person without a warrant upon reasonable information that the accused stands charged in the courts of a state with a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. When so arrested the accused must be taken before a judge with all practicable speed, and complaint must be made against him under oath setting forth the ground for arrest as in section 19-19-114; and thereafter his answer shall be heard as if he had been arrested on a warrant.

§ 16-19-115, 8A C.R.S. (1986).

To be valid, however, an arrest must be supported by probable cause. See, e.g., People v. Villiard, 679 P.2d 593 (Colo.1984). Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer are sufficient to warrant the belief by a reasonable and prudent person, in light of that person's training and experience, that an offense has been committed and the defendant committed it. See, e.g., People v. Roybal, 655 P.2d 410 (Colo.1982); People v. Vigil, 198 Colo. 185, 597 P.2d 567 (1979). Probable cause is determined based upon the information possessed by the officer at the time of the arrest. Just as an arrest may not be validated by subsequently acquired information, it is not invalidated by such subsequent events. State v. Cross, 164 N.J.Super. 368, 374, 396 A.2d 604, 606-07 (1978). In evaluating probable cause, w...