People v. Tierney, Docket No. 252185.

• Decision Date: 14 July 2005
• Docket Number: Docket No. 252185.
• Citation: 266 Mich. App. 687,703 N.W.2d 204
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven Edward TIERNEY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

703 N.W.2d 204

266 Mich. App. 687

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven Edward TIERNEY, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 252185.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted May 17, 2005, at Marquette.

Decided June 14, 2005, at 9:00 a.m.

Released for Publication August 25, 2005.

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Gary L. Walker, Prosecuting Attorney, and Cheryl L. Hill, Civil/Appellate Counsel, for the people.

State Appellate Defender (by Chari Grove), for the defendant.

Before: MURRAY, P.J., and O'CONNELL and DONOFRIO, JJ.

MURRAY, P.J.

I. Introduction

Defendant was convicted on two counts of first-degree, premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), for the ambush murder of two of his coworkers. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of right, challenging decisions made by the trial court both before and during the trial. After a thorough review of defendant's arguments, we conclude that the trial court did not err in any of its decisions. Consequently, we affirm.

Because the most significant and difficult legal issues raised by defendant relate to the trial court's rulings on several pre-trial motions, we will detail the testimony from the motion hearings. We will address the pertinent facts brought out at trial when relevant to defendant's claims of legal error alleged to have occurred during trial.

II. Motion Hearing Evidence

Before the trial, defendant filed a series of motions in limine seeking to suppress certain evidence, including his statements made to police officers before and during questioning on the night of February 15, 2003, and various pieces of physical evidence seized following his arrest. Defendant also sought a ruling on the admissibility of evidence regarding his mental state at the time he committed the charged crimes. Hearings were held on these motions over the course of five days, with the testimony establishing the following sequence of events.

On February 15, 2003, Michigan State Police Troopers Jonah Bonovetz and Jason Tasson learned that defendant was a suspect in the murders of Sally Paajanen and Craig Fleck, two of defendant's coworkers at a Michigan Department of Corrections prison facility. Accordingly, the troopers went to defendant's parents' home that evening to contact defendant. When they arrived at the home, they found defendant's truck in the driveway. The troopers observed a light on in the home and heard loud music coming from inside. Bonovetz approached the door of an enclosed porch and knocked, while Tasson went to the side of the house. When Bonovetz received no answer, he opened the unlocked porch door and crossed the porch to knock on the inner residence door, with Tasson following. Both troopers testified that the porch did not appear to be a living area. Looking through a window in the inner door as he knocked on it, Bonovetz saw a man, subsequently identified as defendant, sitting at the kitchen table with his back to the door, slumped over the table, a rifle and ammunition visible on the table next to his right hand. When defendant did not respond to loud knocking on the inner door, Bonovetz opened the unlocked door and walked into the kitchen. When Bonovetz opened the door, Tasson observed defendant slumped over the table with a rifle near his right hand.

As Bonovetz entered the kitchen and went to defendant's side, he announced the police officers' presence and called out defendant's name, at the same time moving the gun out of defendant's reach. Defendant lifted his head, looked at Bonovetz, and stated, "Just shoot me. I can't spend the rest of my life in prison. Let me kill myself." At that point, defendant was placed in handcuffs for his and the officers' safety. Defendant was read Miranda¹ warnings and was then held at his parents' house for approximately 3½ hours while Bonovetz and Tasson waited for additional officers to arrive. When Marquette County Sheriff's Officers Scott Johnson and Charles Custard, and Michigan State Police Trooper Walley Helmila arrived, one of them again read Miranda warnings to defendant, and the officers then questioned defendant for a number of hours.

Tasson and Bonovetz described defendant as intoxicated and depressed or suicidal, but not behaving as though he were crazy or mentally ill, or in need of medical assistance. Helmila, who knew defendant personally, explained that, although intoxicated, defendant was capable of carrying on a conversation, able to understand the questions asked of him, and did not appear delusional. Indeed, of all the police officers at the scene, only Johnson testified that defendant did not appear intoxicated. Helmila described how defendant twice made a comment about possibly wanting to talk to an attorney, but when asked whether he wanted to continue the interview, defendant twice told the police officers to continue asking questions. At the end of the questioning, Helmila wrote notes regarding the information received from defendant. Helmila and defendant then went over the notes so that defendant could clarify certain points.

According to the officers' testimonies, the porch was enclosed, with windows on the outer walls that were partially covered with blinds. There was no doorbell or knocker outside the outer door. The inner wall had windows into the house with lace curtains on them, and the inner door to the home was made of wood, with a window in it. A wooden welcome sign was hanging next to the inner house door. The porch appeared to be a storage area, rather than a living area or a place to spend time.

Defendant also produced several witnesses who testified about whether the enclosed porch was open to public entry or considered a private part of the home. Lorraine and John Elliott, defendant's mother and stepfather, testified that the family considered the porch to be private and a part of the residence itself. They stated that the outer porch door was locked at night, that a doormat was kept outside the outer door, and that people coming to the home, even close family members, were expected to knock on the outer door and not to enter the porch uninvited. Both insisted that the inner door was never locked, but both did admit that the inner door contained a working lock. They also admitted that there was no doorbell or knocker outside the outer door of the porch and that it was not always possible to hear people knocking on this door. They further admitted that the porch was used for storage, that it contained no heat vents, and that they did not spend much time in the porch.² On September 29, 2003, the trial court issued a thorough, well-reasoned opinion and order denying defendant's three motions. The trial court's rationale will be highlighted in the relevant sections below.

III. Analysis

A. Pretrial Decisions

i. The Police Officers' Entry Into the Enclosed Porch

We first address defendant's assertion that the statements and physical evidence obtained at the house should have been suppressed because they were obtained as a result of the police officers' unlawful entry into the enclosed porch of defendant's parents' home. This is a significant legal issue because, if defendant were correct, much of the evidence used to convict him would be inadmissible as obtained in violation of the Constitution. People v. Goldston, 470 Mich. 523, 528, 682 N.W.2d 479 (2004); People v. Stevens (After Remand), 460 Mich. 626, 633-634, 597 N.W.2d 53 (1999). It is likewise significant given the constitutional interest at stake.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.³

Relying upon longstanding precedent from the United States Supreme Court, our Court has continually recognized that "`"[a]t the very core`" of the Fourth Amendment "'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."'" People v. Bolduc, 263 Mich.App. 430, 439-440, 688 N.W.2d 316 (2004), quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001), quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961). Indeed, "`"physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed."'" Bolduc, supra at 440, 688 N.W.2d 316, quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). See, also, People v. Nunez, 242 Mich.App. 610, 621, 619 N.W.2d 550 (2000) (O'Connell, J., concurring).

That being the case, "`searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable,'" United States v. Martinez, 406 F.3d 1160, 1163 (C.A.9, 2005), quoting Payton, supra at 586 (citation deleted), because "the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house." Id. at 590. However, the United States Supreme Court has noted that an entry without a warrant may be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when there are diminished expectations of privacy or minimal intrusions by police officers. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001).

In addressing an issue similar to the one we face today, the Supreme Court of North Dakota recognized the ultimate question presented in light of the Payton Court's holding:

But, what or where is the threshold to a house? Where should the line be drawn when a house has an enclosed porch, vestibule, or entryway attached to the home? We must look at the reasonableness of each

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