People v. Todd

• Decision Date: 25 September 1997
• Docket Number: No. 80124,80124
• Citation: 687 N.E.2d 998,227 Ill.Dec. 516,178 Ill.2d 297
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: , 227 Ill.Dec. 516 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Robert TODD, Appellant.

Page 998

687 N.E.2d 998

178 Ill.2d 297, 227 Ill.Dec. 516

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Robert TODD, Appellant.

No. 80124.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 25, 1997.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 1, 1997.

State Appellate Defender, Supreme Court Unit, Springfield, John Paul Carroll, John Paul Carroll & Associates, Naperville, for Robert Todd.

Jim Ryan, Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Div., State's Attorney Clinton County, Carlyle, Steven R. Splitt, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, for the People.

Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, Robert Todd, brings this appeal from an order of the circuit court of Clinton County denying his amended petition for post-conviction relief. Because the defendant received the death sentence for the underlying first degree murder conviction, the present appeal lies directly to this court. 134 Ill.2d R. 651(a).

Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Clinton County, the defendant was convicted of the first degree murder and attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault of Sandy Shelton. The trial judge, in a bench proceeding, sentenced the defendant to death for the first degree murder conviction. On appeal, this court affirmed the defendant's convictions and death sentence. People v. Todd, 154 Ill.2d 57, 180 Ill.Dec. 676, 607 N.E.2d 1189 (1992). The United States Supreme Court denied the defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. Todd v. Illinois, 510 U.S. 944, 114 S.Ct. 381, 126 L.Ed.2d 331 (1993).

The defendant instituted the present action on May 2, 1994, by filing a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in the circuit court of Clinton County. Counsel was later appointed to assist the defendant, and the defendant subsequently filed an amended post-conviction petition, raising a number of allegations of constitutional error in the original proceedings. The State moved to dismiss the petition without an evidentiary hearing. The circuit judge granted the defendant an evidentiary hearing on two of the issues raised in the amended post-conviction petition; the judge believed that the remaining claims either were waived or had been determined by this court on direct appeal. Following the evidentiary hearing, the circuit judge denied the defendant's amended petition. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

The evidence of the defendant's offenses was described in our opinion on direct appeal, and only a brief summary of the trial testimony is necessary here. The defendant and the victim were seen together at two bars, one in Carlyle and one in Beckemeyer, late on July 11, 1989, and early the following morning. At the second bar, in Beckemeyer, a bartender provided the defendant with a marker so that he could write on the wall, a practice customers were encouraged to take part in. There, the victim purchased a six-pack of beer, and she and the defendant then left together.

Scott Nielson, who had been a cellmate with the defendant in the Clinton County jail, testified to a statement made to him by the defendant about the present offenses. According to Nielson, the defendant said that he met a woman in a bar, where they had a beer, and that they then went to another bar, where they danced and had a couple of drinks. The defendant signed his name under the woman's name on the wall of one of the bars. They later bought some beer and went to the woman's house, in Beckemeyer. The defendant told Nielson that the woman put a Bob Seger tape in a tape player. After the two drank for awhile, the defendant made advances toward the woman, and she rebuffed him. The defendant then got up, used the bathroom, and got another can of beer from the kitchen. The defendant returned and made more overtures, which the woman again declined, pushing him away. According to Nielson, the defendant said that he then slapped the woman and blacked out. His next memory was of being at a convenience store later that morning.

Two persons saw the defendant's car between 2:30 and 3 a.m. on July 12 at the building in Carlyle where the defendant was renting an apartment. The car drove up to the building quickly, went over the curb, and stopped on the grass. The driver, whom the witnesses were unable to identify, made several trips inside the building, returning to his car with armloads of things, and then drove off.

Other testimony showed that the Pana police department received a telephone call at 8:25 a.m. on July 12 reporting that a woman who drove a Cordoba automobile had been murdered in Beckemeyer. An employee at a convenience store in Pana testified that the defendant came into the store around 8:15 and asked for change so that he could make a telephone call. A pay phone was located outside the store, and the police station was across the street.

The victim's daughter discovered her mother's body around 11 a.m. on July 12. The victim was lying on the floor and was naked. A shirt was wrapped tightly around her neck. The victim's daughter noticed a strong odor of natural gas, and found that the burners on the gas stove were turned on. Candles were burning in several rooms of the house. The cause of the victim's death was later determined to be strangulation; she had also been stabbed five times in the side. Vegetable oil had been spread on the victim, and drops of wax had been placed over that. One hundred dollars in cash was found in the pocket of the victim's jeans, which were lying near her body. Tests for the presence of semen and sperm were negative. In addition, a number of hairs were found on the victim, but none of them could be linked to the defendant; most of the hairs were from the victim herself. Other forensic testimony, however, established that the defendant's fingerprint and bare footprint and several shoeprints were found in the victim's house. Also, wax consistent with that found on the victim's body was discovered in the defendant's shower. In addition, a Bob Seger tape was later found in the victim's tape player, corroborating Nielson's account of the defendant's statement to him. The defendant's name was found under the victim's name on the wall of the bar where the defendant had requested a marker and where the defendant and the victim had been seen together. Also, the victim drove a Cordoba, as the caller to the Pana police department had stated. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge found the defendant guilty of first degree murder and attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault.

A capital sentencing hearing was subsequently conducted. At the hearing, the State established the defendant's eligibility for the death penalty on the basis of two aggravating circumstances: first degree murder in the course of robbery, and first degree murder in the course of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault. At the second stage of the sentencing hearing, the State presented aggravating evidence from several witnesses. The defendant's former wife testified that the defendant had a bad temper and was occasionally violent. A former employer testified that the defendant was fired from his job at a facility for mentally retarded persons because he had used excessive force with two patients. A young woman described her encounter with the defendant a day before the offenses, when the defendant, whom she had not previously met, stopped to help her with her car and then attempted to touch and kiss her. The woman also testified that she declined the defendant's invitation to go to his apartment. The defense presented mitigating testimony from a number of the defendant's family members and friends. We will discuss the evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing in greater detail later in this opinion.

I

The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 through 122-7 (West 1994)) permits an offender to challenge a conviction or sentence for violations of federal or state constitutional rights. People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill.2d 472, 480, 215 Ill.Dec. 59, 662 N.E.2d 1199 (1996); People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill.2d 148, 157, 204 Ill.Dec. 147, 641 N.E.2d 371 (1994). An action for post-conviction relief is a collateral proceeding, not an appeal from the underlying criminal judgment. People v. Brisbon, 164 Ill.2d 236, 242, 207 Ill.Dec. 442, 647 N.E.2d 935 (1995); People v. Free, 122 Ill.2d 367, 377, 119 Ill.Dec. 325, 522 N.E.2d 1184 (1988). "The function of a post-conviction proceeding is not to relitigate the defendant's guilt or innocence but to determine whether he was denied constitutional rights. [Citation.]" People v. Shaw, 49 Ill.2d 309, 311, 273 N.E.2d 816 (1971). To obtain post-conviction relief, a defendant must establish a substantial deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights in the proceedings that produced the judgment being challenged. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994); People v. Guest, 166 Ill.2d 381, 389, 211 Ill.Dec. 490, 655 N.E.2d 873 (1995). Considerations of res judicata and waiver limit the scope of post-conviction review "to constitutional matters which have not been, and could not have been, previously adjudicated." People v. Winsett, 153 Ill.2d 335, 346, 180 Ill.Dec. 109, 606 N.E.2d 1186 (1992). Accordingly, rulings on issues that were previously raised at trial or on direct appeal are res judicata, and issues that could have been raised in the earlier proceedings, but were not, will normally be deemed waived. People v. Coleman, 168 Ill.2d 509, 522, 214 Ill.Dec. 212, 660 N.E.2d 919 (1995); People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill.2d 1, 9, 138 Ill.Dec. 201, 547 N.E.2d 170 (1989). Principles of fundamental fairness, however, will support relaxation of the res judicata and waiver doctrines when appropriate. People v. Neal, 142 Ill.2d 140, 146, 154 Ill.Dec. 587, 568 N.E.2d 808 (1990). With these considerations in mind, we now turn to the issues raised by the defendant in this appeal from the circuit court's denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant first argues that trial couns...