People v. Tortorici

• Decision Date: 18 February 1999
• Parties: , 709 N.E.2d 87, 1999 N.Y. Slip Op. 1448 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ralph J. TORTORICI, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 346

686 N.Y.S.2d 346

92 N.Y.2d 757, 709 N.E.2d 87, 1999

N.Y. Slip Op. 1448

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ralph J. TORTORICI, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 18, 1999.

Crane, Greene & Parente, Albany (Kathryn M. Kase of counsel), for appellant.

Sol Greenberg, District Attorney of Albany County, Albany (Christopher D. Horn of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Chief Judge KAYE.

Article 730 of the Criminal Procedure Law sets out the procedures courts of this State must follow in order to prevent the criminal trial of a defendant "who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense" (CPL 730.10[1] ). The central issue on this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion as a matter of law by failing, on its own, to order a competency hearing under article 730. We hold that it did not, and therefore affirm the order of the Appellate Division, which reached the same conclusion.

I.

On the morning of December 14, 1994, defendant, armed with a semi-automatic rifle and a hunting knife, held a classroom of students hostage in a lecture hall at the State University of New York at Albany. During the two-hour ordeal, defendant made numerous threats and demanded the presence of various university and public officials. He claimed that he was the victim of an experiment in which a microchip was implanted in his brain, and wanted to expose the people responsible for victimizing him. The standoff concluded when several hostages overpowered defendant. During the struggle, defendant shot and seriously injured one hostage, and wounded another with his knife.

The following day, after defendant's arraignment, Albany City Court ordered an examination pursuant to CPL article 730 to determine whether defendant was competent to stand trial. After reviewing the reports of two psychiatric examiners, the court determined that defendant was incapacitated. The court issued a temporary order of observation, pursuant to which defendant was committed to the Mid-Hudson Psychiatric Center (see, CPL 730.40). According to Mid-Hudson records, when defendant was admitted, he was "irritable, easily angered and tense." His judgment was "severely impaired" and "[h]is insight into his troubles was nil." Defendant suffered from delusions "that 'a chip' was implanted in his brain and he has a fiberoptic antenna and the government was experimenting on him." Defendant was diagnosed with alcohol abuse, cocaine-induced psychotic disorder with delusions and paranoid personality disorder.

Despite these problems, the Mid-Hudson records reveal that defendant "showed steady improvement in all areas in a rather short time." After two months of counseling--defendant was not given any medication--a Mid-Hudson psychiatrist reported that defendant appeared "rational and logical in speech and thought," was "very cooperative to the interview situations" and "was able to follow the rules and regulations of the hospital." The psychiatrist further found that defendant had "above average intelligence," as well as "satisfactory knowledge of courtroom procedure and the duties of court officials. He knows his lawyer * * * and he feels very sorry about what he did but knows he cannot change the consequences. He states he is going to go along with his lawyer's suggestions."

Accordingly, Mid-Hudson's director certified defendant fit to proceed and return to court, and defendant was discharged from Mid-Hudson on March 20, 1995. A Grand Jury indicted defendant on 15 counts. ¹

From the time of his arraignment on the indictment on March 20, 1995 until the start of jury selection on January 3, 1996 (five days before the trial opened), the Trial Judge had several opportunities to observe defendant's interaction with his lawyer and understanding of the trial process. While in Albany County Court for his arraignment, defendant responded to the Judge's greeting and request for defendant's date of birth. At a suppression hearing held on November 16, 1995, defendant expressed his desire to be absent from that hearing. In order to determine whether the waiver of the right to be present was voluntarily and knowingly made, the court questioned defendant and his attorney as follows:

"MR. LYNCH [defense counsel]: * * * I have discussed it with my client. There is no particular need for his personal appearance. * * * I would move that Mr. Tortorici's request that he waive his physical presence as distinguished from his legal presence through me be granted. * * *

"THE COURT: Mr. Tortorici do you understand the words I'm using? Mr. Tortorici * * * I'm directing it to you. Do you understand what Mr. Lynch--

"THE DEFENDANT: I speak English, Judge. I don't desire to be present. I made that point clear. That is all.

"THE COURT: Mr. Lynch has spoken with you with regard to your personal presence being dispensed with at this pretrial hearing.

"THE DEFENDANT: I do not desire to be present. No further comments."

After receiving further assurances from defendant's lawyer that he had explained to defendant his right to be present, and that defendant expressed his desire not to attend the hearing, the court granted defendant's request.

In a letter dated December 27, 1995, defendant's lawyer advised the court that defendant also wished to waive his right to be present throughout the trial. The letter stated:

"As the Court is well aware, the defendant has previously been found fit to proceed with trial. He has clearly indicated to me the desire to be absent during the trial. He has consistently maintained a position of refusing to actively participate in the proceedings. He has directed me to proceed with the presentation of the defense, inclusive of the defense that he is not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. * * *

"Please be advised that I have fully informed my client of the nature of his right to be present at trial, as well as the consequences of allowing the trial to proceed in his absence. Once again, my client acknowledged his understanding of the process and further directed me to proceed, in absentia, with the presentation of the defense."

On January 3, 1996, at the outset of jury selection, counsel informed the court that he had "consulted with Mr. Tortorici, as late as this morning," and that defendant still wished to waive his right to be present throughout the course of the entire trial. The court questioned defendant as follows:

"THE COURT: Mr. Tortorici * * * your attorney has indicated to me that you do not wish to be present during the jury selection, which will occur today, and during this trial, which will occur in the next week to ten days. Is that your position, Mr. Tortorici?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is, Judge.

"THE COURT: Do you understand that you have a constitutional right to be present at both this jury selection and the trial proper?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, that is correct.

"THE COURT: And do you understand that it would be my intention, if I grant Mr. Lynch's request that you be removed from the courtroom in a few moments, do you understand that jury selection will continue in your absence and that the trial will continue in your absence?

"THE DEFENDANT: I am aware.

"THE COURT: [Explaining that defendant can change his mind and decide to be present later in the proceedings] Do you understand that point, Mr. Tortorici?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. * * *

"[THE PEOPLE]: * * * [The] People would ask that the record be clear that the defendant understands exactly what he's waiving and his ability to assist in his own defense, and that it's clear on the record that he has discussed this defense with Mr. Lynch and that is his desire at this time.

"THE COURT: Mr. Tortorici, I have asked you earlier, and I will reask it. All of these matters that you're waiving at this point, your right to be present, your right to consult with Mr. Lynch, your right to look at those jurors, your right to speak to Mr. Lynch at every stage of this proceeding, do you realize that if I waive your appearance, you won't be able to participate in that regard?

"THE DEFENDANT: Let me make this clear, please: This trial, the bad memory, it's a nuisance to me. I want to have as little to do with these proceedings as possible.

"THE COURT: Okay * * * you understand [Mr. Lynch is] going to proceed in your absence on your behalf? * * *

"THE DEFENDANT: I understand."

The court granted defendant's motion to waive his right to be present, and informed defendant that he could change his mind and be present at any time in the future. On every day of the eight-day trial, at the beginning of the day's proceedings, the court asked defense counsel whether he had conferred with defendant and whether defendant still wished to be absent from the proceedings. Counsel responded in the affirmative every day.

On December 29, 1995, in order to rebut the defense that defendant was not responsible for his actions by reason of mental disease or defect (see, Penal Law § 40.15), the People moved for an order directing defendant to submit to an examination pursuant to CPL 250.10(3). ² The purpose of the examination was to determine "whether or not this defendant, at the time of the crime, lacked responsibility due to mental disease or defect." The motion was granted, and defendant was examined by Dr. Lawrence Siegel on January 4, 1996, for approximately one hour.

Three days later, the parties received Dr. Siegel's nine-page report of his meeting with defendant. In the report, Dr. Siegel stated that he was unable to assess defendant's mental state at the time of the offense, but opined that defendant was "incapable of rational participation in court proceedings" and "not fit to proceed to trial." According to the report, defendant at times displayed delusional, irrational behavior during the examination, and was often hard to understand. When Dr. Siegel focused defendant on ...