People v. Till

• Decision Date: 30 November 1995
• Parties: , 661 N.E.2d 153 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Mike TILL, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 681

637 N.Y.S.2d 681

87 N.Y.2d 835, 661 N.E.2d 153

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Mike TILL, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 30, 1995.

APPEAL, by permission of a Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, from an order of that Court, entered July 28, 1994, which (1) reversed, on the law, a judgment of the Supreme Court (Robert G. Seewald, J., at hearing; Joseph A. Mazur, J., at trial and sentence), rendered in Bronx County upon a verdict convicting defendant of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and (2) remanded the matter for a new trial.

[87 N.Y.2d 836] Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, New York City (Desiree Dhir Sheridan, Joseph N. Ferdenzi and Susan L. Valle, of counsel), for appellant.

David Samel, New York City, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, and the case remitted to that Court in accordance with CPL 470.25(2)(d); 470.40(2)(b).

Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of criminal possession of a loaded weapon (Penal Law § 265.03). The guilty count factually evolved out of an uncharged armed street robbery that allegedly occurred around midnight in The Bronx. After the robbery, during the attempted escape that was proximate in time and location, defendant fired his weapon at an off-duty New York City Housing Authority police officer, who had observed facts that prompted him to intervene and pursue defendant.

The Appellate Division reversed the conviction on the law as to the weapons count, the only one on which the jury rendered a guilty verdict. The jury acquitted defendant of attempted murder and attempted assault. The majority nevertheless concluded as a matter of law both that the evidence was not relevant and that the testimony regarding the antecedent uncharged crime of robbery unduly and prejudicially outweighed any probative value of such evidence (201 A.D.2d 43). The dissenting Justice at the Appellate Division (201 A.D.2d, at 48) granted leave to appeal. We now reverse and remit.

A trial court may admit into evidence uncharged crimes when the evidence is relevant to a pertinent issue in the case other than a defendant's criminal propensity to commit the crime charged. Even then, such evidence is admissible only upon a trial court finding that its probative value for the jury outweighs the risk of undue prejudice to the defendant (see, People v. Chase, 85 N.Y.2d 493, 502, 626 N.Y.S.2d 721, 650 N.E.2d 379; People v. Carter, 77 N.Y.2d 95, 107, 564 N.Y.S.2d 992, 566 N.E.2d 119; People v. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40, 55, 538 N.Y.S.2d 197, 535 N.E.2d 250; People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 525 N.Y.S.2d 7, 519 N.E.2d 808). People v. Molineux (168 N.Y. 264, 293, 61 N.E. 286) prescribes the litany of exceptions that allow uncharged crimes into evidence, under exceptional circumstances, with limiting cautionary instructions. As a corollary, such evidence may be allowed when, as here, it bears on the motive and state of mind in relation to an avoidance of apprehension during immediate flight from a crime and is found to be "needed as background material" (People v. Montanez, 41 N.Y.2d 53, 58, 390 N.Y.S.2d 861, 359 N.E.2d 371) or to "complete the narrative of the episode" (People v. Gines, 36 N.Y.2d 932, 932-933, 373 N.Y.S.2d 543, 335 N.E.2d 850; see also, People v. Morse, 196 N.Y. 306, 310, 89 N.E. 816; People v. Governale, 193 N.Y. 581, 587, 86...